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1. Introduction
During the last years and especially during the course of the financial crises, economics
has been criticized for being agnostic about real world problems. There seems to be a
consensus in media that the theoretical strand of economics as a whole lacks the con-
nection to empirical applications and can thus not provide any policy recommendation.
In particular, the models of the economic profession are criticized for relying on assump-
tions about human characteristics that do not replicate observed behavior. The derived
implications may thus have no empirical value, or even worse lead to wrong insights. A
closer connection of the theoretical solutions to economic problems and their empirical
validation has two advantages. Firstly, it leads to a better comprehension of the underly-
ing determinants of human behavior. There may either arise supporting or contradicting
evidence with respect to the corresponding assumptions about preferences. This in turn
leads to a sound understanding which characteristics play a crucial role in the analyzed
situation. Secondly, it helps to filter those models that yield reliable predictions and can
thus be used to derive policy advice.
This dissertation tackles three questions theoretically and empirically. First, why do non
binding default options influence the behavior of consumers? Second, does contractual
incompleteness cause labor market segmentation and unemployment? And third, how
should democratic institutions be drafted to foster the quality of political leaders? This
approach unifies both a clear cut and concise derivation of hypotheses and an immediate
empirical validation of the results. Hence, it ensures an instant relation between the
theoretical solution of the considered problems and real world data.
In the first chapter we study how non binding default options influence the behavior
of consumers. In any decision environment a default option specifies which alternative is
implemented if no active decision is taken by the agent. Although seemingly irrelevant
for the behavior of rational consumers, choices are influenced by default options in a wide
array of applications (Johnson and Goldstein 2003, Madrian and Shea 2001, Levav et al.
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2010). We first provide a theoretical framework to analyze when decision makers should
rationally follow default options instead of making active choices. We model decision-
making in environments with default options as strategic interaction between a policy
maker and decision makers. Our model focuses on two key dimensions that affect behavior
of both parties in equilibrium. First, choices of policy makers and decision makers are
influenced by the degree of alignment of their interests. Second, the strength of default
effects depends on the parties’ relative level of information about the decision environment
and decision makers’ optimal choices.
We test the key predictions of our model in a laboratory experiment exogenously varying
these two key dimensions. We find supportive evidence that strategic incentives as well as
the level of information affect behavior of policy makers and decision makers. Our findings
also provide insights for the evaluation of“libertarian paternalistic”policy interventions as
well as consumer protection regulation. Participants in our experiment seem to understand
the arising conflict of interest and tailor their decisions accordingly, taking into account
the alignment of interests as well as the relative level of information. Hence, defaults are
not harmful to those that have a sound understanding which decision alternative is best
for them, while improving the decision quality of less informed agents.
The second chapter provides evidence that two important features of labor markets—
the existence of involuntary unemployment, and the segmentation of markets according
to firms offering “good” and “bad” jobs—may have a common underlying cause. In partic-
ular, in the prevalent case that contracts are incomplete, the implicit contracting strate-
gies adopted by firms may simultaneously generate involuntary unemployment, and labor
market segmentation. To causally identify the impact of contractual incompleteness on
(endogenous) unemployment and market segmentation, we implemented experimental la-
bor markets differing in the absence or presence of verifiable effort and complete contracts.
We show that involuntary unemployment is much higher when third-party contract en-
forcement is absent. Moreover, we show that the necessity to provide implicit performance
incentives can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn
similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions,
and exert less effort, than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs.
The third chapter investigates the effects of power concentrating institutions on the
quality of political selection, i.e., the voters’ capacities to empower competent politicians.
In our model, two candidates compete in an election. They can either propose a risky
reform or the riskless status quo. Only able candidates can implement a reform that
increases ex ante welfare. Candidates are privately informed about their abilities and
motivated by welfare considerations as well as the spoils of office.
In equilibrium, a reform proposal is associated with high ability and thus increases
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electoral prospects. As a consequence, variations in power concentration involve a tradeoff.
On the one hand, higher concentration of power enables the voters’ preferred politician
to enforce larger parts of his agenda. On the other hand, more power concentration leads
to more mimicking by low able candidates, due to increased electoral stakes. We find
that full power concentration is desirable if and only if politicians are strongly driven by
welfare considerations. If politicians are mainly motivated by the spoils of office, on the
contrary, some dispersion of power is optimal.
Additionally, we find that the results of an empirical analysis are in line with this the-
oretical prediction. In a sample of modern democratic countries we study the interaction
effect of power concentration and office motivation of politicians on GDP growth. We
find that power-dispersing institutions have positive effects on economic growth only in
countries in which voters believe that their representatives are mainly driven by private
interests. In countries with a more positive attitude towards the political leaders, in
contrast, power concentration yields higher GDP growth.
This thesis has benefited of comments from numerous people including seminar and
conference participants as well as journal referees and editors. The first chapter has
jointly been developed with Steffen Altmann and Armin Falk and is based on the working
paper with the same name. The second chapter builds upon on a joint paper with Steffen
Altmann, Armin Falk and David Huffman. An earlier version of this paper was circulated
under the title: ”Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation”.
The third chapter stems form joint work with Emanuel Hansen and Gert Po¨nitzsch and
is based on the working paper: ”Political Selection and the Concentration of Political
Power”.
2. Information and Incentives as
Driving Forces of Default Effects
2.1. Introduction
A substantial body of empirical research has shown that non-binding default options
strongly affect consumption and savings decisions. Default effects have been documented,
for instance, in enrollment and contribution decisions in retirement saving plans (Madrian
and Shea 2001, Choi et al. 2004), choices of insurance contracts (Johnson et al. 1993), car
purchases (Levav et al. 2010), or consent to postmortem organ donations (Johnson and
Goldstein 2003, Abadie and Gay 2006). Based on these empirical findings, a number of
scholars have argued that defaults could be a powerful instrument of “libertarian paternal-
ism”(Sunstein 2012b, Camerer et al. 2003). Since they do not restrict choice sets, defaults
could help ill-informed individuals making better decisions, without distorting behavior of
better informed agents. In this paper, we argue that both, the strength of default effects
as well as their influence on agents’ welfare fundamentally depend on the intentions of the
default setter, and the agents’ information about the decision environment.
We provide a theoretical framework to study the influence of these two factors on the
behavior of default setters and decision makers. Our model is based on the premise that
default specifications as well as individuals’ choices are outcomes of a strategic interac-
tion between a default-setter and decision makers: a default setter (“principal”) interacts
with a population of decision makers (“agents”). Both the principal and the agents have
incomplete private information about which of the available choices is optimal for the
agents’ welfare. In particular, both parties may be uncertain about the preferences of
the agent, the exact consequences of the decision or an underlying state of the world.
We assume that agents dispose of different levels of information quality according to the
decision environment.
The model shows that the alignment of interest as well as the relative level of information
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affect default specifications and the strength of default effects. First, the behavior of
default setters and decision makers depends on how closely their interests are aligned. In
principle, the default option may convey the principal’s information about the optimal
choice for agents. In any Pareto-efficient equilibrium, defaults are more informative, if the
principal is more benevolent towards a given population of agents. Defaults specified by a
fully benevolent default setter, for instance, always truthfully reveal her beliefs about the
best decision for the agents. In contrast, defaults specified by a fully selfish default setter
convey no information (“babbling”). Conversely, the reaction of rational agents to a default
option depends on its informative value, and is therefore related to the principal’s level
of benevolence. Second, the model predicts that default effects differ across subgroups of
the population: when defaults are at odds with the decision makers’ information, agents
are more prone to follow defaults, the lower their private information quality is.
In the second part of the paper, we test the key predictions of our model in a laboratory
experiment. As a workhorse, we use a simple binary-choice paradigm in which an agent
has to decide whether a set of nine cards, which can be either red or black, contains
more red cards or more black cards. The ex-ante likelihood that a given set of cards
contains more cards of a given color is 0.5. Before making choices, the principal and the
agent receive independent and informative signals on the agent’s payoffs from the two
available choice options. The principal selects one of the options as default option, and
the agent can accept the default or opt out. We exogenously vary whether preferences
of the principals are (i) fully aligned, (ii) partially aligned, or (iii) misaligned with those
of the agents (FUL, PAR, and MIS treatment, respectively). Within each treatment, we
additionally vary the relative level of information of principals and agents. In particular,
there are always some agents who are better informed than the principal, and some agents
whose information quality is below that of principals.
Our empirical results support the notion that strategic incentives as well as the level of
information are crucial determinants of behavior for default setters and decision makers.
First, defaults truthfully reveal principals’ information in 98% of cases in FUL, but only
in 75% of cases in PAR and in 56% in MIS. Benevolent principals, thus, select informative
defaults, while defaults specified by fully selfish principals barely convey any information.
Second, agents are substantially more likely to accept defaults that are chosen by more
benevolent principals, with 90%, 74%, and 58% of agents accepting defaults in FUL,
PAR, and MIS, respectively. Third, agents’ reaction to defaults strongly depends on the
quality of their personal information. In FUL and PAR, agents with low and intermediate
levels of information strongly rely on the information transmitted through default options.
At the same time, decisions of agents with superior information are barely affected by
default options in either of the treatments. Well-informed agents almost always opt out
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when the default is in conflict to their own information. Finally, our results suggest that
defaults of (partially) benevolent default setters can in fact enhance the aggregate quality
of individual decisions. While choices of well-informed agents are not distorted by default
options, agents with lower levels of information attain higher payoffs by accepting default
specifications. However, we also find that the effects on welfare are ambigious, if the
default setter is fully selfish. While well informed agents are still not affected by default
specifications, those with intermediate information seem to follow defaults to frequently,
thereby suffering a welfare loss.
Conventional wisdom holds that default options should be irrelevant for the behavior of
rational agents as long as the costs of opting out are trivial (see, e.g., Thaler and Sunstein
2003, Schwartz and Scott 2003). This perspective is based upon the assumption that
defaults do not convey any information. In contrast, we suggest that defaults arise from a
strategic interaction of a default setter and a population of agents. Rational agents should
therefore follow defaults whenever the informational quality of the default is sufficiently
high. The idea that defaults are behaviorally relevant since they are perceived as im-
plicit recommendation of the default setter has informally been made in the psychological
literature that studies the foundations of default effects (Johnson and Goldstein 2003,
McKenzie et al. 2006). McKenzie et al. (2006) as well as Tannenbaum (2011) provide
evidence from vignette surveys and questionnaires supporting the notion that consumers
stick to defaults in order to follow the default setter’s recommendation. However, Brown
and Krishna (2004) have argued that customers might be skeptical about defaults set by
profit maximizing firms and, as a consequence, rely more heavily on active choices. We
provide a formal framework that addresses both points of view. It shows that the infor-
mational content of default options, and the extent to which rational consumers account
for this information both depend on the degree of alignment of interests of default setters
and decision makers.
Several further reasons why defaults could influence behavior have been discussed in
the literature (see Sunstein 2012a). These include status-quo effects and loss aversion
(Kahneman et al. 1991, Sunstein 2002), pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of opting out
(Schwartz and Scott 2003, Thaler and Sunstein 2003), quasi-hyperbolic discounting and
individuals’ tendency to postpone active decisions (Madrian and Shea 2001, Carroll et al.
2009), or perceptual limitations of decision makers (Caplin and Martin 2011, Caplin and
Martin 2012). All of these papers show that psychological motives can explain default
effects in a variety of contexts. However, these motives are often context specific. The
channel we introduce in this paper, in contrast, is inherent in every interaction with
a specified default independently of the psychological motives at play. A loss averse
consumer, for example, should take his experience and his knowledge of the decision
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environment into account, when choosing whether to stay with a default option or to opt
out. Even, if consumers tend to postpone decisions, they should consider the intentions
of the default setter in the corresponding choice setting. These aspects have largely
been neglected in most of the empirical studies on defaults that have assessed decision-
making with default options mainly from an individual-choice perspective. We abstract
from the decision context and psychological motives. However, our modeling approach
is flexible enough to be subsequently enriched by these factors. Therefore, we provide a
framework that allows to study the interaction of these alternative factors with incentives
and information in shaping the strength of default effects.
Our results also inform the discussion on the scope of libertarian paternalistic policy
interventions (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, Camerer et al. 2003, Glaeser 2005). One of the
most important concerns against libertarian paternalism is precisely the fear that con-
sumers do not react optimally towards default setters’ incentives and information, and
thus accept defaults that are against their best interest. Participants in our experiment
seem to understand the differences in the informational quality of defaults pretty well,
and tailor their reactions accordingly. In particular, the decisions of well informed partici-
pants are not distorted by the presence of default options. At the same time, participants
with less information benefit from defaults, if specified by a principal with (partially)
aligned interests. Overall, defaults may enhance welfare, if decision makers are aware of
the intentions of the default setter and the relative levels of information. However, our
empirical results also show some important deviations from this pattern. In particular,
agents with intermediate information quality seem to follow defaults too frequently when
specified by default setters with misaligned preferences. This suggests that a high level
of transparency and a sound understanding of default setters’ information and strate-
gic incentives are crucial to ensure that consumers react optimally to default options.
Policies that promote such transparency—such as information disclosure requirements—
are therefore important for protecting consumers from making mistakes in environments
where firms or policy makers use default options.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our
model and derive testable implications for the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 outlines the
design and procedures of the experiment. In Section 2.4 we present the empirical results,
and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. The model
In what follows, we provide a framework to study the strategic interaction between a
default setter (“principal”) and a population of decision makers (“agents”). Building on
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Crawford and Sobel (1982), we focus on two dimensions that are inherent in any interac-
tion between a default setter and decision makers. First, we analyze how default-setting
and decision making are affected by the strategic incentives of the interacting parties.
That is, we aim at providing comparative statics on how alignment of incentives between
principals and agents influence default specifications, and agents’ tendency to stick to the
default. Second, we analyze how asymmetric information between principals and agents
influences decision making. In particular, the principal and all agents are heterogeneous in
the quality of their information according to which decision alternative maximizes agents’
welfare. This heterogeneity enables us to study how the relative level of information be-
tween a decision maker and the default setter shapes default effects. All proofs are found
in appendix A.1.1.
2.2.1. Model setup
In the model one default-setting principal interacts with a population of agents. These
are assumed to be rational decision makers who choose an action z in order to maximize
their utility UA(z, θ), which is strictly concave in z for all θ. The state of the world, θ, can
take value θh or θl, which determine the preferences of the agents over the choice variable.
More precisely, we assume that the partial derivative with respect to z of UA(z, θl) is
smaller than the corresponding derivative of UA(z, θh) for all z, i.e, higher zs are optimal
if the agent puts more probability weight on θh. The action z is a discrete choice variable
z ∈ {z1, . . . , zm}. Both states of the world are equally likely and unobservable for the
agent. All players have incomplete information about the true state of the world. This
may be due to a complex decision environment, unclear preferences of the agents or
uncertainty about an underlying variable that has not been realized, yet. Agents dispose
of different levels of information quality. In particular, we assume that the population of
agents is distributed according to f(x), with full support over [1
2
, 1], where x is the signal
strength of agent x. Agents’ signals are denoted by σ ∈ {σl, σh} and have conditional
distribution p(σl|θl) = p(σh|θh) = x.
The principal as well possesses private information about the optimal decision for the
agents. Her signal is drawn independently from the ones of the agents and denoted by
ρ ∈ {ρl, ρh} with quality q = p(ρl|θl) = p(ρh|θh) ∈ [
1
2
, 1]. Consequently, the principal is
always better informed about the state of the world than some agents, and worse than
others. While the principal cannot influence the agents’ decision directly, she can choose
a default option d ∈ {d1, . . . , dn} prior to the agents’ decision. The utility of the principal
is the weighted sum of the utility of the agent and a term, b(z), that captures a potential
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conflict of interests between the principal and the agents:
UP (θ, z) = µUA(θ, z) + b(z).
The parameter µ describes the benevolence of the principal. For small µ, the principal
cares only little about the agents’ well being and focuses more strongly on her private
interests. For large µ, however, preferences of the principal and the agents are strongly
aligned. A firm that anticipates a repeated long run interaction with the consumer may
for example weigh consumer satisfaction more strongly than a firm that interacts only
once with each consumer. Similarly, the alignment of interests between a government and
agents may be stronger, than it may be in the case of a customer and a profit maximizing
company. To put structure on the preferences of the principal, we assume an upward bias
in the sense that b(z) is strictly increasing in z.
The game is divided into four periods. In period 1 nature draws the state of the
world, θ, and all private signals. Moreover, all agents and the principal observe their
corresponding signal. In period 2 the principal decides on the default option d. In period
3, the default is transmitted to the agents, and they decide individually on which choice
z they implement. Dependent on the choice and the true state of the world, payoffs for
agents and the principal are realized in period 4. In this setup, a strategy of the principal
is a mapping
sP : ρ→ (p(d1), . . . , p(dn)) ∈ [0, 1]
n
which specifies the probability of every default to be chosen for all possible signals ρ. A
strategy of the principal, thus, determines the correlation between any default and her
signal. For any combination of a private signal σ and default d, agents choose z. A pure
strategy1 of an agent with signal strength x is thus a mapping
sxA : (σ, d)→ z ∈ {z1, . . . , zm}.
Define s to be a strategy profile, consisting of a strategy of the principal and the strategy
of every agent. As a solution concept we apply Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, all players
maximize their utility at any information set occurring with positive probability given
their type and the strategies of all opponents.
2.2.2. Equilibrium analysis
In the following analysis we concentrate on equilibria in which all defaults are played with
positive probability. This is without loss of generality, since every equilibrium can be
1In principle an agent may be indifferent between different actions z and mix over the actions in equi-
librium. Nevertheless, the set of agents that are indifferent between at least two messages has mass
zero. Hence, extending the analysis to mixed strategies does not allow for any additional insights.
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replicated by an output equivalent equilibrium without out of equilibrium defaults. If there
is an off equilibrium path default, it is always possible to construct a principal’s strategy
which mixes over this default and an equilibrium default such that both convey the same
information. Consequently, the best response of the agent is to treat them identically.
Since the principal is, thus, indifferent between both defaults, the new strategy profile
constitutes an output equivalent equilibrium. More precisely, the ex ante probability that
a particular utility outcome for the agents and the principal is realized is identical.
Lemma 2.1. For any Bayesian equilibrium s there exists an output equivalent Bayesian
equilibrium in which all defaults are played with positive probability.
Note that any Bayesian equilibrium without out of equilibrium messages also constitutes
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, agents choose action z to maximize the expected
utility E(UA|d, ρ, x) at any information set. Once an agent received his signal and the
principal has decided upon a default, agent x solves
max
z
Eθ(UA|d, σ, x) = p(θl|d, σ, x)UA(z, θl) + p(θh|d, σ, x)UA(z, θh).
Before the agents decide on z, the principal can influence them by choosing a default
option to ensure a more favorable outcome to herself. Consider a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium with strategy profile s. The principal’s expected payoff from playing default k in
information set i associated with signal ρi, is given by∫ 1
1
2
p(θl, σl|ρi, x)UP (s
x
A(σl, dk), θl) + p(θh, σl|ρi, x)UP (s
x
A(σl, dk), θh)
+ p(θl, σh|ρi, x)UP (s
x
A(σh, dk), θl) + p(θh, σh|ρi, x)UP (s
x
A(σh, dk), θh)dF (x).
Whenever the principal receives a high signal, her preferences are aligned with those of
the agents. This is true independently of the level of µ, since we assumed an upward bias
of the principal. In this case, a higher z maximizes both, her selfish interests b(z) and the
utility of the agents. Hence, the principal chooses the default which induces the highest
z. As a consequence, all messages that are played with positive probability after a high
signal must induce the same z and are qualitatively identical. The remaining defaults
reveal that the principal received a low signal. According to this distinction we bisect the
set of defaults {d0, . . . , dn}. First, those defaults that are exclusively played after a low
signal {d0, . . . dk−1} = Dl, and second default options {dk . . . , dn} = Dh which are played
with positive probability after a high signal.
Lemma 2.2. In every equilibrium the principal will send at most two qualitatively different
messages.
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Using the lemma we are able to describe the information transmission by the principal
by a single parameter c = p(d0|ρl) + · · · + p(dk−1|ρl). The larger c, the more often the
principal truthfully reveals her signal after a low signal, leading to more information
transmission. Note that the meaning of every default arises endogenously in equilibrium
and is not exogenously given. Clearly, all permutations of messages also support an
equilibrium. We name all defaults played with positive probability after a high signal a
high default (dh) and those that are exclusively played after a low signal a low default
(dl).
2.2.3. Principal’s level of benevolence
The decision of rational agents to follow defaults specified by a principal is likely to
depend on the principal’s level of benevolence. A principal with opposing interests will
use his information to extract a higher rent for herself. In contrast, a more benevolent
principal will specify a default that is more trustworthy for the agents and should thus
more likely be followed. In the extreme case of full alignment of preferences, the principal
has incentives to truthfully transmit all of his information.
Proposition 2.1. Fixing everything else, there exists a µ¯ such that for all µ > µ¯ the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium exhibits complete information transmission. Moreover, there
exists a µ such that for all µ < µ defaults exhibit no informational content in equilibrium.
If preferences are not fully aligned, the principal may choose to conceal some of her
information. While the existence of equilibria is still clear for this case there may emerge
multiple equilibria exhibiting information transmission. To rank those, we employ the
Pareto-efficiency criterion. Agents always prefer an equilibrium corresponding to a larger
c to one with less information transmission, since more information yields a better decision
and thus a higher expected payoff. The same is true for the principal, if she receives a
high signal, because preferences are aligned in this case. If the principal receives a low
signal she is indifferent between all mixed equilibria. To see this, suppose the principal
chooses a message from the set Dl in a mixed equilibrium. Since this action reveals her
signal, the inherent information and the expected payoff associated with a low default are
equal in all mixed equilibria. Furthermore, the principal is indifferent between a low and a
high default. Hence, the expected payoff after a high default must also be identical across
mixed equilibria. Overall, the principal prefers the mixed equilibrium with the highest
information transmission rate. If the expected payoff following a high default is larger
than the one corresponding to a low default for full information transmission, the principal
clearly prefers the full information equilibrium to all mixed equilibria. We conclude that
the equilibria featuring the highest information transmission rate are Pareto-efficient.
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Lemma 2.3. Consider two equilibria with corresponding c1 < c2. Then the equilibrium
corresponding to c2 Pareto-dominates the one belonging to c1.
In the following, we focus on the question how a Pareto-efficient equilibrium depends
on the model’s main parameters. Define cpd(µ) to be the information transmission rate
in any Pareto-dominant equilibrium. As argued above, µ represents the degree to which
principal’s and agents’ preferences are aligned. For increasing µ, any Pareto-efficient
equilibrium becomes more favorable for the agents.
Proposition 2.2. cpd(µ) is weakly increasing in µ. Agents internalize this effect and
exhibit more pronounced reactions to defaults, i.e, sxA(σi, dh) is weakly increasing and
sxA(σi, dl) is weakly decreasing in µ.
In any equilibrium with full information transmission this is trivially the case. Consider
the case of a Pareto-dominant equilibrium with a mixed strategy of the principal. Then
she is indifferent between specifying a high or a low default in response to a low signal:∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ, dh))− UP (θ, s
x
A(σ, dl))|x, ρl]dF (x) = 0.
With increasing µ the principal’s preferences become more strongly aligned to those of the
agents. As a consequence, her utility of a truthful report increases relative to the utility
of concealing information, hence, the difference above is decreasing in µ for all x. This
effect is offset along equilibrium path by a higher transmission rate c. While the second
part of the difference does not change with c - playing a default from the set Dl always
conveys the same information and thus induces the same action z-, the first part must
be increasing in c. We show in the appendix, that if this were not the case, there would
always exist an equilibrium with a higher transmission rate which is a contradiction to the
assumption of being in a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. In general, the proposition implies
that a higher level of benevolence leads to a higher informational content of the defaults,
and thus ceteris paribus to a higher incentive for agents to adapt their choice towards
the default. In particular, in the case of a conflicting private signal and default, agents
weigh the default more strongly. Hence, default effects are stronger in a given population
of agents if interests of the population and the default setter are more aligned.
2.2.4. The quality of information
Differences in agents’ knowledge about the decision environment are an intuitive expla-
nation why the stickiness of defaults might differ across subgroups of the population.
Intuitively, agents that are less familiar with the choice environment rely more heavily on
the information entailed in the default option. In our model, such differences in agents’
information are captured by the agents’ signal strength, x = p(θl|σl) = p(θh|σh).
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Proposition 2.3. In equilibrium, the strategies of any two agents with x1 < x2 exhibit
the following properties:
sx1A (σl, di) ≥ s
x2
A (σl, di) s
x1
A (σh, di) ≤ s
x2
A (σh, di) for i ∈ {l, h}
Agents are less susceptible to adapt their decision towards a given default if the quality
of their personal information increases. The relationship between agents’ knowledge and
the degree of default adherence is most clearly seen if the default and the agent’s private
signal are in conflict. For instance, the strategy sxA(σl, dk), which describes agents’ behav-
ior after a high default and a low personal signal, is decreasing in the information quality
x. Consequently, agents with more informative low signals shift “further” away from the
high default and rely more strongly on their own information about the optimal decision.
2.3. Design of the experiment
2.3.1. The game
In the experiment, we aim at testing the key comparative statics of the model empiri-
cally. Firstly, we endogenously vary the alignment of interests between default setters and
decision makers. We consider three different situations in which the preferences of the
default setter and the agents are (i) fully aligned, (ii) partially aligned, or (iii) misaligned
(in what follows, we refer to the three conditions as the “FUL”, “PAR”, and “MIS” treat-
ment, respectively). Secondly, for a given level of benevolence, our empirical approach
ensures controlled variation in the relative level of information between the default setter
and the agents. Some agents are better informed than the principal about which decision
maximizes their payoff, while others are less informed.
As a workhorse for implementing these treatment conditions, we use a simple paradigm
in which one principal interacts with one agent. In each period, the agent has to decide
whether a set of nine cards, which can either be red or black, contains more red cards
or more black cards. Each card in each period is drawn independently with probabilities
p(Red) = p(Black) = 0.5, i.e., the ex-ante likelihood that a given set of cards contains
more cards of a given color is 0.5. Before making choices, the principal and the agent
receive independent signals about the composition of the current set of cards.
The principal receives the signal via a message on her screen. The message can either
indicate that the current set of cards contains “more black cards”, or “more red cards”.
The signal is private information of the principal. Her signal strength, however, is common
knowledge and held constant at q = 0.8. Whether a principal receives a correct or wrong
signal in a given period is determined randomly and independently between principals,
periods, and sessions.
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Agents receive information about the number of red and black cards in the current
set, by a subset of cards, which is privately revealed to the agent. In each period, a
coin flip determines whether the first two or the first five cards in the set are uncovered
for a given agent.2 The signal-generating mechanism for agents ensures that we obtain
controlled variation of the information quality for different types of agents. Since each of
the revealed cards for the agent is black or red with probability 0.5, we obtain five different
levels of signal strengths. The resulting distribution of agents’ signal qualities is reported
in Table 2.1. Since the principal’s signal strength is always 0.8, the agent is informed worse
than the principal in about 56% of cases (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.1); in about 25% of
cases he has about the same signal strength (Column 3 in Table 2.1), and in 19% of cases
(Columns 4 and 5), the agent is better informed than the principal. As a within-subject
dimension, we can test whether agent types 1–5 systematically differ in their behavior,
holding principals’ information quality and benevolence constant (Proposition 2).
Agent Type 1 2 3 4 5
Signal Quality 0.5 0.69 0.77 0.94 1.00
Occurrence Probability 0.25 0.313 0.25 0.156 0.031
Example 1 black 3 black 2 black 4 black 5 black
1 red 2 red 0 red 1 red 0 red
Table 2.1.: Distribution of agent’s signals.
Participants in the experiment are not shown Table 2.1, but the signal-generating mech-
anism for principals and agents is common knowledge. In particular, the principal knows
the procedure how the agent is informed, and consequently the distribution of signal qual-
ities for the agent. However, she is not informed about the number or colors of the cards
that are revealed to the agents. Hence, the principal essentially plays against a population
of agents as depicted in Table 2.1, although principals and agents are matched one-to-one
in a given period.
After having received her signal, the principal selects the default option for the current
period. She can either specify “more red cards” or “more black cards” as the default. In a
next step, the agent is informed about the default option. He can then accept the default
or opt out and take an active decision. To accept or change the default option in the
experiment, the agent has to press the respective button displayed on his screen. In case
the agent accepts the default option, the selected default is implemented as final decision
for both the principal and the agent. If the agent presses “opt out”, a new screen pops
2Figure A.1 in appendix A.1.2 depicts an example of an agent’s information screen.
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up on which the agent can (actively) choose between “more red cards” and “more black
cards” as her ultimate decision for this period.3 After the agent has taken his decision, he
is asked to state his perceived certainty that his choice was correct on an 8-points Likert
scale. In a final stage of the game, principal and agent are provided with a feedback
screen, on which the entire set of cards for the current period is revealed. Furthermore,
players are informed about the agent’s final decision and the resulting payoffs for both
players.
2.3.2. Treatments and payoffs
Agents earn points, if their decision in a given period is correct (i.e., the chosen color
matches the color that occurs more frequently in their current set of cards). In each of
the three treatments, payoffs for agents were calculated as follows:
piA =
{
50 points if decision correct
0 if decision wrong
Payoff functions for principals differed across treatment conditions. In treatment FUL,
principals’ payoffs are perfectly aligned with those of the agents. Thus, a principal receives
50 points if the agent’s decision in a given period is correct, and 0 otherwise:
piFULP =
{
50 points if A’s decision correct
0 if A’s decision wrong
In contrast, principals in the treatment with misaligned preferences (MIS), receive 50
points if and only if the agent’s decision in a given period is “more red cards”. They
receive 0 points if the agent’s decision is “more black cards”:
piMISP =
{
50 points if A’s decision “red”
0 if A’s decision “black”
This payoff function resembles a principal intending to direct the decision of the agent
towards one particular alternative, without taking the welfare consequences for the agent
into account, i.e, a fully selfish principal. To induce partial benevolence, each matching
group in our third treatment, PAR, consisted half of benevolent and half of selfish prin-
cipals with payoff functions piFULP and pi
MIS
P , respectively. Agents are not informed about
which type of principal they are matched with in a given period. From agents’ (ex ante)
perspective, this treatment is thus equivalent to interacting with a partially benevolent
principal.
3We neither impose a time limit for principals setting the default nor for agents making their final
decision. This procedure ensures that the cost of opting out of the default is minimal, while at the
same time avoiding mistakes due to time pressure or accidental clicks.
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2.3.3. Parameters and procedures
Overall, we conducted 12 sessions of the experiment; four sessions for each treatment. In
each of the sessions, we had 12 principals and 12 agents that interacted for 50 periods.
Subjects within a session were divided into two matching groups with 12 participants each.
Principals and agents within a given matching group were randomly rematched between
periods, yielding 8 independent observations per treatment for the non-parametric tests
reported below. Points earned throughout the experiment were converted at an exchange
rate of 100 points = 1 Euro. Overall, sessions lasted about 120 minutes, and subjects
earned on average 24.32 euros (about 32 USD at the time of the experiment), including a
showup fee of 4 euros.
All sessions were carried out in the BonnEconLab, the laboratory for economic exper-
iments at the University of Bonn. The experiment was computerized using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and subjects were recruited with the online recruitment sys-
tem by Greiner (2003). A total of 288 subjects (96 in each treatment) took part in the
experiment. Subjects were mainly undergraduate university students from all majors, and
participated in only one of the treatment conditions. To ensure common knowledge of the
rules and structure of the experiment, a summary of the instructions for the respective
treatment was read out aloud at the beginning of each session. Participants then received
detailed written information about the experiment.4 The experiment started only after
all participants had answered several control questions correctly.
2.3.4. Hypotheses
Applying our model to the setup and parameters of the experiment yields the following
predictions for differences in behavior between treatments and agent types.
Hypothesis 2.1. Principals’ propensity to truthfully reveal their signal through defaults
is highest in FUL, intermediate in PAR, and lowest in MIS.
In particular, principals in FUL should always truthfully reveal their signal. In con-
trast, defaults specified by fully selfish principals (MIS) should convey no information (see
Proposition 2.1). Since 50% of principals in PAR are benevolent and 50 % are selfish, the
truthfulness of defaults in this treatment should lie in between MIS and FUL.
Hypothesis 2.2. Agents’ aggregate propensity to accept defaults should be highest in
FUL, intermediate in PAR, and lowest in MIS.
4A translation of the verbal summary and the instructions is available upon request.
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This aggregate hypothesis is derived from a more specific sub-hypothesis. Proposition
2.2 implies that the strength of default effects is weakly increasing in the benevolence of
the principal. Applying Proposition 2.2 to the parameters of the experiment it predicts
that agents’ propensity to accept a default that is in conflict with their private information
should be strictly higher in FUL than in PAR, and strictly higher in PAR than in MIS for
“low-information types” (type 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2.1).5 In contrast, the model predicts
no treatment difference in default adherence after conflicting signals for “high-information
types” (type 4 and 5 in Table 2.1). Similarly the application of Proposition 2.3 to each
of the treatments yields the following hypothesis for behavioral differences in the within-
subjects dimension (behavior of low-information vs. high-information types within a given
treatment):
Hypothesis 2.3. In case of conflicting signals, low-information agents should be strictly
more likely to accept defaults than high-information agents in FUL and PAR. There should
be no difference in acceptance rates between low-information and high-information types
in MIS.
Finally, the above predictions for differences in behavior yield the following hypothesis
for differences in the overall quality of agents’ decisions as measured by the resulting
monetary payoffs.
Hypothesis 2.4. For low-information types, the quality of decisions in FUL should be
strictly higher than in PAR which in turn should be strictly higher than in MIS. The
quality of decisions for high-information types should not be affected by principals’ level
of benevolence (FUL=PAR=MIS).
2.4. Results
In this section, we present the results of the experiment. We first summarize the behavior
of principals and analyze whether the informational content of defaults differs across
treatments (Hypothesis 1). We then focus on the agents, and study how agents react to
defaults in FUL, PAR, and MIS (Hypothesis 2). In a next step, we analyze differences in
agents’ behavior, depending on their relative level of information (Hypothesis 3). Finally,
we compare the quality of decisions for the different types of agents across treatments
(Hypothesis 4).
5Since some predictions for individual types of agents who have lower signal quality than the principal
do not differ, we jointly denote types 1, 2, 3 from Table 2.1 as “low-information types” for ease of
exposition. Types 4 and 5 are denoted as “high-information types”, accordingly.
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2.4.1. How do principals set defaults?
Figure 2.1 summarizes principals’ behavior in the different treatments. The figure depicts
the average frequency of defaults that are specified according to the private signal of
principals about the state of the world, ρ. In line with Hypothesis 1, we observe strong
treatment differences in the likelihood that defaults truthfully reveal principals’ private
signal. Fully benevolent principals (FUL) almost always reveal their signal (in 98% of
cases). In contrast, principals reveal their private signal only in 75% of cases in PAR.
Selfish principals set the default according to their private signal in only 56% of cases.
Hence, defaults in the MIS treatment convey hardly any information about the principals’
knowledge of the state of the world. The overall difference in the information quality of
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Figure 2.1.: Frequency of principals setting default according to their signal. Average
values per period in FUL, PAR, and MIS treatment.
defaults is highly significant for all pairwise treatment comparisons (Fisher-exact tests,
p < .001 for FUL vs. PAR, FUL vs. MIS, and PAR vs. MIS).6 Figure A.2 in the appendix
A.1.2 shows that principals’ default-setting strategy is relatively stable over time in all
treatments. The strong difference between treatments is already observed in the first
periods, and we find no significant time trend in either of the treatments.
Overall, principals’ behavior in the experiment matches the predictions accurately. A
small, but noteworthy exception is observed in the MIS treatment. The model predicts
that defaults set by fully selfish principals convey no information in equilibrium. That is,
6Unless otherwise noted, all non-parametric tests are based on matching-group averages. Reported
p-values are always two-sided.
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the likelihood of a principals’ signal to be red or black, should be exactly 50% indepen-
dently of the observed default. Principals’ behavior in the experiment comes close to this
prediction. However, the actual frequency of informative defaults in MIS is 56%. There
could be two potential explanations for this deviation from the model’s point predictions.
First, the higher informativeness of defaults could be explained by a failure of principals to
completely shade their private information. Second, some principals in MIS could be not
fully selfish in the sense that they deliberately provide agents with information about their
private signal. This could, for instance, be due to preferences for honesty (Charness and
Dufwenberg 2006, Erat and Gneezy 2012, Fischbacher and Heusi 2008), aversion towards
payoff inequalities (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), or other forms of social preferences. Put
differently, the true preferences of some principals might not coincide with the monetary
incentives induced in the MIS treatment.
To shed light on which of the two potential explanations is likely to drive the deviation,
we study behavior of individual principals in the MIS treatment. As a measure for the
truthfulness of reports we calculate the average frequency of a realized black default after
a principal received a black signal.7 We then estimate an OLS model with the principals’
individual frequency as dependent variable and different potential determinants. As prox-
ies for the “cognitive mistakes” explanation, we include principals’ scores in the Cognitive
Reflection Test, CRT (Frederick 2005), and principals’ final math grade in high school.8
As a proxy for the “social preference” explanation, we include the “Honesty-Humility-
Scale”, HHS—a subscale of the HEXACO personality questionnaire designed to measure
an individual’s inclination to avoid manipulation of others for personal gain (Ashton and
Lee 2009).9
Table A.1, in appendix A.1.2, shows that principals who score higher on the Honesty-
Humility-Scale have a weakly significant higher likelihood to truthfully reveal a black
signal in the MIS treatment (p=.064). In contrast, the proxies for cognitive reflection and
math abilities are not significantly related to principals’ behavior. All in all, the results
provide tentative evidence that the“too informative”defaults observed in the MIS are due
to some principals’ preferences for honest behavior, rather than due to strategic errors by
the principals.
7We concentrate on the case of black signals since principals almost unanimously select red defaults after
a red signal (in 98.6% of cases). That is, principals mostly choose to shade their private information
by always selecting “red” as the default (the overall frequency of red defaults in MAL is 93.4%).
8The CRT is a three-item questionnaire that measures an individual’s inclination to suppress a sponta-
neous, but wrong answer. High school grades range from 1-6 with 1 being the best grade.
9The HHS ranges from -60 to +40.Higher scores indicate a higher inclination to avoid manipulations.
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Figure 2.2.: Frequency of default adherence. Average values in FUL, PAR, and MIS.
2.4.2. How do agents react to defaults?
In the next step, we turn to the analysis of agents’ reactions to defaults in the different
treatments. Figure 2.2 depicts the aggregate frequencies of default adherence for agents in
FUL, PAR, and MIS. Agents accept the default specified by principals in 90% of cases in
FUL, 74% of cases in PAR, and 58% of cases in MIS. All pairwise treatment differences in
agents’ behavior are statistically significant (Fisher-exact tests, p < .001 for FUL vs. PAR,
FUL vs. MIS, and PAR vs. MIS). Figure A.3 in appendix A.1.2 depicts the frequency
of default acceptance in the different treatments over time. Again, we observe a strong
difference between treatments already in the first periods and relatively stable behavior
over time. The only treatment exhibiting a significant decrease in default acceptance over
time is the MIS treatment.10 Similar to principals’ behavior, agents match the predictions
of the theoretical model well. The aggregate treatment comparisons for agents’ default
acceptance support the comparative static predictions of our model (Hypothesis 2).
We conclude that agents account for differences in the principals’ benevolence and the
resulting differences in the informativeness of defaults on the aggregate level. This also
holds for each type of agent. The top panel of Figure 2.3 depicts the average frequency of
default acceptance for the five different types of agents in the different treatments.11 Sub-
10A linear time trend is significant at the 5% level in a probit estimation where the dependent variable
is 1 if an agent accepts the default, and 0 otherwise (p=.030, accounting for potential clustering in
standard errors on the matching-group level).
11Agents are ordered according to their signal quality. Type “A69” in Figure 2.3 are agents who received
an a signal with 69 % correlation in a given period (Type 2 in Table 2.1).
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 21
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a
g
e
n
ts
 a
c
c
e
p
ti
n
g
 d
e
fa
u
lt
A50 A69 A77 A94 A100
PARFUL
MIS
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a
g
e
n
ts
 a
c
c
e
p
ti
n
g
 d
e
fa
u
lt
A50 A69 A77 A94 A100
PARFUL
MIS
Figure 2.3.: Fraction of agents accepting the default. Upper panel: average aggregate
values for different agent types in FUL, PAR, and MIS. Bottom panel: cases
where default is in conflict with agents’ private signal; average values for
different agent types in FUL, PAR, and MIS.
stantiating our previous results, we find that the likelihood of accepting defaults increases
in the benevolence of the principal for each individual type of agent.
Next we analyze agents’ reactions to defaults that are at odds with their private signal.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 shows the behavior of the different types of agents, if they
face a default that is in conflict with their private signal (e.g., the agent observes three
black and two red cards, but a red default).12 The data depicted in the graph allow us to
directly test the sub-hypothesis implied by Proposition 2.2. In particular, we predicted
that low-information types are strictly more likely to accept defaults in FUL than in PAR
12Note that type A50 is excluded from the analysis. Since this types has no informative signal (1 red
card and 1 black card), there can be no conflicts between own signal and the default.
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after conflicting signals, and strictly more likely in PAR than in MIS. In contrast, we
expect no treatment effects for agents who have superior information than the principal.
Indeed, we find that the default adherence rate for low-information types if the default
is in conflict with their private signal is increasing in the benevolence of the principal
(Fisher-exact test for low-information types. FUL vs. PAR: p < .001, FUL vs. MIS:
p < .001, PAR vs MIS: p = .010). On the contrary, the reactions of high-information
types do not differ significantly across treatments (Fisher-exact test for high-information
types. FUL vs. PAR: p = 1.000, FUL vs. MIS: p = .619, PAR vs MIS: p = .619).
The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 also allows to test Hypothesis 3, which predicts that
high-information types are less likely to accept conflicting defaults than agents with lower
quality information when facing a (partially) benevolent default setter. This within treat-
ment effect is born out by the data (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for high-information types
vs. low-information types, p = .012 for FUL and PAR). However, the difference remains
significant when analyzing the MIS treatment, while we hypothesized that there are no
type-specific differences in behavior as a response to selfish defaults (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p = .012). The top panel of Figure 2.3 shows that the diverging reactions of
agents to conflicting defaults induce overall differences in type specific default acceptance
rates. Agents who are better informed than the principal (i.e., Type A94 and A100) are
less likely to accept defaults than agents with inferior information quality if the principal
is (partially) benevolent. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms that high-information
types behave significantly different from low-information types in both the FUL and PAR
treatment (p = .012, for FUL and PAR). When interacting with selfish principals, the
effect is less pronounced and turns out to be insignificant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = .161). This is in line with the prediction of our theoretical model: Since defaults
convey no information in a babbling equilibrium, all types of agents should merely rely
on their private signal.
Overall, the empirical results support Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 from our model.
However, we again find some deviations from the model’s predictions. In particular,
agents with low and intermediate levels of information seem to trust defaults in the MIS
treatment “too much”. This becomes most evident when looking at behavior of type
A69 and A77 in the case of conflicting signals (bottom panel of Figure 2.3). Our model
predicts that all types of agents completely ignore defaults set by a fully selfish principal.
For conflicting signals, we thus expect default acceptance rates close to zero for A69 and
A77, whereas the acceptance rates in the experiment are about 20% for both types of
agents.13
13A similar effect is observed in the PAR treatment where we observe acceptance rates of 40-50% instead
of 20-30% as predicted by our model.
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We have already seen that some principals in the MIS treatment do not behave in a fully
selfish way. That is, defaults in the MIS treatment are—on the aggregate level—not fully
uninformative from the agents’ perspective. This raises the question whether the default
acceptance rate by low-information agents that we observe is caused by “too much trust”
in selfish defaults (i.e., a mistake by low-information agents) or rather a best response to
the informational content of defaults, that agents experience during the experiment. If
agents’ choices are a best response to the behavior of principals, the experienced profits
of agents should be as least as high as in a hypothetical situation without defaults in
which agents always follow their private signal. The next section discusses, if the decision
quality of agents is positively influenced by the presence defaults.
2.4.3. Do defaults improve decisions?
In a final step of our empirical analysis, we turn to the question whether defaults in our
experiment improve the overall quality of agents’ decisions, and how this depends on the
agents’ level of information and the principals’ level of benevolence. Figure 2.4 depicts the
percentage change in the agents’ decision quality compared to a hypothetical situation in
which agents always follow their private signal. This behavior resembles a setting without
default, since agents can only adapt their decision according to their private signal. To
evaluate this situation, we take the actually realized signals and sets of cards from the
experiment. Positive values indicate that agents profited from defaults, while negative
values mean that they would have attained higher profits without default options.
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Figure 2.4.: Percentage change of agents’ decision quality compared to a hypothetical sit-
uation, in which agents always follow their signal, for different agent types
and treatments.
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For high-information types (A94, A100), figure 2.4 indicates that profits are hardly
affected by the presence of defaults independently of the alignment of preferences. This
reflects the observation that these types react appropriately to their high signal quality
and only rely on their private signal. Thus, there are little or no distortions in the decisions
of well-informed agents.
For agents with lower information quality, the extent to which default options are
welfare enhancing depends on the agent’s level of information and, more importantly,
on the benevolence of the default setter. Compared to the situation without default
specifications, we observe an unambiguously positive effect of default options in the FUL
treatment where principal’s and agents’ information are fully aligned. Agents with lower
information quality make use of the informativeness of defaults, which are set by a better
informed default setter, and thereby attain higher profits.
For the PAR and MIS treatment, our findings on the beneficial or detrimental effects
of default options for agents with low information quality are somewhat mixed. First,
we observe unambiguously positive effects on the decision quality of agents with no in-
formation (Type A50). For Type A69 who has intermediate level quality, defaults set by
partially benevolent or selfish default setters have almost no profit consequences. Their
decision quality is, on average, not distorted relative to the benchmark without default.
Finally, profits of Type A77 suggest that agents with informational levels similar to the one
of the principal do not discount the informational content of the default strong enough
to account for the misalignment of preferences14. Overall, this finding suggests that a
sound understanding of the relative quality of private and default setters’ information
and strategic incentives are crucial for agents to reap the benefits of defaults without
bearing detrimental consequences if defaults are specified by principals with misaligned
interest.
2.5. Conclusions
In the first part of this paper, we have provided a theoretical model focusing on two
key channels for behavioral consequences of non-binding default options—the strategic
incentives of default setting institutions, and the default setter’s and decision makers’
relative level of information about the decision environment. While both effects have
been discussed informally in the literature, our model provides a unifying framework for
analyzing how individual behavior and the overall strength of default effects are shaped
by both factors. We derive two testable predictions. First, default options should have
14This lack of discounting has also been documented by Cain et al. (2005), who find that agents trust
the information given by selfish advisers too strongly.
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a stronger impact on behavior, if interests of the default setter and decision makers are
more closely aligned. Second, whenever decision makers experience conflicts between their
own information about optimal choices and a default option, those with less information
are more prone to accept the default.
In the second part of the paper, we test these predictions in a laboratory experiment
that allows us to exogenously vary the parameters of interest. Overall our empirical results
match the theoretical predictions well. We find that the informational content of defaults
and, thus, the strength of default effects are increasing in the alignment of interests. In
the second dimension, we show that agents with lower information quality are indeed more
susceptible to accept default options, if these are in conflict with an agent’s individual
information.
On a more general level our analysis suggests that a more integrative perspective
on defaults is important. It ought to incorporate both, psychological factors that may
strengthen default effects like a status quo bias or present biased preference (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser 1988, Carroll et al. 2009) but also the incentives created by the strategic
interaction that is inherent in the default setting process. Our model is flexible enough to
be extended such that the interaction of these effects can be studied. Further interesting
extensions include an integration of the possibility that agents can acquire additional in-
formation (Caplin and Martin 2012), the possibility of heterogeneous preferences of agents
for a given state of the world and to allow for imperfect information about the opponents
interests.
Our findings also provide insights for the evaluation of “libertarian paternalistic” policy
interventions. In particular, they indicate that agents do take the default setter’s strategic
incentives and information into account, and condition their acceptance of default options
on both factors. This suggests that defaults might indeed only influence the part of the
population that has inferior information about making “good” decisions. At the same
time, decisions of individuals that have a sound understanding of what is the best option
for themselves are not distorted by the presence of default options. However, our empirical
results also suggest that a high level of comprehension of default setters’ information and
strategic incentives are crucial to ensure that consumers react appropriately to default
options.
3. Contractual Incompleteness,
Unemployment, and Labor
Market Segmentation
3.1. Introduction
This paper provides evidence that two important features of labor markets—the existence
of involuntary unemployment, and the segmentation of markets into firms offering “good”
and “bad” jobs to apparently similar workers—may have a common underlying cause. In
particular, both phenomena may jointly arise as a consequence of contractual incomplete-
ness in market environments in which work effort is not third-party verifiable. We also
provide evidence supporting a specific mechanism for how contractual incompleteness can
cause these two phenomena, in which the implicit incentive strategies adopted by firms
to address the contract enforcement problem play key role.
Intuitively, when effort is not verifiable, firms may adopt an implicit incentive strategy
for eliciting high work effort that involves paying relatively high wages, and condition-
ally renewing workers’ contracts based on their performance. With diminishing marginal
product of labor, however, high wage payments can make it profitable for firms to hire
fewer workers than technologically feasible, since the gains from higher overall production
might be more than offset by higher wage costs. The result of such job rationing is en-
dogenous involuntary unemployment. If a critical mass of firms rations jobs, however, a
secondary employment sector could also emerge, where firms profitably fill all vacancies
and pay relatively low wages. Such firms are able to pay lower rents, and elicit relatively
lower but non-minimal effort, because of the unemployment pressure in the market. This
might give rise to a segmented labor market in which the strategies of offering “good”
high-rent jobs and “bad” low-rent jobs are—in equilibrium—equally profitable for firms.
We show that the qualitative features of this intuition can be captured in a simple formal
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model, which builds on the classic efficiency wage frameworks by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
In order to provide empirical evidence on the causal impact of contractual incomplete-
ness on unemployment and market segmentation, we study behavior of firms and workers
in competitive experimental labor markets. All firms in our markets share the same pro-
duction technology which exhibits decreasing returns to scale from labor but ensures that
full employment is technologically efficient. In our main treatment, the Incomplete Con-
tracts treatment (IC treatment), work effort is observable to firms but not verifiable to
third parties. Firms may, however, use implicit incentives to elicit non-minimal work effort
in this treatment. In a control treatment, the Complete Contracts treatment (C treat-
ment), effort is verifiable and contracts are explicitly enforced. If a worker accepts a
contract in this treatment, he thus has to provide the contractually stipulated effort level.
Our first main empirical result is that contractual incompleteness causes a strong in-
crease in the level of unemployment. Our data also reveal important differences in how
labor markets function in the presence or absence of explicit contract enforcement. In
line with the hypothesized mechanisms, we find that firms in the IC treatment use im-
plicit incentives involving conditional contract renewal and paying strictly positive worker
rents. At the same time that they pay high wages, however, some firms choose to offer
fewer vacancies than possible. Endogenous unemployment in the IC treatment arises as
a byproduct of this job rationing decision. Given that employed workers earn substantial
rents, unemployment in the IC treatment is involuntary. In the C treatment where effort is
explicitly enforced, labor market outcomes differ substantially along all these dimensions.
Firms pay much lower wages and reap the major share of production surplus. Employment
relations are shorter than in the IC treatment, and the overwhelming majority of firms
does not ration jobs. As a result, endogenous unemployment in this treatment is very low
and mostly voluntary, being caused by workers who do not accept existing contract offers.
We also find support for the underlying mechanism that is hypothesized to drive these
treatment differences, namely an impact of incompleteness on the profitability of differ-
ent contractual instruments: paying positive rents and using contingent contract renewal
increases firm profits in the IC treatment, while being counterproductive or irrelevant for
firms in the C treatment.
Our second main empirical finding is that contractual incompleteness leads to a stable
coexistence of different job types. After an initial phase in which we observe a trend
towards job rationing in the IC treatment, a plateau is reached such that unemployment
stabilizes at a high level, and a relatively constant fraction of firms continues to oper-
ate without rationing job offers. Whereas in the initial phase job rationing is the more
profitable strategy for firms, in this later phase firms earn similar profits regardless of
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whether or not they ration jobs. Workers, however, earn substantially lower rents and
exert lower effort in firms that do not ration jobs. In the long run, the situation in the IC
treatment thus resembles a segmented labor market in which some workers are employed
in “primary-sector” jobs characterized by high worker rents, relatively stable employment
relationships, and job rationing, while other workers work under less favorable conditions
in“secondary-sector” jobs (see, e.g., Doeringer and Piore 1971, or Saint-Paul 1996). Given
the equal profitability of these alternative firm strategies, the segmentation has the char-
acter of a stable market equilibrium. By contrast, market segmentation is not observed
in the C treatment where firms’ strategy of not rationing jobs and paying low worker
rents pervades the market. This indicates that the emergence of market segmentation is
directly linked to contractual incompleteness. We also find support for a key mechanism
hypothesized to sustain segmentation, which is an impact of unemployment pressure on
worker behavior: workers in the IC treatment are significantly less likely to shirk when
reduced market activity indicates lower job finding chances.
The first important contribution of our paper lies in empirically identifying a direct
causal link between contractual incompleteness and involuntary unemployment. While
efficiency-wage theory has long hypothesized that this link may exist (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Akerlof and Yellen 1990, MacLeod and Malcomson
1998), establishing this key claim of the theory is difficult if not impossible using field
data. The empirical literature has made important contributions on other aspects of the
efficiency-wage hypothesis, particularly the relationship between rents and worker perfor-
mance (for a survey see Katz 1986). However, evidence on key variables like worker effort
has necessarily been indirect, because effort is inherently difficult to measure in settings
where efficiency wages would be relevant. As a solution, previous field studies have re-
lated indirect proxies for effort, such as worker discipline problems or survey measures of
workplace performance, to wage premiums (e.g., Cappelli and Chauvin 1991, Campbell
III and Kamlani 1997), or to measures of dismissal barriers and firing threat (e.g., Ichino
and Riphahn 2005). An experimental approach is complementary to these studies because
of the possibility to exogenously vary the degree of contractual incompleteness, and to
measure the impact on involuntary unemployment.1 In our setup we can also induce or
accurately measure key variables such as worker effort and ability, or firms’ production
technology. Thus, we are able to precisely assess whether contractual incompleteness influ-
ences worker rents or decisions on job rationing and contract acceptance, as hypothesized
in the theory.
The second main contribution of our paper concerns understanding the foundations
1For a general discussion of the role of lab experiments in studying labor market institutions see, e.g.,
Charness and Kuhn (2011).
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of dual labor markets. The theoretical literature on dual labor markets has tradition-
ally argued that market segmentation can result from contract enforcement problems and
efficiency wages, if monitoring technologies differ exogenously across segments (Bulow
and Summers 1986). Some theoretical approaches have made segmentation endogenous,
arising due to non-linearities in monitoring technology, differences in setup and adjust-
ment costs, or on-the-job search (Albrecht and Vroman 1992, Saint-Paul 1996, as well as
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn 2011). We provide further theoretical insights on how market
segmentation can emerge endogenously, with diminishing marginal product in the pro-
duction function, despite homogeneous technology across firms. More importantly, we
provide the first empirical evidence on the endogenous emergence of market segmentation
due to contractual incompleteness. Some earlier experimental papers have observed firms
offering different types of jobs which are more and less attractive from workers’ perspec-
tive (Brown et al. 2004, Bartling et al. 2012). Importantly, however, in these studies
jobs that are good and bad for workers also exhibit strong and systematic differences in
firm profits. In contrast, we find that firms who use the good-job and bad-job strategy
are equally profitable, consistent with market segmentation being supportable as a stable
equilibrium outcome.
A number of other papers has used experimental techniques to study the consequences
of contractual incompleteness in labor market settings (e.g., Fehr et al. 1993, Brown et al.
2004, Linardi and Camerer 2010). Our paper differs from this literature in that it incor-
porates an analysis of endogenously arising unemployment. By contrast, unemployment
in earlier papers was exogenously given, ruled out by the design of the experiment, or
determined by exogenous stochastic shocks. Previous studies have shown that contrac-
tual incompleteness can lead to an adoption of implicit incentive strategies that involve
rent payments and contingent contract renewal (e.g., Brown et al. 2004).2 We add a
missing dimension to this literature, showing how contractual incompleteness can also af-
fect aggregate-level market outcomes, and how these in turn reinforce workers’ incentives.
Our findings thus provide a missing empirical link, showing that contractual incomplete-
ness, the use of implicit incentives, unemployment, and market segmentation can all be
intimately related.
In the remainder of the paper, we first present the setup and procedures of the exper-
iment, before discussing theoretical hypotheses in section 3.3. In section 3.4, we present
our empirical results, and section 3.5 concludes.
2For recent surveys on lab and field experiments that study contractual and non-contractual solutions to
alleviate moral hazard in the labor market see Charness and Kuhn (2011) and Bandiera et al. (2011).
See Brown and Zehnder (2007) and Brown and Serra-Garcia (2012) for applications in credit markets.
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3.2. Design and Procedures of the Experiment
To study the impact of contractual incompleteness on unemployment and market seg-
mentation, we implemented experimental labor markets where we exogenously varied the
verifiability of work effort. As our workhorse, we used a variant of the gift-exchange
game (Fehr et al. 1993). In the market, firms and workers interacted for 18 periods.
Each period consisted of a market phase where firms offered employment contracts and
hired workers, and a work phase where work effort was determined. In our main treat-
ment, the IC treatment, effort was not verifiable and workers thus could depart from
the contractually agreed upon effort level. By contrast, the effort level stipulated in the
employment contract was explicitly enforced in our control treatment, the C treatment.
Keeping everything else identical (production technology, supply and demand of labor,
etc.) while varying the verifiability of work effort allows us to causally identify the effects
of contractual incompleteness on labor market outcomes.
3.2.1. The Market Phase
Firms were the contract makers in the market phase. To offer a contract, firms stipulated
a non-contingent upfront wage payment, w, and a desired level of effort, eˆ. Firms could
make two types of contract offers: public offers that were available to all workers and
could also be observed by all other firms, or private offers that were only available to one
specific worker. Public offers allowed firms to reach the entire market if they wanted to
fill a vacancy regardless of a particular trading partner. Private offers made it possible
for firms to target specific workers. This is a necessary feature if firms want to apply a
strategy that involves systematic rehiring of workers based on their previous performance.
If an employer wanted to (re)hire a specific worker via a private contract offer, she had to
specify the ID of the worker in the contract offer. In this case, only the selected worker
was informed about the contract offer, and only this worker could accept the offer.
In a given market period, each firm could hire up to two workers. As long as none of her
contract offers had been accepted, a firm could make as many private and public offers
as she wanted. A worker could accept any public contract offer available in the market,
and any private offer he had received. Workers were not informed about the number of
private offers in the market as a whole, but they could infer labor market conditions and
the tightness of the market from the number of public offers observed in a given period.
Once a worker accepted a contract offer, he was not allowed to accept further offers in
this period. Additionally, all other outstanding offers of the respective firm were removed
from the list of available contracts. The firm could then decide to open a second vacancy
and hire another worker, by entering new contract offers. This feature of opening first
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and second vacancies sequentially was implemented to prevent “accidental hiring”, such
that a firm who wanted to employ only one worker but entered multiple contract offers
had a second offer accepted before being able to withdraw her remaining contract offers.
Note that while firms and workers could endogenously build up long-term employment
relationships by repeatedly offering and agreeing on (private) contract offers, it was not
possible for market participants to directly announce or sign a multi-period employment
contract.
The market phase ended when all firms had filled both vacancies, or when all firms
had indicated that they did not want to offer further vacancies.3 At the end of the mar-
ket period, workers received a summary of their own contract terms, and information on
whether and under which conditions their firm had employed a second worker. This infor-
mation was mainly provided to ensure common knowledge within a firm on whether the
firm operated as a one-worker or two-worker firm. While complete information regarding
co-workers’ wages may not be fully realistic, some degree of transparency is likely present
in many work settings: even with a firm policy encouraging wage secrecy, workers may
have a reasonably accurate idea about co-workers’ earnings.4
3.2.2. The Work Phase
After the end of the market phase, workers who had accepted a contract offer entered the
work phase in which actual work effort, e, was determined. Since effort was contractible
in the C treatment, effort levels corresponding to the contractually stipulated ones were
exogenously implemented by the experimenter (e = eˆ). By contrast, work effort was ob-
servable by the firm, but not verifiable to third parties in the IC treatment. Therefore, a
worker could exert equal, less, or more effort than stipulated in his employment contract.
Workers’ effort choices, together with firms’ wage payments, determined material payoffs
of firms and workers. Before the next period started, a firm and its worker(s) were in-
formed about work efforts and the resulting payoffs for the firm and the workers employed
by this firm.
3We also had a maximum trading time of 200 seconds for each market phase. This constraint was,
however, only binding in few occasions (mostly in the C treatment). The impact of the time limit on
unemployment and other market outcomes reported below is thus limited and confined to the control
treatment.
4Empirically, co-worker wages have no significant impact on workers’ effort choices in our setup. Efforts
in the IC treatment strongly depend on a worker’s own contract terms, but they are not significantly
related to either the wage or the desired effort level of the co-worker (results can be found in Table A.2
of the appendix). The finding that wage inequalities per se might not affect behavior is in line with
recent evidence on social comparison processes in similar setups (Charness and Kuhn 2007, Ga¨chter
et al. 2012).
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 32
3.2.3. Parameters and Procedures
Participants’ roles were randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment and kept
constant throughout all market periods. In every market, we had 17 workers and 7
firms. Since firms could employ at most two workers, this implies that three workers were
“exogenously” unemployed in each period.
A worker’s payoff in a given period, piW , was given by
piW =
{
w − c(e) if worker accepted a contract [w, eˆ]
0 if unemployed
A worker who remained unemployed in a given period received a payoff of 0 points. An
employed worker received the wage w specified in his contract and had to bear the cost
of the work effort he provided, c(e). The set of feasible efforts and wages was given by
e ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10} and w ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 100}. As illustrated in Table 3.1, we induced a convex
(monetary) effort-cost schedule in the experiment.
Effort level e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of effort c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table 3.1.: Schedule of effort costs.
A firm’s profit depended on the number of workers hired, the wage(s) paid, and the effort
exerted by the worker(s). Firms’ production technology was characterized by decreasing
returns to scale. Decreasing returns are often argued to arise with increases in firm size,
for instance due to higher bureaucratic or coordination costs in larger organizations. We
conceptualized this as a reduction in workers’ productivity if a firm hired two workers.
Specifically, each unit of effort by a worker increased output (and the firm’s payoff) by 10
points if only one worker was employed by the firm. If two workers were employed, each
unit of effort increased the firm’s payoff by 7 points. This corresponds, for instance, to a
work environment where workers in larger firms need to spend some of their time doing
administrative tasks that are not directly productive. The payoff of a firm, piF , can thus
be summarized as follows:
piF =


10e1 − w1 if one worker employed
7(e1 + e2)− w1 − w2 if two workers employed
0 else
e1 (e2) denotes the effort provided by the first (second) worker, and w1 (w2) is the wage
paid to the first (second) worker employed by the firm. Note that this specification of the
production technology implies that efficiency is maximized when two workers are employed
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and maximum effort is exerted. Payoff functions piF and piW , workers’ cost schedule c(e),
and the number of firms and workers in the market were common knowledge.
The experiment was carried out in the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn. A total
of 240 subjects, mainly university students from all majors, took part in the experiments.
Every subject participated only in one session, and we conducted five independent market
sessions for each treatment. At the beginning of a session, participants received detailed
information about the rules of the experiment.5 The experiment started only after all
participants had answered several control questions correctly. In addition, subjects played
one trial period of the market phase to ensure that they understood how to use the
computer program. Sessions lasted about 110 minutes and subjects earned on average
25.49 euros (about 35 USD at the time of the experiment), including a showup fee of
8 euros. The experiments were computerized using the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher
2007); subjects were recruited with the online recruitment system by Greiner (2003).
3.3. Behavioral Predictions
The treatments described in the previous section allow us to identify the causal impact
of contractual incompleteness on unemployment and labor market segmentation in our
setting. Furthermore, using the data from the experiment we can investigate whether
both phenomena arise in a way that is consistent with a specific theoretical equilibrium.
A simple model, which is derived in the theoretical appendix, informs our hypotheses. In
the model, we show how unemployment and segmentation can be part of a market equi-
librium when effort is non-verifiable, and how these aggregate-level outcomes arise along
with a very specific set of strategic behaviors by workers and firms. These individual-level
mechanisms become additional qualitative predictions, which should be satisfied empiri-
cally if unemployment and segmentation are to be explainable by the type of equilibrium
formalized in the model.
Our model builds on two important strands of efficiency-wage theory. One is the “shirk-
ing version”of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), in which materially selfish agents are motivated
to work by the prospect of earning future rents, and a threat of being fired in case of shirk-
ing. The other is the“gift-exchange version”of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), in which workers
are fair-minded, in the sense of experiencing a psychological benefit or cost of fulfilling a
contract, depending on the generosity of the rents offered in their current contract. Our
model incorporates both motivations: a fraction of agents is assumed to have fairness
5A translation of the instructions can be found in section A.2.3 of the appendix. To rule out that
differences in participants’ experiences from their employment relationships outside the lab could bias
our results, instructions were framed in a neutral goods-market language.
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concerns, while the rest is materially selfish. This assumption is in line with abundant
previous evidence from the lab and field, showing that a mix of selfish and fair types is
typically present in a given population (see, e.g., Fehr et al. 1993, Bewley 1999, Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2000, Cohn et al. 2012). To match the experimental setting, our model features
a finite horizon.6
3.3.1. Non-verifiable effort
The presence of both fair and selfish types has important implications for the type of
market equilibria that can emerge in finite-horizon settings where effort is non-verifiable,
as is the case in our IC treatment. Intuitively, the presence of some fair types may lead
firms to pay non-minimal wages in the final period, anticipating that fair agents voluntarily
provide non-minimal effort in response to fair wages. This generates a rent from being
employed in the final period. The prospect of earning this final-period rent, in turn, opens
up possibilities for equilibria in which firms use implicit incentives to motivate agents in
the pre-final period(s). There can thus exist equilibria in the IC treatment that involve
firms paying rents and conditioning contract renewal on workers’ previous performance;
in pre-final periods of such equilibria, selfish and fair types pool and fulfill their contracts
in order to qualify for reemployment and earning future rents.
Our model shows how—in an environment where effort is non-verifiable—there exist
equilibria in which involuntary unemployment can arise as a byproduct of the implicit-
incentive strategies adopted by firms. Intuitively, starting from a situation where unem-
ployment is low, the rents needed to deter shirking may be rather high because shirkers
who are fired can relatively easily find another job. If a firm adopts a strategy of paying
high wages and worker rents, however, decreasing returns to scale can make it profitable
to “stay small”. Increasing the number of workers at a given wage yields a proportional
increase in wage costs, but a lower increase in output. If wages are high, the absolute in-
crease in the wage bill can be larger than the gains in terms of extra output, so that it can
be profitable to hire fewer workers than technologically feasible. Endogenous unemploy-
ment arises as a byproduct of such job rationing, and since firms pay positive rents, this
unemployment is involuntary.7 The model identifies several key components that should
6For a more abstract model that is tied less directly to the specifics of the experimental design, see
the discussion paper version of our paper, in which we show in an infinite-horizon setting how unem-
ployment and segmentation can be part of a stationary labor market equilibrium under contractual
incompleteness.
7Anticipating an impact of higher unemployment pressure on worker effort potentially provides an
additional motive for firms to ration jobs. This is likely a second-order concern, however, since an
individual firm has only a modest impact on the aggregate unemployment rate in our experiment. In
the limit, as the number of market participants increases this motive vanishes entirely.
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be observed in the IC treatment if such an equilibrium arises. First, the profit-maximizing
strategy of firms should involve paying strictly positive worker rents, and conditional con-
tract renewal such that workers who shirk have a higher likelihood of being dismissed
than workers who provide the contractually stipulated effort level. Second, from a worker
perspective, the long-run costs of shirking in terms of forgone future rents should more
than offset the short-run gains due to lower effort costs. Third, unemployment should
emerge due to firms deciding to offer less vacancies than possible, rather than workers
rejecting available job offers.
The model also shows how an equilibrium with non-verifiable effort can involve market
segmentation, emerging jointly with involuntary unemployment. Intuitively, as some firms
adopt the strategy of eliciting effort with high rents (“good jobs”) and rationing jobs, the
resulting unemployment reduces the job-finding chances for unemployed workers, and
therefore the attractiveness of shirking for those employed. If the unemployment pressure
in the market is strong enough, a fraction of firms might be able to operate equally
profitably by hiring two workers, and offering jobs involving lower worker rents, and
somewhat lower effort levels (“bad jobs”). Firms with this low-wage, low-effort strategy
can have a larger optimal size since doubling a low wage leads to a small absolute cost
increase, and this can be smaller than the gain in extra output even with decreasing
returns to scale.8 Importantly, without sufficient unemployment pressure, the low rents
of secondary-sector firms might not be able to prevent shirking, and offering bad jobs
would thus not be profitable for firms. In the appendix, we derive sufficient conditions
for segmentation to be part of a stable market equilibrium, such that the strategies of
offering good jobs and bad jobs are equally profitable for firms, and neither type of firm
has an incentive to deviate. If a segmentation equilibrium arises in our experiment, the
model thus predicts that one-worker firms and two-worker should coexist in the market,
and that firms in both segments are equally profitable. Furthermore, the firms who ration
jobs should be the ones offering high wages and worker rents, and workers in such firms
should exert high effort levels. In firms who hire two workers, wages and offered worker
rents are predicted to be lower, as are worker effort levels.
3.3.2. Explicit contract enforcement
The mechanisms we have described as potential sources of unemployment and market
segmentation are directly linked to the inability to verify work effort; they thus do not
8The tendency for larger firms to implement a lower effort level than smaller firms follows directly from
profit maximization and DRS: As we show in appendix A.2.1, the optimal effort is always lower for
a larger firm, since the impact of effort on output is smaller at a flatter portion of the production
function.
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apply in our control treatment where effort is contractible. In the appendix we discuss
equilibrium characteristics for an environment with explicit contract enforcement, as is
the case in the C treatment. Holding constant other assumptions besides the verifiability
of work effort, the equilibrium is characterized by all firms hiring two workers and thus
zero endogenous unemployment. Firms elicit maximum effort from workers, while paying
wages just slightly above worker effort costs. Because effort is explicitly enforced, there is
also no need to engage in repeated contract renewal with specific workers. Since all firms
use a homogenous strategy of offering “bad jobs”, there is no market segmentation.
Intuitively, firms can elicit high effort without paying high rents or using conditional
contract renewal because contractibility of effort eliminates a source of worker bargaining
power: not only are firms on the short side of the market, but workers have no option
to shirk once they are employed. The presence of fair types has relatively minor impli-
cations for behavior in an environment with explicit contract enforcement, as workers
cannot shirk on the job.9 Firms strictly prefer hiring two workers, due to the efficiency
of maximum employment for our production technology. We thus hypothesize that firms
in the C treatment maximize profits by paying very low rents, and filling both vacancies.
Furthermore, contingent rehiring of specific workers should be irrelevant for firm profits,
and firms are thus predicted to more heavily rely on public offers in the C treatment.
When a firm wants to fill a vacancy without concern of hiring a particular worker, public
offers have the advantage that they reach the entire market.
Our discussion has illustrated how involuntary unemployment and market segmenta-
tion can be part of a market equilibrium when effort is not verifiable. It is well known,
however, that there are typically multiple possible equilibria in repeated games (see, e.g.,
Fudenberg and Maskin 1986), and this is true as well in our setup. For example, there
is a range of different equilibria for our IC setting, involving different equilibrium separa-
tion rates between firms and non-shirking workers. Our model illustrates how equilibrium
characteristics depend on the equilibrium separation rate on which the players endoge-
nously “coordinate”. For example, according to our model, segmentation equilibria in
environments with excess supply of labor always involve positive equilibrium separation
9Fairness could play a role in the decision of whether or not to reject a contract. Theories of fairness,
and ample empirical evidence, however, indicate that a key motive underlying fairness is a desire to
punish unfair actions by an opponent. In a setting like the C treatment, where receivers of offers face
competition, rejection of contract offers has limited effectiveness as a punishment strategy and even
offers involving very low worker rents are thus likely to be accepted (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
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rates, whereas market segmentation is not possible with a separation rate of zero.10 While
equilibrium multiplicity limits the predictive power of repeated game models, in our view
they are nevertheless very useful for heuristic purposes. The specification of “candidate”
equilibria gives rise to additional testable hypotheses for behavior, which must be satisfied
if the data are to be explained by a particular type of equilibrium. For instance, equal prof-
itability of both firm types and positive separation rates between firms and non-shirking
workers are both necessary features, and thus testable qualitative implications of an equi-
librium involving market segmentation. The presence of multiple equilibria also makes it
even more important to study actual behavior in a narrowly controlled environment, as
it is ultimately an empirical question which type of equilibrium emerges.
To summarize, the equilibria described above for the IC and C settings suggest the
following qualitative predictions : (1) endogenous involuntary unemployment in the IC
treatment, in contrast to maximum employment in the C treatment; (2) firms in the IC
treatment using strictly positive rent payments, and conditional contract renewal with
private offers, as a strategy to provide implicit incentives, in contrast to firms in the C
treatment using minimal rents and more strongly relying on public contract offers; (3)
segmentation of the market in the IC treatment, such that firms earn similar profits but
differ qualitatively with respect to worker rents, effort, and job rationing, in contrast to no
segmentation in the C treatment with all jobs involving minimal rents; (4) the secondary-
sector strategy in the IC treatment being supported by unfavorable market conditions,
which make workers willing to provide non-minimal effort for low rents; (5) a positive
separation rate for firms and non-shirking workers in the IC treatment. The discussion of
our empirical results in the following section will be structured according to these main
predictions.
3.4. Results
In this section we first analyze the impact of contractual incompleteness on the level
of unemployment, before examining in more detail whether the channels through which
unemployment emerges are in line with the mechanisms featured above (section 3.4.1).
A similar structure applies to section 3.4.2, where we study the influence of contractual
incompleteness on labor market segmentation.
10As discussed in the theoretical appendix, when there are zero job separations in a no-shirking equilib-
rium, there are no labor-market flows and the value of unemployment is zero. In this case the value
of unemployment does not depend on the number of one-worker firms, eliminating a key mechanism
for sustaining segmentation.
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3.4.1. Contract Enforcement and Unemployment
Figure 3.1 depicts the average unemployment rates for the C treatment (black) and the IC
treatment (grey), as well as the fraction of workers who are exogenously unemployed due to
excess supply of labor (dashed grey line). We observe strong differences in unemployment
between treatments (p < 0.01).11 In the C treatment where contracts are explicitly
enforced, unemployment remains close to the minimum possible level: in most periods,
the unemployment level lies only 1–5 percentage points above the baseline level that
is due to excess supply of labor. The unemployment pattern looks markedly different,
by contrast, when effort is not verifiable. In particular, we observe a sharp increase in
unemployment over the first seven market periods, before unemployment stabilizes and
remains high for the rest of the game.12 Overall, contractual incompleteness thus causes
a strong increase in the level of unemployment.
Result 1: We observe strong differences in unemployment between treatment con-
ditions. Under explicit contract enforcement (C treatment), unemployment levels
are close to the minimal possible level. When effort is not verifiable (IC treatment),
unemployment rises strongly before stabilizing at a relatively high level.
Rows (1) and (2) of Table 3.2 shed further light on the driving forces behind the
differences in unemployment. As could be inferred from the low levels of endogenous
unemployment in the C treatment, we find that firms in this treatment almost always try
to fill two vacancies (in 96.7% of cases) and, with an acceptance rate of 97.8%, workers
essentially always accept. In the IC treatment, by contrast, firms open up only 67.5% of
the possible vacancies. At the same time, available contract offers are accepted in 99.8%
11This test is based on a panel estimation with session-level random effects. Unless otherwise noted,
the same procedure is also applied for all tests on other aggregate-level outcomes in the remainder
of this section. Test statistics for individual-level data (e.g., wages in Table 3.2 below) are based on
estimations with individual-level random effects and standard errors accounting for potential clustering
at the individual level. Results are robust to applying non-parametric tests based on session-level
averages for analyzing the main treatment differences, or to using alternative estimation strategies,
such as allowing for multi-level random effects at the session and individual level, or clustering of
standard errors at the session level. Reported p-values are always two-sided.
12Regressing per-period changes in unemployment on a constant, we estimate an average change of
∆t = 3.6 percentage points for the first seven period in the IC treatment (p = 0.044). If we do the
analog for the remaining periods, the average change is much smaller and insignificant (∆t = 0.6;
p = 0.517). Not surprisingly, the same holds in an estimation framework that uses linear time trends
and accounts for a potential “endgame effect” in unemployment in the final period of the IC treatment.
We find a significantly positive trend for the first seven periods (p < 0.01), but not for the remaining
periods or the final period alone (p = 0.154 and p = 0.228, respectively).
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Figure 3.1.: Unemployment over time. Average unemployment rate in the IC treatment
(grey) and the C treatment (black). Fraction of exogenously unemployed work-
ers (dashed grey).
of cases.13 Firms’ decision to offer fewer vacancies than possible—i.e., to ration jobs—is
thus the main source of endogenous unemployment in the IC treatment.
Rows (3)–(9) of Table 3.2 summarize further differences in the characteristics of em-
ployment relationships, in terms of the contract terms being offered, worker behavior,
and the duration of employment relationships. In the C treatment, firms pay worker
rents of only 5.7 points, hire workers via public offers in 84% of cases, and elicit effort
close to the maximum possible level (9.65). In contrast, wages and offered worker rents
are substantially higher in the IC treatment, reaching levels of 34.6 and 21.1 points, re-
spectively. In addition, 71.7% of concluded contracts in this treatment are initiated via
private offers, and long-term employment relationships are frequently observed. For in-
stance, 60% of firms rehire the same worker for at least 9 consecutive market periods.
Effort levels are lower than in the C treatment, but at an average level of 7, they lie far
above the minimum. Although effort is not verifiable, workers in the IC treatment on
average deviate from the contractually stipulated level by only 1.2 points. These findings
provide first indications that firms in the IC treatment successfully use contract renewal
and worker rents to establish implicit performance incentives. The co-existence of high
13In the few cases in which we observe available contracts offers being rejected, these exhibit very low
or even negative worker rents. On average, the rejected contract offers stipulate worker rents of only
0.9 points (1.9 points in the C treatment, and -6.6 points in the IC treatment). Rejection of such
offers with extremely low worker rents might be an indication of workers’ fairness concerns (see the
discussion in the theoretical appendix).
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C treatment IC treatment
(1) Fraction of possible vacancies offered 0.967 0.675 p < 0.01
(2) Fraction of offered vacancies accepted 0.979 0.998 p < 0.01
(3) Wages 22.80 34.60 p < 0.01
(4) Rents offered by firms (w − c(eˆ)) 5.74 21.12 p < 0.01
(5) Realized worker rents (w − c(e)) 5.74 23.59 p < 0.01
(6) Fraction of private contracts 0.160 0.717 p < 0.01
(7) Fraction of firms with employment 0.029 0.600 p < 0.01
relationships ≥ 9 market periods
(8) Effort 9.65 6.97 p < 0.01
(9) Desired effort 9.65 8.20 p < 0.01
Table 3.2.: Market characteristics. Mean values across treatments. The p-value for row
(7) is derived from a linear-probability model where we regress a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if a given firm has at least one employment relationship for ≥
9 consecutive market periods during the experiment on a treatment dummy.
Reported p-values for all other tests are derived using the procedures described
in Footnote 11.
worker rents and job rationing through firms also demonstrates that unemployment in the
IC treatment is involuntary. At the same time, the observation of low rents and a lack of
repeated contract renewal in the C treatment indicate that firms manage to exploit their
high bargaining power when contracts are explicitly enforced.
In Table 3.3 we investigate two additional hypotheses about differences in the func-
tioning of employment relationships, which cannot be directly inferred from the level
differences in Table 3.2. Columns (1) and (2) report linear-probability estimates on the
determinants of firms’ contract renewal decisions. This allows us to examine whether the
greater prevalence of long-term relationships in the IC treatment indeed reflects a policy
of conditional contract renewal, with rehiring and separation decisions depending on a
worker’s previous performance. Comparing rehiring rates across treatments, the positive
coefficient for the IC treatment in Column (1) confirms that contract renewal is overall
more prevalent when effort is not verifiable. The negative coefficient on the indicator for
shirking, however, demonstrates that firms in the IC treatment do indeed strongly con-
dition contract renewal decisions on whether a worker fulfilled the contract. The average
likelihood that a contract is renewed drops from 70.9% in the case of contract fulfillment
to only 26.8% if a worker deviates from the contractually stipulated effort level. The
estimates also imply that separation rates in the case of contract fulfillment are lower, but
strictly positive in the IC treatment. This is important since—according to our model—
equilibria involving endogenous unemployment and market segmentation exhibit non-zero
separation rates in equilibrium. Column (2) adds controls for other important character-
istics of employment relations, including the rents offered in the current period’s contract,
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Dependent variable:
1 if worker is Future rents
re-hired in t+ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IC treatment 0.639*** 0.232*** 153.899*** 211.060***
(0.061) (0.072) (14.896) (21.012)
Shirking (t) -0.427*** -0.205*** -74.028*** -70.156***
(0.057) (0.058) (14.081) (10.902)
Offered rents (t) 0.003 0.768*
(0.002) (0.425)
IC × Offered rents (t) 0.002 0.483
(0.003) (0.635)
Contract renewed (t) 0.416*** 4.717
(0.083) (4.769)
IC × Contract renewed (t) 0.045 50.617***
(0.098) (11.767)
Constant 0.065*** -0.007 28.480*** 56.495***
(0.020) (0.022) (1.949) (5.974)
Market period no yes no yes
N 1,935 1,935 2,042 2,042
Table 3.3.: Rehiring and long-run incentives. Random-effects models; the reported stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) account for potential clustering at the individual
level. Columns (1)–(2): the dependent variable equals 1 if a firm renews the
contract of a worker through a private contract in period t+ 1. Columns (3)–
(4): the dependent variable “future rents” is the sum of a worker’s earnings
from period t + 1 until period 18. “Shirking” is an indicator equal to 1 if the
worker deviates from the contractually stipulated effort level in the current pe-
riod (i.e., et < eˆt). “Contract renewed” is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm has
interacted with the same worker in period t−1, and rehired the worker through
a private contract offer in period t. “IC × Offered rents” and “IC × Contract
renewed” are interaction terms of the respective measure with the treatment
dummy. Columns (2) and (4) additionally control for a linear time trend, as
well as an interaction term of the time trend with the treatment dummy. ∗∗∗ /
∗∗ / ∗ indicate significance on the 1-percent / 5-percent / 10-percent level.
and an indicator for past contract renewal, which equals 1 if a firm has already renewed
a worker’s employment contract in the current period (via a private contract offer). In
this specification shirking continues to be a crucial factor in firms’ contract renewal deci-
sions in the IC treatment.14 This indicates that firms in the IC treatment systematically
engage in conditional contract renewal rather than, e.g., just having a stronger taste for
repeatedly interacting with a given worker. Further estimates (available upon request)
14By design, shirking is not possible in the C treatment, and thus we do not include an interaction term
between shirking and the treatment dummy. Interestingly, the coefficient of “Contract renewed” in
the C treatment is significant and positive (Column 2). This only reflects a small number of firms,
however, who engage intensely in contract renewal in this treatment; as illustrated in Column (1), the
likelihood that a firm in the C treatment rehires her worker is very low. Our estimates from Table
3.4, discussed below, further indicate that this strategy does not increase the respective firms’ profits.
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show that the results reported in Table 3.3 are also robust to using alternative measures
of worker slacking, such as the degree of deviation from the contractually stipulated effort
level.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 show that the observed differences in rent payments
and contract renewal strategies have important consequences for workers’ long-term earn-
ings prospects. Confirming the observations from Table 3.2, the treatment dummy in
Column (3) illustrates that workers in the IC treatment generally earn higher future rents
than those in the C treatment. More importantly, the coefficient for shirking indicates
that—within the IC treatment—the long-run benefits of contract fulfillment in a given
period considerably outweigh the short-run gains from shirking.15 Controlling for other
aspects of contract terms yields similar results (see Column (4) of Table 3.3). This under-
lines that workers in the IC treatment face strong implicit performance incentives. The
relatively high effort levels in this treatment are thus understandable from a long-term
incentive perspective.
The data from the IC treatment also illustrate the relevance of both (implicit) material
incentives and fairness concerns. This can best be seen in the final market period, in which
the potential for future interactions and the prospect of qualifying for future rents vanish.
Nevertheless, we find that 46.1% of workers in the IC treatment provide above-minimal
efforts in this periods, on average choosing an effort level of 6.0. This underlines the
relevance of voluntary gift-exchange in our setting, paralleling what has commonly been
observed in similar labor-market settings in the lab and field (see, e.g., Fehr et al. 1993,
Brown et al. 2004, Cohn et al. 2012). At the same time, our data on effort provision also
illustrate the importance of future rents and contingent contract renewal for motivating
workers in the IC treatment: those workers who only exert minimal effort in the final
period on average provide efforts of 7.7 in period 17 in which the potential for future
interaction is still intact.
Result 2: Firms in the IC treatment pay higher workers rents, engage more heavily
in repeated contract renewal, and offer fewer vacancies than firms in the C treatment.
The combination of job rationing and high worker rents implies that endogenous
unemployment in the IC treatment is involuntary. The strategies of firms in the IC
treatment establish implicit performance incentives that imply a cost of shirking.
So far, our findings on treatment differences in worker rents, the prevalence of condi-
tional contract renewal, and other key characteristics of employment relationships are all
15For instance, a worker who shirks in period 10 earns on average 96.5 points less during periods 11-18
compared to a worker who provides the contractually stipulated effort in the same period. These losses
in future rents are higher than the maximally possible short-run gains of shirking due to reduced effort
costs.
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Dependent variable: firm profit from a given contract
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Offered rents -0.990*** -0.991*** -0.869***
(0.121) (0.116) (0.112)
(Offered rents)2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
IC × Offered rents 2.229*** 1.894*** 1.529***
(0.203) (0.186) (0.193)
IC × (Offered rents)2 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Contract renewed -1.596 1.432 0.865
(3.909) (1.437) (1.297)
IC × Contract renewed 17.948*** 11.458*** 9.802***
(4.309) (2.386) (2.268)
IC treatment -42.961*** -28.971*** -43.105*** -41.695***
(1.991) (1.441) (1.703) (2.701)
Constant 52.160*** 46.405*** 52.087*** 49.600***
(0.520) (0.755) (0.552) (1.659)
Market period no no no yes
Final period no no no yes
N 2,042 2,042 2,042 2,042
Table 3.4.: Profitability of contractual instruments. Random-effects models; the reported
standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential clustering at the firm
level. The dependent variable is the level of a firm’s earnings from a given
employment contract. See Table 3.4 for definitions of the remaining variables.
Column (4) additionally controls for a linear time trend, an indicator equal
to 1 in period 18 to capture a possible endgame effect, as well as interaction
terms of the respective variables with the IC treatment. ∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicate
significance on the 1-percent / 5-percent / 10-percent level.
consistent with our theoretical hypotheses. However, our model also suggests a specific
mechanism for why these differences emerge, namely that the absence of explicit contract
enforcement makes specific contractual instruments profitable for firms. Table 3.4 pro-
vides a test of this key underlying mechanism. As explanatory variables, we focus on the
types of contractual instruments studied in Table 3.2, relating to worker rent levels and
contingent contract renewal. Column (1) shows that higher rent payments decrease the
profitability of a contract for firms in the C treatment. In the IC treatment, by contrast,
we see a qualitatively opposite relationship. Firm profits are increasing in the level of
rents that a firm offers to her worker; this holds up to a point, after which further in-
creases in wage costs dominate the profit increases due to higher work efforts. Column
(2) reports estimates on the profitability of repeated contract renewal in both treatments,
using the “renewed contract” indicator from Table 3.3. We find that firm profits in the IC
treatment are strictly higher in employment relationships that involve repeated rehiring.
In contrast, firm profits in the C treatment are not systematically affected by whether
firms and workers interact repeatedly. In further specifications, we allow for a simultane-
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 44
ous influence of both contractual instruments, and add controls for potential differences
in dynamics across treatments (Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4). This does not affect
our main findings. In sum, we find important qualitative differences in how contractual
instruments affect firm profits, and we see that the level differences in the variables shown
in Table 3.2 are in line with these profit incentives. We discuss the profitability of dif-
ferences in job rationing in the next section, where we study the impact of contractual
incompleteness on market segmentation.
Result 3: Contractual incompleteness leads to a qualitative change in the profitabil-
ity of contractual instruments. Paying higher rents decreases profits, and repeated
contract renewal is irrelevant for firms when contracts are explicitly enforceable.
Paying higher rents and using repeated rehiring has a positive impact on firm profits
when work effort is not verifiable.
3.4.2. Contractual Incompleteness and Labor Market Segmentation
In this section we turn to investigating the impact of contractual incompleteness on labor
market segmentation, and we analyze whether individual behavior is consistent with our
theoretical hypotheses for how segmentation can be an equilibrium phenomenon. We have
already seen in Figure 3.1 that, after a strong initial increase the level of unemployment
in the IC treatment stabilizes during the later phase of the experiment. Given that
endogenous unemployment is almost exclusively driven by job rationing, this also implies
that the proportion of firms who ration jobs is increasing initially, but then reaches a
plateau. Indeed, a relatively stable fraction of about 25% of firms continues to employ
two workers during the later phase of the IC treatment. This provides a first indication
that there might be market segmentation under contractual incompleteness, with two
different firm types coexisting in the long run.
For market segmentation to be an equilibrium phenomenon according to our model,
however, it is necessary that the firm strategies characterizing the different market seg-
ments are equally profitable. This can occur if the unemployment pressure arising due to
job rationing by some firms is sufficient to allow the non-rationing strategy to be viable
for other firms. This is exactly what we observe in our data. Job rationing is strictly prof-
itable for firms in the early periods of the IC treatment, in which unemployment pressure
is relatively low, and in which we observe strong dynamics towards adopting the one-
worker strategy. On average, one-worker firms earn roughly 50% more than two-worker
firms during the first seven market periods (average per-period profits are 37.2 and 24.7
points, respectively). The difference in firm profits is statistically significant (p < 0.01).16
16In line with the idea that firms ration jobs in order to pay high worker rents and elicit high work effort,
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In contrast, in the remaining periods where unemployment has reached a plateau and the
fraction of two-worker firms stabilizes, profits between one-worker firms and two-worker
firms do not differ significantly anymore. The average per-period profits for periods 8–18
are 36.7 and 35.3 points in one-worker and two-worker firms, respectively (p = 0.361).
The finding that, in the long run, profits of one-worker firms and two-worker firms are
similar is consistent with the emergence of a segmentation equilibrium.
C treatment IC treatment
1-worker 2-worker 1-worker 2-worker
(1) Firm Profits 77.12 p < .01 95.46 36.74 p = .361 35.32
(2) Wages 22.88 p = .115 21.40 42.33 p < .01 27.70
(3) Rents offered by firms 4.88 p = .313 3.74 26.90 p < .01 16.00
(4) Realized worker rents 4.88 p = .313 3.74 29.21 p < .01 17.55
(5) Effort 10.00 p = .161 9.88 7.91 p = .718 6.48
(6) Fraction of private contracts 0.192 p = .082 0.170 0.900 p = .012 0.775
(7) Employment duration 1.00 NA 1.87 6.76 p < .01 4.48
(8) Fraction of firms 0.068 0.932 0.738 0.262
Table 3.5.: Market segmentation in the IC and C treatment. Mean values of market char-
acteristics during the late phase of the experiment (periods 8–18). The reported
p-values are derived from random-effects estimations in which the respective
dependent variable is regressed on a dummy equal to 1 if a contract comes
from a one-worker firm (standard errors account for clustering on the individ-
ual level).
While both strategies yield similar profits for firms during the later market phase, work-
ers in two-worker firms face much less favorable contract terms than their counterparts
in one-worker firms (see the rightmost columns of Table 3.5). On average, firms who em-
ploy two workers offer about 40% lower worker rents than one-worker firms. At the same
time, workers in one-worker firms work somewhat harder: average effort is approximately
20% higher, although this difference turns out to be statistically insignificant. Overall,
however, the substantially higher wages in one-worker firms result in much higher real-
ized earnings for workers in those firms.17 Thus, firms using the one-worker strategy and
two-worker strategy in the IC treatment offer “good“ jobs and “bad” jobs, respectively,
consistent with the endogenous emergence of a segmented labor market. Interestingly,
we observe that 67.4% of firms who switch to a one-worker strategy in the IC treatment subsequently
increase their wage payments, and that this increases the profits of the respective firms.
17Notably, we find a negative correlation between wages and firm size in the IC treatment. It is important
to bear in mind, however, that our design rules out some of the most important factors that are
typically discussed as reasons for positive firm size-wage differentials, e.g., larger firms hiring higher-
quality workers in terms of observed and unobserved skills, having higher degrees of unionization, or
facing stronger monitoring difficulties (e.g., Brown and Medoff 1989, Abowd et al. 1999).
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the two segments in the IC treatment also seem to differ in the general stability of em-
ployment relationships: two-worker firms are somewhat more likely to hire their workers
through public contract offers, and the overall employment duration in two-worker firms
is also shorter (see line (7) and (8) of Table 3.5).
In contrast to the situation in the IC treatment, we do not see any indication of market
segmentation under explicit contract enforcement (see the leftmost part of Table 3.5).
In the few occasions in which firms do hire only one worker in the C treatment, wages
and worker rents are only slightly above the values for two-worker firms (the differences
are 1.5 and 1.2 points, respectively). Similarly, efforts are about 1% higher, and the
fraction of private contracts is 2.2 percentage points higher in one-worker firms. While
the latter effect turns out to be weakly significant, the differences between segments are
generally much smaller than in the IC treatment. Most importantly, the data on firm
profits demonstrate that employing a one-worker strategy in the C treatment is clearly
suboptimal from a firm’s perspective. Firms who hire only one worker in the C treatment
earn almost 20 points less than the ones employing two workers. This underlines why
the latter strategy dominates the market, with 93% of firms using a two-worker strategy
when contracts are explicitly enforced.
Result 4: The absence of explicit contract enforcement leads to a segmentation
of the labor market. In the long run, two types of firms coexist in the market when
effort is not verifiable. These earn similar profits, but differ qualitatively with respect
to wage payments, worker rents and effort provision.
As a final step we investigate more directly a key mechanism underlying our theoret-
ical explanation for segmentation, which is a feedback from unemployment pressure to
behavior of workers. The emergence of the secondary sector is possible in equilibrium,
because the unemployment pressure arising as a byproduct of job rationing makes workers
less likely to shirk and willing to put in higher effort for a given wage. If this is true, we
should observe workers being more likely to shirk on the job when they receive information
that signals low unemployment pressure and high chances to acquire a job. While workers
in the experiment did not have precise information on the level of unemployment or the
job acquisition rate in a given period, they could infer the tightness of the labor market
from activity in the contracting stage. The most salient indicator of less favorable market
conditions from a worker’s perspective is the number of public contract offers in a given
period. Since unemployed workers disproportionally have to rely on public contract offers
for finding a new job, a low number of public offers indicates high costs of unemployment
and, consequently, higher unemployment pressure for those employed.
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 3.6 demonstrate that a decrease in the number of public job
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Dependent variable:
1 if e < eˆ Effort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# public offers 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020** -0.069** -0.058** -0.070**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028) (0.025) (0.033)
Wage -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Desired effort 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.222***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Contract renewed -0.044 -0.045 0.248 0.274
(0.048) (0.048) (0.201) (0.203)
Market period -0.000 -0.008
(0.005) (0.023)
Final period 0.379*** 0.382*** 0.385*** -3.147*** -3.162*** -3.085***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.087) (0.490) (0.486) (0.540)
Constant 0.120* 0.130** 0.135 1.403*** 1.349*** 1.446***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.089) (0.229) (0.214) (0.383)
N 849 849 849 848 849 849
Table 3.6.: Shirking and effort provision in the IC treatment as a function of market
conditions. Random-effects models; the reported standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) account for potential clustering at the firm level. Column (1) – (3): the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the worker deviates from the con-
tractually stipulated effort level. Column (4) – (6): the dependent variable is
the level of effort provided in a given period. “# public offers” is the number of
public contract offers available in the market in a given period. “Final period”
is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the final period of the game. ∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗
indicate significance on the 1-percent / 5-percent / 10-percent level.
offers in the market is associated with a significant reduction in workers’ propensity to
shirk. This holds after controlling for the contract terms faced by a worker, an “endgame
dummy”to account for the sharp increase in shirking in the final period of the experiment,
and a general time trend. Paralleling the observations on shirking, Columns (4)–(6) of
Table 3.6 show that information signaling lower job finding chances is associated with
a general increase in workers’ performance in terms of effort level. This illustrates how
changing market conditions feed back into workers’ behavior under contractual incom-
pleteness.
Our data also allow us to rule out alternative explanations for why the secondary-
sector strategy becomes profitable. In particular, we find no evidence that workers who
are employed in two-worker firms during the late phase of the experiment are inherently
more willing to provide higher efforts for a given wage. In other words, there is no support
for a sorting explanation in which two-worker firms become more profitable over time, on
the basis of eventually finding especially diligent workers. Instead, our data indicate that
a within-worker change in the willingness to provide effort under tighter labor market
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conditions accounts for the increased profitability of two-worker firms.18
Result 5: Workers’ behavior in the IC treatment changes in accordance with tight-
ening market conditions. This contributes to the increasing profitability of two-
worker firms and the long-run segmentation of the labor market.
3.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided empirical evidence and theoretical insights that involun-
tary unemployment and labor market segmentation may both arise as a consequence of
contractual incompleteness. Our experiments show a causal impact of contractual incom-
pleteness on the emergence of involuntary unemployment. While this link has long been
discussed in theory, direct causal evidence on its relevance has remained scarce (Shapiro
and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Our findings
also provide new insights on the efficiency-wage foundation of dual labor markets (Bu-
low and Summers 1986, Albrecht and Vroman 1992, Saint-Paul 1996). More precisely,
we show theoretically and empirically that contractual incompleteness can lead to a seg-
mented labor market, arising endogenously along with unemployment, although firms face
identical technological constraints.
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting
to study how the availability of additional contractual instruments affects unemployment
and market segmentation. This holds for other explicit enforcement strategies (e.g., piece
rates), as well as for other contracting schemes that require no verifiability of workers’
performance, such as voluntary bonus payments or possibilities to sign multi-period em-
ployment contracts (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson 1998, Huck et al. 2011). Second, our
setup could be enriched by labor market institutions such as unemployment insurance
or employment protection, which might affect workers’ on-the-job behavior and employee
turnover. This would be especially interesting since our model predicts that the emergence
and characteristics of market segmentation depend on the job separation rate in equilib-
rium. Finally, our theoretical and empirical framework can be used to analyze how hiring
decisions, rent payments, and other labor market outcomes interact with the available
production technology. In our setup, decreasing returns to scale imply that one-worker
18This result comes from restricting the analysis to workers who are mainly employed in two-worker firms
during the later phase of the IC treatment. We find that the willingness to provide effort for a given
wage for these workers increases between the early and late phase. Thus, we observe a within-worker
change, which is consistent with adaption to market conditions, but not with an explanation where
two-worker firms eventually found a particularly hard-working group of workers.
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firms and two-worker firms face an implicit reservation value of using the respective other
hiring strategy. In many labor markets, there are additional factors that directly influence
a firm’s hiring incentives. For instance, firms might face market entry costs, have different
outside opportunities available, or they might differ in the degree to which they can sub-
stitute capital and labor inputs. Studying how these factors affect market performance
under contractual incompleteness is an important extension to our analysis.
4. Political Selection and the
Concentration of Political Power
4.1. Introduction
Unfortunately, most politicians are neither benevolent nor omniscient. It is thus the role
of political institutions to enforce the voter’s interest within the political process. From
the founding of modern democracies in the 18th century to recent constitutional drafts in
Egypt and Lybia, political thinkers have been engaged in finding the best institutions for
centuries. A central question in constitutional design has been whether political power
should be concentrated on a group of political agents, typically the one winning the general
election, or dispersed between different groups.1 Strikingly, there are pronounced cross-
country differences along this dimension, with classical extreme cases being the United
Kingdom with concentrated power on the one hand, and Belgium and Switzerland with
dispersed power on the other hand.
The Federalist Papers highlight two channels through which constitutions affect social
welfare: the selection of competent politicians and the reduction of moral hazard of politi-
cians in office.2 The economic literature on the first channel, moral hazard, consistently
finds that power-dispersing institutions increase welfare as they help to discipline egoistic
incumbents. In contrast, economists have yet little to say about the second channel, po-
litical selection (see Besley 2005). Selecting competent politicians, however, is non-trivial.
Since voters base their ballot on their perceptions of candidates’ competence (Stokes et al.,
1958; King, 2002; Pancer et al., 1999), politicians exert considerable effort in appearing
1For a discussion of this crucial issue and its relation to various specific institutions, see Lijphart (2012),
Lijphart (1999) and Tsebelis (2002).
2“The aim of every political Constitution, is or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and in the next
place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold
their public trust” (Madison, 1788b)
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competent and virtuous during electoral campaigns. This affects voters’ capacity to iden-
tify and empower able candidates. A comprehensive appraisal of political institutions
thus has to account for whether institutions hinder or enforce the selection of competent
candidates for office.
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of power-concentrating institutions on cam-
paigns and political selection. We consider a pre-election setup in which candidates are
privately informed about their quality and are partly office motivated. Voters infer can-
didates’ qualities from their campaigns. In this setup, we identify a trade-off that arises
for changes in the level of power concentration. On the one hand, higher concentration of
power implies a better allocation of political influence to competent candidates, as long
as political campaigns provide at least some information to voters. We refer to this posi-
tive effect on welfare as the empowerment effect. On the other hand, more concentration
of power increases the desire of office motivated candidates to win the election. Thus,
mimicking of good candidates becomes more profitable, resulting in increasingly distorted
policy choice. Campaigns convey less information on the competence of individual can-
didates and voters are less able to select high quality politicians. We call this negative
welfare effect the behavioral effect.
We formalize our argument by a simple model in which two candidates compete in a
public election by making binding policy proposals. In particular, candidates can either
commit to a risky reform or to the (riskless) status quo. Candidates differ in their abili-
ties, which are unobservable to the electorate. Only highly able candidates can increase
expected welfare by adopting the risky policy, while less able candidates should stick to
the status quo. Voters observe policy proposals and draw inferences about the candidates’
abilities. In equilibrium, a reform proposal is associated with high ability and reforming
candidates win the election more often than those proposing the status quo. Politicians
do not only care about welfare but are also office motivated. This creates incentives for
low-ability candidates to mimic the policy choice of their more able counterparts at the
cost of adopting inefficient policies.
Variations in the level of power concentration involve a trade-off between the empow-
erment effect and the behavioral effect. The size of these effects depends on the relative
weights of office motivation and policy motivation in the candidates’ utility function. We
find that the optimal level of power dispersion is higher, the more politicians are driven
by office rents. If and only if politicians care predominantly about implementing efficient
policies, it is optimal to concentrate power completely in the hands of the election win-
ner. Conversely, if office rents are a strong component of candidates’ motivation, some
dispersion of political power enhances voter welfare.
The basic intuition behind this result is the following. Candidates’ office motivation
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induces mimicking and distorts their policy choice. These distortions are fueled by the
concentration of power because higher concentration increases electoral incentives. For
particularly high office motivation, it is then optimal to reduce the resulting inefficiencies
by dispersing political power among candidates. Hence, power dispersing institutions are
beneficial if politicians are mainly office motivated.
We generalize the model in different aspects, finding that the qualitative results do not
change. First, we introduce a continuous policy space such that candidates may choose
the magnitude of reform they propose rather than limiting their choice set to a reform
and the status quo. Second, we relax the assumption of binding policy commitments by
introducing the possibility to withdraw a proposed reform after the election, under some
circumstances. Third, we allow for heterogeneous policy preferences in the electorate. In
this setting, we additionally show that increasing power dispersion reduces inequality in
the society. If the social planner is inequality averse, the optimal level of power dispersion
is consequently higher.
Data from international surveys like the International Social Survey Panel indicate con-
siderable cross-country differences in voters’ assessments of politicians’ office motivation.
Assuming that they mirror actual differences in politicians’ motivation, our theoretical
analysis gives rise to a testable hypothesis: Countries in which politicians are predomi-
nantly office motivated benefit from power dispersion. In contrast, countries with policy
motivated politicians reduce welfare if they disperse political power.
In a cross-country design, we investigate the interaction effect of power dispersion and
politicians’ motivation on social welfare. For this purpose we combine measures of political
institutions3 with data on the perceived motivation of politicians. As a measure for
the performance of the political system, we use growth in per capita GDP. Due to the
availability of this data our analysis is restricted to eighteen established democracies.
For this set of countries, the data provide support for our hypothesis. For countries
with highly office motivated politicians, we find a positive relationship between power
dispersion and growth, while we observe a negative relationship for countries with mainly
policy motivated politicians.
Our analysis intends to identify the economic effects of power-dispersing institutions,
which limit the office-holders discretion. Many economists have addressed this question
abstracting from the problem of political selection. For a homogeneous set of politicians,
power-dispersing institutions increase voter welfare. For example, Lizzeri and Persico
(2001) demonstrate that office-motivated politicians campaign for more public good pro-
3We use Lijphart’s index of the executive-parties dimension which considers five categories of political
institutions to order political systems according to the implied dispersion or concentration of power
(Lijphart, 1999).
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vision and less pork-barrel spending under proportional representation than under the
winner-takes-all regime. For the term in office, Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that
voters are more able to discipline an incumbent if power is separated between multiple
political agents.
These papers abstract from any heterogeneity in candidate quality and thus from the
role of political selection.4 The importance of incorporating the selection aspect into the
analysis of political institutions is emphasized by Besley (2005). The process of selecting
politicians that are qualified for office has two aspects. First, to choose among competing
candidates the one who holds most promise to design and implement efficient policies.
This part of political selection is based on electoral campaigns, which are typically studied
in pre-election models (see, e.g., Downs, 1957; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Second, to
keep in office only politicians who adequately performed during the term. This aspect
of political selection is based on the behavior of an incumbent, which is analyzed in
post-election models in the spirit of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). While pre-election
models are based upon the idea that politicians can commit to policies through campaigns,
post election models assume that commitment is not possible. However, models of both
types identify a common pattern. If an unobservable trait of politicians, e.g., competence,
is important to voters, politicians will do their best to signal this trait. This affects
politicians’ behavior both before the election (Callander and Wilkie, 2007; Callander,
2008; Kartik and McAfee, 2007) and after it (Majumdar and Mukand, 2004) and should
have an impact on the voters’ capacity to select and retain the politician they want.
The role of institutions for political selection only recently came to attention and has
so far only been studies in post-election settings. A first model addressing this question is
Maskin and Tirole (2004). It investigates conditions under which the voter prefers political
decisions to be taken by accountable politicians instead of non-accountable judges. Maskin
and Tirole (2004) argue that holding public officials accountable in reelections is not
optimal for all kind of policy decisions. While they do not compare alternative democratic
institutions, this approach is taken by Smart and Sturm (2006) in a closely related paper.
They study variations in the level of accountability through the introduction of term
limits. Depending on the amount of noncongruent politicians, a limit of two terms as
applied in many modern democracies is shown to be optimal.
Closest to our paper is the analysis by Besley and Smart (2007), who study the effects
of several fiscal restraints on political selection in a post-election setting. Similarly to
Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Smart and Sturm (2006), they show a trade-off between
4The assumption that candidates differ in a quality dimension, sometimes referred to as “valence issue”,
is applied in a large number of papers, including Adams (1999), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
Groseclose (2001), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Sahuguet and Persico (2006) and Krasa and Polborn
(2011).
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disciplining incumbents and improving political selection. Whenever an institution allows
to discipline bad incumbents, i.e., to make them adopt welfare-enhancing policies, this
prevents effective political selection because voters are unable to distinguish a disciplined
but bad politician from a good one. Our pre-election model produces a different trade-off.
If voters have to infer the ability of candidates from their campaigns, dispersing power
leads to both better policy choice and better selection, but comes at the cost of giving
some political power to low-ability candidates. Besley and Smart (2007) consider four
fiscal restraints, such as limits on the government size and transparency, which limit the
office-holders’ discretion. Our focus, in contrast, is on power-dispersing institutions, such
as proportional representation, federalism, or public referenda. Interestingly, Besley and
Smart (2007) find that three of the four restraints only increase voter welfare if there are
sufficiently many good politicians. This contrasts our result according to which power
dispersion is optimal if and only if the candidates are strongly driven by egoistic motives.
Finally, we also relate to a growing empirical literature on democratic systems and their
effects on fiscal policy. The analyzes often focus on specific political institutions (see, e.g.,
Feld and Voigt, 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 2004; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007;
Blume et al., 2009; Voigt, 2011). In contrast, we apply a classification of political systems
based on the implied dispersion of political power, thus encompassing a broad range
of institutions. Lijphart (1999, 2012) as well as Armingeon (2002) study the influence
of the dispersion of power on various political and economic outcomes. While Lijphart
(1999) finds no effect of power dispersion on economic variables, Armingeon (2002) finds
a negative effect of power dispersion on unemployment and inflation. Complimenting
these findings, we show that the effect of power dispersion on growth in GDP positively
interacts with the strength of politicians’ office concerns.
4.2. The model
Our model studies the effects of institutions on candidates’ campaigns and the empower-
ment of competent politicians. Candidates differ in quality, more precisely in the ability
to implement welfare-enhancing policies. They are privately informed about their abilities
and commit to a policy prior to the election. Voters observe candidates’ campaigns and
vote based on the expected welfare each candidate provides. We depict political insti-
tutions in reduced form, by means of how much political power is concentrated in the
political system. With higher concentration of power, the candidate receiving a majority
of votes is more capable to enforce his agenda.
The game consists of three stages. At the first stage, nature independently draws both
candidates’ abilities a1 and a2, which are privately revealed to the candidates. At the
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second stage, both candidates simultaneously make binding policy proposals, x1 and x2.
At the third stage, voters observe the proposals, update their beliefs about the candidates’
abilities and cast their votes. Based on the election result, the power allocation rule divides
political power between both candidates. Finally, each candidate’s power determines the
enacted policy.
While the basic model serves to clarify the main arguments, we discuss a number of
modifications in Section 4.7. In particular, we allow for a continuous policy space, a form
of limited commitment and heterogeneity in the voters’ policy preferences. Importantly,
these modifications do not alter the main results of the basic model.
4.2.1. Voters
There is a continuum of fully rational and risk neutral voters of mass one who have
preferences both over policy and candidates. Voters have identical preferences regarding
the considered policy field. In this policy field, either the status quo can be maintained
(xi = 0) or a reform can be implemented (xi = 1). All voters receive a positive payoff
from the reform if and only if it is successful. More precisely, we assume that a successful
reform yields a return of 1 to each voter while a failing reform leads to a return of zero.
Whenever a reform is adopted, all voters bear a cost of c. Maintaining the status quo
gives a certain payoff of zero.
Voters might also care about other policy fields and about the candidates’ ideologies
or personal characteristics. We account for these preferences in the tradition of the prob-
abilistic voting model by assuming that voters have heterogeneous candidate preferences
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987).5 If candidate 1 is in power, voter k receives an additional
utility of µk, while we normalize the additional utility if candidate 2 enters office to zero.
Let µk be distributed according to some symmetric cdf Ω with expected value zero. Fur-
thermore, let Ω have full support on the interval [−1, 1] to guarantee heterogeneity in
the resulting voting preferences. Altogether, if candidate i is in power and sets policy xi,
voter k receives a utility of
Vk(xi, i) =


(i)µk + 1− c
(i)µk − c
(i)µk
if
reform succeeds
reform fails
status quo is maintained,
where (i) denotes the indicator function which is one if i = 1 and zero otherwise. Voter
k prefers candidate 1 if and only if he expects Vk(x1, 1) to be larger than Vk(x2, 2). Voters
vote sincerely, i.e., each voter casts his vote for his preferred candidate. Hence, candidate
5Note that our results are independent of whether these candidate preferences are subject to an addi-
tional aggregate shock as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
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i’s vote share depends positively on the voters’ belief about the payoff he provides, and
negatively on the belief about the payoff provided by his opponent.
4.2.2. Candidates
There are two candidates running for office. Each candidate i can either commit to a
reform (xi = 1) or to the status quo (xi = 0). More able candidates design better reforms,
i.e., reforms that are more likely to succeed. We measure candidate i’s ability by the
implied probability of a successful reform, ai ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, policy xi set by candidate i
provides an expected payoff of xi(ai − c) to each voter. We refer to it as the candidate’s
welfare contribution.
Prior to the election, nature independently draws both candidates’ abilities from the
cumulative distribution Φ. Let the corresponding density function φ have full support
on [0, 1] and be continuously differentiable. After observing his ability, each candidate i
commits to policy xi ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the strategy Xi of politician i is a mapping from
abilities to policy commitments.
Candidates care about gaining political power (office motivation) as well as about the
expected welfare contribution of the policy they have designed (policy motivation). The
utility function of politician i is given by
Ui(ai, xi) = f(vi, ρ) [θ + xi(ai − c)] , (4.1)
where θ > 0 denotes the relative weight of office motivation. Candidate i’s power f(vi, ρ) ∈
(0, 1) equals the probability that he can enforce his policy proposal xi. It depends on his
vote share vi and the parameter of power concentration ρ, representing the set of political
institutions. To simplify notation, this utility function is formulated at an ex interim
stage, i.e., taking the expected payoff after the election but before the reform outcome
has been realized. We also omit the dependence of vi on both candidates’ strategies and
actions.
Note that candidate i only cares about how expected welfare is affected by his policy
choice, not about voter welfare in general. This way to formulate policy preferences of
politicians has been introduced by Maskin and Tirole (2004), who phrase it legacy motive.
It captures the idea that politicians have a desire to leave a positive legacy to the public.
4.2.3. Institutions of power allocation
We model political institutions by a power allocation rule f that translates election results
into an allocation of political power, i.e., each politician’s probability to implement his
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 57
policy proposal. Technically, candidate i’s power f(vi, ρ) depends on his vote share vi and
on the level of power concentration ρ implied by the set of political institutions.
Definition 4.1. The continuously differentiable function f : [0, 1]×R+ → [0, 1] is a power
allocation function if it satisfies:
1. monotonicity in vi:
∂f(vi,ρ)
∂vi
> 0 ∀ ρ
2. symmetry in vi: f(vi, ρ) = 1− f(1− vi, ρ)
3. piece-wise monotonicity in ρ: ∂fi(vi,ρ)
∂ρ
> 0 ∀ vi ∈ (1/2, 1).
The first property rules out that candidates receive a larger amount of political power if
they gain less votes in the election. The second establishes anonymity, i.e., the constitution
does not treat candidates differently. The third allows us to interpret any rise in ρ as an
unambiguous increase in the concentration of power. The higher is ρ, the larger is the
amount of power assigned to the election winner, i.e., the candidate that gains more than
half of the votes.
This modeling approach allows to study a large variety of institutional differences.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how political institutions can be represented by power allocation
functions. Each of the four panels depicts two examples of allocation functions. Through-
out, the solid line represents an institutional setup that concentrates power more strongly
than the one corresponding to the dashed line.
Panel I depicts two stylized allocation rules frequently used to compare electoral systems
in the theoretical literature (see, amongst others, Lizzeri and Persico 2005). The solid line
represents institutions that fully concentrate power in the hands of the election winner.
The step function is the standard way to model plurality voting, also known as winner-
takes-all system. The dashed line represents proportional representation, which implies
a lower concentration of political power and is often modeled by the identity function
f(v, ρ) = v.
A less simplistic representation of these two systems is shown in Panel II. Here, the
amount of power depends on the margin of victory, e.g., because delegates might occasion-
ally vote against the party lines. Plurality voting tends to generate clear-cut majorities, as
the winning party typically receives a share of parliamentary seats beyond its vote share.
In contrast, the allocation of seats corresponds closely to vote shares under proportional
representation. Thus, the dashed curve for the proportional system is flatter than the one
for plurality voting.
In Panel III, the dashed line represents a political system with a supermajority require-
ment for certain policy decisions (as employed in Germany and the US). This requirement
generates additional steps in the power allocation function, since some policies can only
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Figure 4.1.: Political institutions and the corresponding power allocation rules.
be enforced after a landslide victory. In contrast, the solid line corresponds to a system
as applied in the UK where any decision can be taken by a simple majority.
Finally, the dashed line in Panel IV depicts the use of direct democratic measures as
employed for example in Switzerland. Even with a landslide victory in the election, the
winning party cannot always implement their agenda. The opposition party can block
policies via a referendum or even enforce their own proposals. Thus, only a limited part of
political power is at stake in the parliamentary election (similar arguments can be made
with respect to federalism, bicameralism or a constitutional court).6
4.2.4. Equilibrium concept and normative criterion
To solve this game, we study Perfect Bayesian equilibria. Thus, an equilibrium of this
game consists of a strategy profile and a belief system such that (1) both candidates play
mutually best responses at the announcement stage, anticipating the winning probabil-
ities for each vector (x1, x2) that are implied by the voters’ beliefs, and (2) the voters’
belief system σ is derived from the candidates’ strategies X1, X2 according to Bayes’ rule
everywhere on the equilibrium path.
6Note that our definition of the power allocation function does not allow to compare all institutional
settings. For example, the dashed lines in Panels III and IV of Figure 4.1 cannot be ordered unam-
biguously in terms of power concentration, as they intersect more than once.
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In the following, we compare the effects of changes in power concentration, i.e., in
parameter ρ. As normative criterion, we use a utilitarian welfare function in ex ante
perspective, i.e., expected welfare before candidates’ abilities are drawn:
W (ρ, θ) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2)
2∑
i=1
f(vi, ρ)Xi(ai)(ai − c) da2da1.
Welfare is, hence, given by the weighted sum of the politicians’ welfare contribution, inte-
grated over all possible combinations of candidates’ ability. The weights correspond to the
candidates’ power, f(vi, ρ). Note that welfare is calculated using equilibrium strategies,
which are functions of the parameters ρ (power concentration) and θ (candidates’ office
motivation).7
4.3. Benchmark case: perfect information
If individual abilities are observable to the electorate, voters condition their ballot on
candidates’ abilities and reform proposals. In particular, the fraction of citizens voting
for a candidate is increasing in his welfare contribution.
Candidates’ choices are driven by two motives. They seek to obtain power and to
contribute to voter welfare. Under perfect information, these motives are fully aligned:
Each candidate maximizes his electoral prospects by proposing the policy with highest
welfare contribution. Hence, a reform is only proposed by high-ability candidates with
ai ≥ c. In contrast, a candidate with ability ai < c gains more power by proposing the
status quo instead of a reform with a negative welfare contribution. Thus, candidates’
policy choices are undistorted: A politician proposes to implement a reform if and only if
the reform enhances welfare. As a consequence, candidates with higher ability, i.e., those
who propose to reform, receive higher vote shares in the election.
This result has a direct welfare implication. While variations in the power concentration
parameter ρ do not distort candidates’ behavior, higher concentration of power allocates
more power to candidates’ with higher welfare contribution. Hence, welfare strictly in-
creases with the level of power concentration ρ. The following Proposition summarizes
these results (all proofs are found in Appendix A.3.1).
Proposition 4.1. Under perfect information, candidates propose a reform if and only if
ai ≥ c. Welfare is maximized if political power is completely concentrated.
7We neglect the candidates’ utilities when calculating welfare.
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4.4. Imperfect information
In the following, we derive the equilibrium properties under the assumption that candi-
dates are privately informed about their abilities. Under imperfect information, voters
form beliefs about politicians’ welfare contribution on the basis of their policy proposals.
The vote share of candidate i thus depends on the proposals only, and not on candidates’
abilities. However, the higher a candidate’s ability ai, the higher is his welfare contribu-
tion from a reform. A candidate’s incentive to propose a reform is thus monotonically
increasing in his ability. Hence, the optimal behavior of candidates exhibits the cutoff
property, i.e., all candidates with ability greater or equal to some cutoff value αi propose
a reform, while candidates with lower ability propose the status quo.
Lemma 4.1. Given any belief system σ and any strategy of the opponent Xj, the optimal
strategy of candidate i can be characterized by a unique cutoff αi ∈ [0, 1] such that
Xi(ai) =

1, if ai ≥ αi0, if ai < αi.
In the following, we denote strategies only by their corresponding cutoffs. Candidates
compare the utility of proposing a reform and of proposing the status quo, given the
strategy of the opponent and voters’ belief system σ. They propose a reform if the
following utility difference is positive:
Ri(ai, αi, αj , ρ) = E[Ui(ai, xi = 1)|αi, αj , σ]− E[Ui(ai, xi = 0)|αi, αj , σ].
We refer to this utility difference as the reform incentive function Ri.
Proposition 4.2. Two classes of Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist. In class one, equilibria
exhibit symmetric cutoffs αi = αj = α smaller than c. In class two, at least one of the
cutoffs is equal to 1. Class one is non-empty and consists of divine equilibria only, while
all equilibria in class two are not divine.
To refine the set of equilibria, we apply the divinity criterion proposed by Banks and
Sobel (1987), which restricts the feasible set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In any divine
equilibrium, a deviation from equilibrium actions must be attributed to the type that
profits most of it. For all equilibria in class two, at least one of the candidates always
proposes the status quo even if he has the highest ability possible. This can only be
optimal if voters are convinced that candidates proposing a reform have low ability. In
this case a reform proposal is associated with a substantially lower vote share than the
status quo proposal. According to the divinity criterion, however, the reform proposal
necessarily needs to be attributed to the most able type of candidate, whose incentive to
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propose a reform is highest among all candidates. Hence, such an equilibrium cannot be
divine.
The first class of equilibria, in contrast, is robust to the divinity criterion. If α ∈ [0, c),
all actions are played in equilibrium and there are no out-of-equilibrium beliefs. If the
cutoffs are equal to zero, even the least able candidates propose a reform. If any candidate
deviates to the status quo, his associated welfare contribution is zero independently of his
ability. Since the welfare contribution of such a deviation is known, out-of-equilibrium
beliefs about abilities are irrelevant for the voting decision. Hence, restricting these will
not eliminate this equilibrium. In the following, we only consider equilibria of this class.
To see that all equilibria in this class are characterized by α ≤ c, note that a reform
proposal is always associated with a positive welfare contribution. In other words, the
expected vote share increases if a reform is proposed. If voters associated a negative welfare
contribution with a reform proposal, candidates with ability below c would never choose
to propose a reform. Otherwise, they would suffer from a negative welfare contribution
as well as from a loss in expected office utility. Clearly, this is a contradiction: If only
candidates with ability above c were to choose a reform, the associated welfare contribution
could not be negative. Hence, a reform is associated with a higher vote share than the
status quo. It follows that candidates with ability above c always choose to reform. They
gain not only from their welfare contribution but also from an increase in expected office
rewards. Thus, the equilibrium cutoffs must be below c.
Definition 4.2. A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium with α > 0 is an informative equi-
librium.
Next, we derive the equilibrium condition for informative equilibria.8 In any informative
equilibrium, candidates with high ability choose to propose a reform while candidates
with low ability choose the status quo. Policy proposals hence convey an informative
signal about candidates’ abilities. The cutoff type is indifferent between proposing a
reform or refraining to do so. Thus, the equilibrium cutoff α is implicitly defined by
Ri(α, α, α, ρ) = 0. The resulting equilibrium condition is
R(α, ρ) = θ
(
f(vr, ρ)−
1
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in office utility
+
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)
(
f(vr, ρ)−
1
2
)]
(α− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in welfare contribution
= 0, (4.2)
where vr represents the vote share from proposing a reform, when facing an opponent
who proposes the status quo.
Both aspects of the politicians’ preferences can easily be distinguished in Equation (4.2).
The change in office utility stems from the expected increase in office rewards due to a
8We discuss non-informative equilibria in the extensions.
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reform proposal. This term is always positive, since a reform proposal is associated with a
higher vote share. However, the politician also cares about the welfare contribution that
is induced by his proposal. The first part of the change in welfare contribution stands for
the probability that a proposed reform is implemented. The second part is the welfare
contribution of a reform implemented by the cutoff type. Note that this term represents
a loss, since the ability of the cutoff type α is below the cost c. The cutoff type is hence
willing to make a negative welfare contribution to increase his chances to enter office.
Next, we establish the uniqueness of divine equilibria.
Assumption 4.1. The ability distribution φ(a) is bounded from above with φ(a) < 1+Φ(a)
c−a
for all a < c.
Assumption 4.1 is a regularity assumption on the ability distribution, which is fulfilled
for example for the uniform distribution. It ensures that the reform incentive is mono-
tonically increasing in the cutoff. Hence, both incentive functions cannot intersect more
than once and there is only one symmetric equilibrium. For the remainder of the paper,
we take Assumption 4.1 as given.9
Proposition 4.3. There is a unique divine equilibrium. Moreover, it exists θ˜(ρ) ∈ R+ ∪
{∞}, such that this equilibrium is informative if and only if θ < θ˜(ρ).
For any given level of power concentration, the existence of informative equilibria de-
pends on the level of office motivation. If office motivation is not too large (θ < θ˜(ρ)),
cutoffs are larger than zero, and the unique divine equilibrium is informative. Otherwise,
all candidates propose a reform, and the equilibrium is non-informative. If the average
ability is smaller than the costs, the unique equilibrium is informative for all θ < ∞. In
this case, a non-informative would imply a negative welfare contribution from a reform so
that candidates with low ability would prefer to propose the status quo.
4.5. The effects of power-concentrating institutions
Empirically, democratic countries differ strongly in their political institutions and the
levels of power concentration implied by them. As we have argued in Subsection 4.2.3,
our framework allows to represent these differences by means of an appropriate power
allocation function f . In this section, we study the effects of these variations, captured
by changes in the parameter of power concentration ρ.
9If Assumption 4.1 is not given, multiple equilibria may arise. The following analysis is not changed, if
we restrict it to the welfare optimal equilibrium.
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4.5.1. Effects on candidates’ behavior
The power allocation function f determines the electoral incentives of political candi-
dates. Under perfect information, variations in power concentration leave the behavior
of politicians unaffected. As low-ability candidates are not able to mimic their more able
counterparts, policy choice is always efficient (see Proposition 4.1).
With asymmetric information and office-motivated candidates, in contrast, policy choice
is distorted as some low-ability candidates propose welfare-reducing reforms. It turns out
that political institutions affect the magnitude of these policy distortions.
Proposition 4.4. In any informative equilibrium, increasing power concentration ρ leads
to the proposal of more inefficient reforms: dα
dρ
< 0.
Consider some level of power concentration ρ0. By construction, the cutoff type with
ability ai = α0 < c is indifferent between proposing the reform and the status quo. We find
that after an increase in power concentration, the cutoff type strictly prefers to propose
the reform. In particular, his utility of proposing the status quo decreases while his utility
of proposing the reform increases.
If the cutoff type proposes the status quo, his welfare contribution is equal to zero.
Thus, his utility is only determined by the office rents he receives according to his expected
amount of power. With increasing power concentration, office rents are reduced because
he receives less power when running against a reforming opponent.
If the cutoff type proposes a reform, his utility is composed of two parts. He receives
office rents but also incurs a utility loss due to a negative welfare contribution. As he is
indifferent between proposing a reform and the status quo, the sum of the two is positive.
With increasing power concentration, both office rents and negative welfare contribution
increase by the same factor. Hence, the sum of both, representing his utility from a reform
proposal, also increases by this factor.
Consequently, with higher levels of power concentration, status quo proposals lead to
lower utility while reform proposals become more profitable. The equilibrium cutoff is
thus decreasing in the level of power concentration.
4.5.2. Welfare effects
In the following, we study the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the perfor-
mance of the political system. The objective function is the utilitarian welfare function
formulated in ex ante perspective, i.e., before the candidates’ abilities are drawn.
With privately informed candidates, the relation between power concentration and wel-
fare is not as clear-cut as under perfect information. On the one hand, there is still a pos-
itive empowerment effect of power concentration. Whenever both policies are proposed,
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the majority of votes goes to the reforming candidate, who provides a higher expected
welfare than the candidate proposing the status quo (see Section 4.4). Consequently, any
increase in power concentration ρ assigns more power to the appropriate candidates.
On the other hand, the previous section demonstrated a negative behavioral effect of
power concentration. By reinforcing the electoral stakes, a stronger concentration of power
leads to the proposal of more inefficient reforms. This reduces the information revealed
during the campaigns and limits the voters’ capacities to allocate power to high-ability
candidates. We show below that the relative size of the two effects, and thus the overall
sign, depend on the average payoff from a proposed reform. This in turn is determined by
the level of power concentration itself. Under weak conditions, however, there is a unique
welfare optimum.
Assumption 4.2. The ability distribution has a non-decreasing reversed hazard rate
Φ(a)/φ(a).
In the following, we assume that this regularity condition is satisfied.
Lemma 4.2. The welfare function W is strictly quasi-concave in ρ.
Lemma 4.2 implies that the welfare function has at most one maximum in ρ. In other
words, the behavioral effect and the empowerment effect are equalized at most once, and
the optimal level of power concentration is well-defined.
To prove Lemma 4.2, we analyze how the empowerment effect and the behavioral effect
are influenced by changes in power concentration. The positive empowerment effect results
because, with increasing ρ, a reforming candidate receives more power if he runs against an
opponent proposing the status quo. Thus, its size depends positively on the average payoff
from a proposed reform and the probability that a candidate advocates the status quo,
Φ(α). The empowerment effect is consequently highest at ρ = 0, i.e., completely dispersed
power. With increasing ρ, the average reform payoff becomes smaller as more inefficient
reforms are conducted. At the same time, the probability Φ(α) is reduced because less
types propose the status quo. Thus, the empowerment effect is strictly decreasing in ρ,
as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The negative behavioral effect results because increasing power concentration leads to a
reduction in the cutoff α. The size of this effect depends on, first, how harmful this decline
in α is to welfare, and second, how sensitively α reacts to changes in power concentration.
The effect of changes in power concentration on the size of both factors is directly opposed.
On the one hand, a marginal decrease in α reduces the average reform payoff by φ(α)(α−c).
With completely dispersed power (ρ = 0), the cutoff is equal to c, and a marginal change
in α does not affect welfare. With increasing power concentration, α departs further from
c and the additionally proposed reforms are increasingly harmful for welfare. Hence, the
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Figure 4.2.: The welfare effects of a change in ρ for a logistic power allocation function with mean
µ = 0.5 and scale parameter β = 1/ρ, µk distributed according to N (0, 0.5), a uniform ability
distribution, θ = 1, and c = 0.6. The solid line represents the (positive) empowerment
effect, the dashed line represents the (negative) behavioral effect. The optimal level of ρ is
attained at the intersection of both lines.
size of the first factor increases in ρ. On the other hand, the sensitivity of α depends on
the additional vote share a candidate gains by proposing a reform. For higher levels of
power concentration, the average payoff from a proposed reform is smaller and so is the
additional vote share. Thus, the cutoff α reacts less sensitively to further increases in ρ
and the size of the second factor decreases in ρ. As a consequence, the behavioral effect
is not monotonic in ρ (see Figure 4.2).
In Appendix A.3.1, we show that the sign of the overall welfare effect depends only on
the relative sizes of the probability to face a status quo proposing candidate, Φ(α), and
the marginal welfare contribution, φ(α)(c− α). The standard assumption of a monotone
hazard rate guarantees that, at every local extremum, the empowerment effect is strictly
increasing in the cutoff relatively to the behavioral effect. Since α depends negatively
on ρ, the relative size of the empowerment effect is strictly decreasing in ρ. Thus, there
cannot be a local minimum and at most one local maximum, which corresponds to the
definition of quasi-concavity.
Proposition 4.5. If and only if office motivation is below some threshold level θ¯, welfare
is maximized by full concentration of power. If instead θ > θ¯, it is optimal to disperse
power to some degree ρ∗(θ) ∈ (0,∞), and the optimal concentration of power is strictly
decreasing in the candidates’ office motivation: dρ
∗
dθ
< 0.
Proposition 4.5 establishes a relation between candidates’ motivation and the optimal
level of power concentration. For two reasons, changes in office motivation affect the rela-
tive size of empowerment effect and behavioral effect. First, increasing office motivation θ
implies that candidates respond more strongly to electoral incentives. Thus, the negative
behavioral effect is reinforced. Second, increasing θ results in larger policy distortions,
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i.e., a lower cutoff α. As argued above, the reduction in α implies that the negative be-
havioral effect increases relatively to the positive empowerment effect at the optimal level
of concentration. In total, an increase in office motivation makes power concentration less
beneficial for voters.
Regarding the optimal level of concentration, we have to distinguish two cases. First,
consider the case of mainly policy-oriented candidates, in which mimicking is not preva-
lent. For θ < θ¯, the behavioral effect is sufficiently small to be dominated by the positive
empowerment effect for all levels of ρ. Consequently, welfare is maximized by full concen-
tration of power. For higher levels of office motivation, θ > θ¯, both effects outbalance each
other at some interior level of power concentration ρ∗ ∈ (0,∞), representing the optimal
political institutions. With any further rise in θ, the relative increase of the behavioral
effect implies that both effects are equalized at a strictly lower level of ρ. Hence, the more
office-motivated politicians are, the more dispersion of power is optimal.
Intuitively, office motivation represents a source of inefficiency in our model because it
induces policy distortions, which are aggravated by high levels of power concentration.
The more severe the implied inefficiency is, the more beneficial it is to attenuate these
distortions through power-dispersing political institutions.
4.6. Empirical analysis
In this section, we analyze whether data for established democracies is in line with our
model predictions. Our model establishes a relationship between democratic institutions
and the efficiency of implemented policies. Crucially, the effect of institutions depends on
the motivation of politicians. Proposition 4.5 states that power concentration is always
conductive to the implementation of efficient policies at low levels of office motivation, θ <
θ¯. At higher levels of office motivation, however, the optimal level of power concentration
is interior and power should not be maximally concentrated. Moreover, the optimal
degree of power concentration declines for further increases in office motivation. Since the
welfare function is quasi-concave, the implications of our model can be summarized in the
following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.1. The effect of power concentration on welfare depends on the level of
politicians’ office motivation. Power concentration has positive effects on welfare if politi-
cians are mainly policy motivated. In contrast, if politicians are mainly office motivated,
the welfare effect of power concentration is significantly smaller or even negative.
We discuss an operationalization of the relevant variables and an empirical test of this
Hypothesis in the following.
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4.6.1. Operationalization
The test of our model’s predictions requires three basic measures. As the dependent
variable, we need a measure of efficient policies. Key independent variables are the de-
gree of power dispersion within the political system and the extent of politicians’ office
motivation.
Any efficient policy, as described by our model, benefits the public as a whole. As
a measure for efficient policies, we use growth in real GDP per capita (World Bank).
It provides a concise and objective measure of developments that bear the potential of
welfare improvements for the general public. Growth has been used as outcome variable
by a number of other empirical studies on political institutions as Feld and Voigt (2003)
and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007). Other frequently used outcome measures relate
to fiscal policy (see Voigt, 2011), which is not addressed in our model.
Several measures of democratic institutions have been discussed in the literature. The
allocation of power that is implied by political institutions is well described by Lijphart’s
index of the executive-parties dimension (Lijphart, 1999). This well-established measure
quantifies how easily a single party can take complete control of the government. High
values of the index correspond to high dispersion of power within the political system. It
focuses on economically developed countries with a long democratic tradition and hence
covers 36 countries. The measure is based on the period 1945-1996. New Zealand under-
went major constitutional changes after 1996 and is thus excluded from the analysis. Its
inclusion, however, does not change the qualitative results.
While office motivation cannot be measured objectively, indication for it may come
from surveys of voters.10 The International Social Survey Panel (ISSP) includes questions
on voters’ opinion about politicians.11 The item relevant to our study was included in
its 2004 survey, which was performed in most democratic states: ’Most politicians are in
politics only for what they can get out of it personally.’ Agreement with this statement is
coded on a five point scale. We use the mean points of all survey participants in a country
as our measure for the importance of office motivation in our model. That means, we
assume that differences in this item reflect differences in politicians’ motives.
For an easy interpretation of regression results, we normalize the indices for both office
motivation and power dispersion to range between zero and one. High values indicate
10Alternatively, one could use measures that are based on experts’ assessments like the Corruption
Perception Index from Transparency International and the Worldwide Governance Indicators from
Kaufmann et al. (2009). However, these indices focus on rent extraction and not on private motivations
of politicians in general.
11Other surveys, as the World Values Survey, the Global Barometer Survey, the Eurobarometer, or the
European Value Survey query trust or confidence in institutions, such as the political parties and the
national parliament. Such questions only indirectly relate to politicians’ motivation.
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pronounced office motivation of political leaders or a strong dispersion of political power,
respectively.
4.6.2. Design
Our analysis focuses on countries with a similar degree of democratization. We require
that all countries be established democracies as identified by the 2002 Polity IV Consti-
tutional Democracy index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). All countries have to feature
an index of 95 or higher, which excludes Venezuela from the sample. The remaining 18
countries in the sample are similar with respect to their economic characteristics. In par-
ticular, all countries are highly economically developed as classified by the World Bank.
They furthermore feature a Human Development Index (HDI) of at least 0.9 in 2004,
which places them in the top quintile of all countries.12
The time-invariant regressors require a cross-country analysis. To address problems of
reverse causality, we use 2004 as the base year for the regression. Our explained variable
captures growth after 2004, while our explanatory variables are measured at or before
this year. We control for variables that may be correlated with both our explanatory
variables and our explained variable. Most notably, past economic performance affects
growth (see, e.g., Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1994) and may also alter voters’ perception
of politicians. We hence control for GDP per capita of 2004. Also other variables have
been shown to robustly affect growth, such as capital accumulation, school enrollment
rates, life expectancy, or openness of the economy (see, e.g., Sala-i-Martin, 1997). To
capture such influences and to keep the number of explanatory variables low, we add past
growth in real GDP per capita (from 1991 to 2004) to the regression. All variables used
in our regression are summarized in Appendix A.3.3.
4.6.3. Results
As a first step in our analysis, we split the country set at the median value of politicians’
office motivation. Figure 4.3 plots growth against the dispersion of power for the two sets
of countries. The left panel depicts the relationship for countries in which politicians’
office motivation is below its median value, while the right panel depicts the relationship
for countries in which politicians’ office motivation is above its median value. The figure
suggests that power dispersion has only small effects if politicians are mainly policy mo-
tivated, whereas power dispersion is beneficial for growth if politicians are mainly office
12The similarity in socioeconomic development was formulated as a major prerequisite for cross-country
analyses in Armingeon (2002).
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motivated. For both groups of countries, the unconditional correlations between power
dispersion and growth support this observation.13
Figure 4.3.: Relationship between power dispersion and growth
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A statistical test of the effect of power dispersion on economic growth is performed in the
OLS regressions presented in Table 4.1. Test statistics are based onWhite heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Column (a) displays the regression results if the interaction
term between power dispersion and politicians’ office motivation is omitted. The uncon-
ditional effect of power dispersion on economic outcomes is insignificant.
This picture changes if the interplay between power dispersion and politicians’ moti-
vation is taken into account. Column (b) reports the corresponding regression results.
Note the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term between power disper-
sion and office motivation. It implies that power dispersion is more positively related to
growth, the more office motivated politicians are. The inclusion of the interaction term
in the regression also strongly increases the explanatory power of the econometric model.
The adjusted R2 increases from 0.19 to 0.49. In the analysis of political institutions, ne-
glecting the interplay between power dispersion and politicians’ office motivation would
thus ignore a relevant aspect.
As it turns out, power dispersion goes along with either increased or decreased growth
prospects depending on the level of politicians’ office motivation. The conditional effect
of power dispersion at the lowest and the highest level of office motivation are reported in
13For countries with high levels of politicians’ office motivation, there is a positive and weakly significant
relationship between growth and power dispersion (Pearson’s correlation coefficient, ρ = 0.618, p =
0.0759), while there is no significant relationship between the two variables for countries with low
levels of politicians’ office motivation (Pearson’s correlation coefficient, ρ = 0.291, p = 0.447).
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Table 4.1.: OLS regression results
Growth in real GDP per capita (2004-2011)
(a) (b)
Power dispersion 0.852 −3.565*
(0.490) (1.637)
Office motivation −0.125 −6.382**
(1.090) (2.666)
Power dispersion 8.948**
· office motivation (3.520)
Real GDP per capita −0.0247 −0.0436*
in 2004 (in $ 1000) (0.0251) (0.0214)
Growth in GDP per capita −0.267*** −0.352***
(1991-2004) (0.0789) (0.0586)
Constant 1.530 5.410***
(1.045) (1.583)
adjusted R2 0.19 0.49
F 4.38 14.17
N 18 18
Standard errors are provided in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent
level, respectively.
Table 4.2. At the lowest level of office motivation, power dispersion is negatively related
to growth whereas this relationship turns out to be positive at the highest level of office
motivation. Our analysis thus leads to the following result.
Result 1. The higher is office motivation the more positively is the link between power
dispersion and growth. Furthermore, power dispersion is positively related to growth if and
only if politicians’ office motivation is high. If politicians’ are mainly policy motivated,
power dispersion comes along with reduced growth.
This result is in support of the hypothesis derived from our model. We do not only
observe that the interaction effect is as predicted, but also that the effects of power
dispersion changes its sign as suggested by the theory. In total, we conclude that the data
is in line with the model presented in this paper.
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Table 4.2.: Effect of power dispersion
low office motivation high office motivation
Coefficient −3.565* 5.382***
Standard error 1.637 1.955
The table depicts the coefficient of power dispersion for the lowest level of office motivation
(θ = 0) and for the highest level of high office motivation (θ = 1). ***, **, * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
4.6.4. Discussion of empirical results
We conduct several robustness checks for our empirical test. In the following, we discuss
the use of different indicators for our main variables, the period of the financial crisis in
our data, and an alternative explanation for our result.
We check whether the positive and significant interaction term between power disper-
sion and politicians’ office motivation is robust to the use of different measures for our
key variables. Instead of politicians’ motivation from the ISSP, we also use confidence in
political parties as contained in the third wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), which
was concluded in 1998. Using this measure and adjusting the GDP and growth vari-
ables to the survey date, the interaction effect remains positive and significant (p=0.009,
F=1141.31, N=10). Unfortunately, the set of countries covered both by the third wave of
the WVS as well as by Lijphart is small. Other surveys on politicians’ office motivation
have been conducted only very recently and are thus not applicable within our research
design.
The measure for power dispersion by Lijphart (1999) is available in a more current
version from Armingeon et al. (2011). The use of this indicator yields a highly significant
interaction term (p=0.009, F=9.95, N=17). Armingeon et al. (2011) also provide a modi-
fied index which focuses on institutional factors only. It is based on the variables ”electoral
disproportionality” and ”number of parties” and is invariant to behavioral factors such as
”absence of minimal winning coalitions” included in the original index. Using this mea-
sure instead, the results remain significant (p=0.061, F=15.99, N=17). We also use three
different measures which depict important aspects of power dispersion and find similar
patterns. For the index for checks and balances (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) and a plural-
ity electoral system dummy (Beck et al., 2001), the interaction effect shows the expected
sign (p ≤ 0.087, F ≥ 8.91, N = 18). For the nine-categorial type of electoral system
(IDEA, 2004), however, the coefficient is insignificant (p = 0.159, F = 8.53, N = 18).
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One might fear that our result is influenced by the Financial crisis which affected output
beginning in 2008. To ensure that the Financial crisis does not drive patterns in the data,
we may restrict explained GDP growth to the years 2004-2007. For this shorter period the
interaction term between power dispersion and office motivation remains weakly significant
(p=0.092, F=4.20, N=18). Using the World Values Survey for our measure of politicians’
office motivation we can expand explained GDP growth to the years 1998-2007. This
data provides a similar picture (p=0.062, F=127.54, N=10). An alternative approach to
deal with the financial crisis is to exclude countries that were particularly affected. The
result is robust to the exclusion of any one country from the analysis (p≤0.081) and to
the exclusion of any subset of the countries Ireland, Spain, and Portugal (p≤0.075), which
were affected disproportionately.
Finally, the empirical observation in this section could have a different explanation.
This may be the case if our measure for politicians’ office motivation captures politicians’
preferences not only for office but also for rent extraction. Our measure is in fact likely to
represent a mix of both motives. However, it is not evident that institutions interact with
rent seeking as predicted by our model. In particular, models that allow the prevalence of
rent seeking to vary among politicians (Smart and Sturm, 2006; Besley and Smart, 2007)
deliver ambiguous results.
4.7. Modifications and extensions
Our model is flexible enough to incorporate several modifications and extensions. In a
first step, we extend the analysis to non-informative equilibria. In a second step, we gen-
eralize the setting in three dimensions. First, we introduce a continuous policy space such
that candidates may choose the magnitude of reform they propose rather than limiting
their choice set to a complete reform and the status quo. Second, we show that limited
commitment, i. e., the possibility to withdraw a proposal after the election with a certain
probability, does not change the results. Third, we allow for heterogeneous policy prefer-
ences of voters in the sense that proposals of candidates may be valued by some voters
and disliked by others. None of these modifications alter the qualitative results of the
model (all proofs are found in Appendix A.3.2). We end the section with a discussion of
the desirability of democratic selection where we contrast a result of Maskin and Tirole
(2004) with our findings.
4.7.1. Non-informative equilibria
In the main part of the paper, we focus on the effects of power dispersion in informative
equilibria. However, changes in power concentration may also allow to move from a non-
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informative to an informative equilibrium, thereby increasing welfare.
Proposition 4.3 establishes a dependence between the level of office motivation θ and
the characteristics of the unique divine equilibrium. This equilibrium is informative if
and only if θ is below the threshold θ¯(ρ). If instead θ ≥ θ¯(ρ), the unique divine equilib-
rium is non-informative: the reform incentive function is larger than zero for all types of
candidates. Even the least able candidate proposes a reform, although it will fail with
certainty (α = 0). However, θ¯(ρ) is strictly decreasing in ρ. Thus, it is possible to move
from non-informative equilibria to informative ones by implementing political institutions
that induce more power dispersion.
Proposition 4.6. For any level of θ, there exists ρ¯(θ) > 0 such that the unique divine
equilibrium is informative if and only if power is sufficiently dispersed, ρ < ρ¯(θ). All
informative equilibria strictly welfare-dominate non-informative equilibria.
For the last statement, note that in any informative equilibrium low ability candidates
with ai ∈ [0, α) refrain from proposing inefficient reforms. Hence, these candidates receive
less power, while more power is allocated to welfare enhancing candidates with ai ≥ α,
who provide a positive welfare contribution.
4.7.2. Continuous policy space
Until now, we have assumed that candidates can either propose a reform or the status
quo. However, many policy decisions are inherently continuous and politicians can choose
”how much” of a reform they propose to be implemented. Suppose that the action space
of the candidates is xi ∈ [0, 1], with xi = 0 being the status quo and xi = 1 representing a
complete reform. As before, the welfare contribution of candidate i is given by xi(ai− c).
Given the continuous policy space, it is possible to interpret the realized outcome as a
compromise between the candidates’ agendas instead of a lottery between the proposals.
Then, candidates with larger amount of power f(vi, ρ) are able to enforce larger parts of
their agenda, while candidates with less power only slightly influence the political decision.
Proposition 4.7. Let the action space of candidates be continuous with xi ∈ [0, 1]. There
is a unique divine equilibrium, which is outcome equivalent to the one resulting for a
binary action space. As a consequence, Propositions 1 to 5 hold.
Since reform incentives are still monotonically increasing in the ability of the candi-
dates, so is the magnitude of reform they propose. The divinity criterion yields that only
complete reforms or the status quo are played in equilibrium. To see this, first note that
complete reforms are always proposed in a divine equilibrium. If this was not the case, the
divinity criterion would require that a deviation to a complete reform would have to be
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attributed to the most able candidate. Given these beliefs, a complete reform would yield
a profitable deviation for the most able candidates. As a consequence, all agents with
ability above c choose to propose a complete reform instead of proposing only a share
of a reform, since they profit from the higher welfare contribution as well as from the
higher office utility generated by this proposal. Thus, voters associate a negative welfare
contribution with any intermediate reform proposal. Hence, such a proposal leads to a
smaller vote share than the status quo. For candidates below c, an intermediate reform
proposal also leads to a smaller welfare contribution than the status quo. Overall, only
the two extremes of the action space are played in a divine equilibrium.
Consequently, restricting the action space of candidates to the status quo policy or a
complete reform does not impose a loss of generality. The unique divine equilibrium is
outcome equivalent in the sense that strategies are equivalent and only out-of-equilibrium
beliefs may distinguish the equilibria. All proofs carry over to this setup.
4.7.3. Limited commitment
The assumption of full commitment is widely used to ensure tractability of models (see,
e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003). However, it may seem too restrictive that politicians can
never change or adapt their agenda. In our setting, candidates with ability lower than c
have an incentive to withdraw a reform proposal when they gain power. A straightforward
way to introduce limited commitment into the model is to assume that, with probability
λ > 0, the environment changes after the election and politicians may deviate from their
proposal. This could be due to an unexpected shock in the policy field, a major event in
another policy field, etc. With probability 1− λ, on the contrary, they have to carry out
their proposal.
Proposition 4.8. Suppose policy proposals are binding with probability λ. Then Propo-
sitions 1 to 5 continue to hold.
This form of limited commitment does not change the main results of the paper. In
essence, it increases incentives to propose a reform for low ability candidates, since they
may be able to withdraw their proposal after the election. However, this only affects the
level of equilibrium cutoffs and not the qualitative results.
The welfare effect of reduced commitment is ambiguous. On the one hand, all candidates
with ability ai < c withdraw their reforms with probability λ, thereby increasing welfare.
On the other hand, as limited commitment diminishes the negative welfare contribution
of a reform proposal for low ability candidates, more inefficient reforms are proposed.
Thus, reform proposals become less informative to the voters, and high-ability candidates
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receive less political power. The worse selection of politicians as well as the more inefficient
reform proposals per se represent a negative effect on welfare.
4.7.4. Heterogeneous preferences
In political philosophy as well as public debate, a major virtue of power dispersion is
seen in the political representation of minorities and the prevention of a tyranny of the
majority. For example, James Madison argues in the federalist papers #51 that ”the rights
of the minority will be insecure” without proper checks and balances (Madison, 1788a).
So far, our analysis has abstracted from this aspect of political institutions in order to
emphasize effects of power dispersion that are independent of minority rights.
To incorporate heterogeneity in voters’ policy preferences into our model, we may as-
sume that voters differ in their valuation of a reform rather than in their candidate
preferences.14 In particular, voter k receives a payoff of µk if a reform is successfully
implemented. Let the preference parameter µk be symmetrically distributed according to
the pdf ξ(µ) and the cdf Ξ(µ) with full support on some interval
[
µ, µ¯
]
. We assume that
the mean preference is larger than the reform cost c, while µ ∈ (0, c). This implies that a
majority of voters is in favor of the reform as long as it is adopted by a sufficiently able
candidate, while a minority strictly prefers the status quo.
Proposition 4.9. If the voters have heterogeneous policy preferences according to distri-
bution Ξ(µ), Propositions 1 to 5 continue to hold.
Essentially, the proofs for all previous results hold whenever the expected vote share of
a reforming candidate i is increasing in the average ability of candidates that propose a
reform, i.e., in the equilibrium cutoff αi. The basic model can be seen as the special case
with a degenerate distribution function with µk = 1 for all voters.
Given these heterogeneous policy preferences, our model allows to reconsider Madison’s
conjecture. Increasing power dispersion leads to higher amounts of power for candidates
proposing the status quo, which is the minority’s preferred option. As a consequence,
the status quo is proposed more often yielding an additional increase in the minority’s
welfare.
14Our model also allows for additional (ideological) heterogeneity. Let the reforms advocated by both
candidates be targeted towards a different group of voters and let µki denote the payoff to voter
k from a successful reform by candidate i. If both parameters share the unconditional distribution
Ξ(µ) defined above, Proposition 4.9 continues to hold for any correlation between µk1 and µk2. With
negative correlation, the candidates’ reform proposals differ strongly or are even diametrically opposed
(as in a stylized left-right policy space).
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Lemma 4.3. In any informative equilibrium, the utility of each minority voter k with
µk ≤ c is strictly decreasing in the concentration of political power.
The quote above suggests that the Founding Fathers of the United States were interested
in the protection of minority rights per se. Formally, this objective can be captured
by introducing inequality aversion into the welfare function, using a strictly increasing,
strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable weighting function w:
WIA =
∫ µ¯
µ
w(V (µk, ρ))ξ(µk)dµk.
In this function, V (µk, ρ) represents the expected utility of a voter with preference µk. Fol-
lowing Atkinson (1973) and Hellwig (2005), the relative curvature of w can be referred to
as a measure of inequality aversion. Compared to the inequality-neutral welfare function,
WIA puts higher weights on voters with low expected utility.
Proposition 4.10. Any welfare function WIA with inequality aversion is maximized at a
lower level of power concentration than the inequality-neutral function W .
Intuitively, power-dispersing institutions reduce the discretion of the election winner,
who is chosen by the majority. The expected utility of the majority of voters is hence
reduced while the minority is better off. The utility of the minority is valued strongly by
an inequality averse constitutional designer. Thus, he will choose to disperse power more
strongly than if he was inequality-neutral.15
4.7.5. Desirability of democratic selection
Our model also allows to investigate whether democratic selection leads to higher welfare
than a non-democratic system in which one agent is drawn randomly and receives unlim-
ited political power. A similar question is addressed by Maskin and Tirole (2004), who
investigate whether decision-making power should be allocated to accountable“politicians”
or nonaccountable “judges”. While a non-democratic system in our model does not allow
for sorting of candidates, it does not provide the decision-maker with incentives to choose
inefficient policies, either. Clearly, this is an extremely positive view on non-democratic
systems, which reflects the lack of agency problems in our model, once a candidate is in
office.
In our framework, a non-democratic system is mathematically equivalent to the limit
case of complete dispersion of power. With ρ = 0, the allocation of power is independent
15Note that WIA is maximized at a strictly lower level than W for any θ < θ¯. For the opposite case,
even constitutional designers with small degrees of inequality aversion will prefer to concentrate power
completely.
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of the election result and each candidate sets policy with probability one half. Thus, it
follows directly from Proposition 4.5 that political selection is always desirable.
Corollary 4.1. For any θ <∞, democratic elections with optimally chosen power concen-
tration (ρ = ρ∗) provide strictly higher welfare than non-democratic systems with random
assignment of political power.
Note that this contrasts to the result of Maskin and Tirole (2004) who find that, under
certain circumstances, political decisions should rather be delegated to “judges” than to
“politicians”. In contrast to our setup, accountability in their model refers to whether the
public official is subject to reelection after taking a political decision. More importantly,
however, Maskin and Tirole only consider the polar case of politicians with fully con-
centrated political power, while we allow for continuous changes in the degree of power
concentration.16
4.8. Conclusion
We have investigated effects of variations in the level of power concentration on the behav-
ior of politicians in political campaigns and the implied welfare changes if candidates are
office-motivated and privately informed about their ability. Increasing the concentration
of power causes two effects. On the one hand, it has a positive empowerment effect be-
cause more power is given to election winners, who provide higher welfare in expectation.
On the other hand, it also has a negative behavioral effect. With a stronger concentration
of political power, low-ability candidates have a stronger incentive to mimic more able
ones by committing to risky reforms. This limits the voters’ capacities to select high
ability politicians. The optimal level of power concentration balances both effects.
Furthermore, we have identified a negative relation between the extent of office motiva-
tion and the optimal level of power concentration. If politicians care mainly about welfare,
power concentration yields strictly positive effects. In the case of strong office motivation,
on the contrary, welfare is maximized by institutions that divide power between election
winner and loser.
In the empirical part, we have confronted these findings with data for eighteen estab-
lished democracies. Our findings are in line with the theoretical predictions: There is
a significant positive interaction effect between office motivation and power dispersion.
For the lowest levels of office motivation, power-dispersing institutions come along with
16If one restricts attention to the two polar cases of fully concentrated and completely dispersed power,
however, one of the main results of Maskin and Tirole (2004) can be replicated in our model. Then,
non-democratic systems perform better if candidates are mainly office-motivated.
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significantly lower economic growth, while we find a positive correlation for countries with
higher levels of office motivation.
A. Appendices
A.1. Appendix to Chapter I
A.1.1. Proofs of propositions and lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Suppose strategy profile s with strategies sxA, sP constitutes a
Bayesian equilibrium. Denote by D1 the set of all defaults being played in equilibrium and
by D2 the nonempty set of out of equilibrium defaults. Take any di ∈ D1 and dj ∈ D2.
sP : ρl → (.., p(di) = α1, .., p(dj) = 0, ..) , ρh → (.., p(di) = α2, .., p(dj) = 0, ..)
Define a new strategy of the principal:
sˆP : ρl →
(
.., p(di) =
α1
2
, .., p(dj) =
α1
2
, ..
)
, ρh →
(
.., p(di) =
α2
2
, .., p(dj) =
α2
2
, ..
)
Moreover, construct new strategies sˆxA for the agents such that sˆ
x
A(dj, σ) = sˆ
x
A(di, σ) =
sxA(di, σ). Leaving everything else fixed sˆ
x
A, sˆP also constitute a Bayesian equilibrium.
First note that p(θ|di, σ) = p(θ|dj, σ) for both θ. According to Bayes’ rule these are
also equivalent to the conditional probabilities following di in the original equilibrium.
Hence, agents’ maximization problem is identical and the best responses do not change.
Given their strategy the sˆP must also be a best response, since messages di, dj induce the
same action and the principal is indifferent between them. By subsequently adding all
out of equilibrium defaults to the set of equilibrium defaults we can construct an output
equivalent equilibrium without any out of equilibrium defaults.
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Since we consider informative equilibria, there are at least two
different defaults in the sense that p(θh|dk) > p(θh|df ). Given the signal ρh, we show that
it is always more profitable to play dk for the principal. The incentive function of the
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principal i.e the expected payoff difference from dk versus df is:∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (s
x
A(σ, dk))|ρh, x]df(x)−
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (s
x
A(σ, df ))|ρh, x]df(x) =∫ 1
1
2
p(σl, θh|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, dk))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, df ))) + b(s
x
A(σl, dk))− b(s
x
A(σl, df )))
+ p(σh, θl|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, dk))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, df ))) + b(s
x
A(σh, dk))− b(s
x
A(σh, df )))
+ p(σh, θh|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, dk))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, df ))) + b(s
x
A(σh, dk))− b(s
x
A(σh, df )))
+ p(σl, θl|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, dk))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, df ))) + b(s
x
A(σl, dk))− b(s
x
A(σl, df )))df(x).
The differences of the selfish parts b(z) of the utility function are clearly larger or equal to
zero, since the agents’ best responses to dk are weakly higher zs. We can, thus, concentrate
on the utility difference of the agents. The integral of these is definitely larger than zero if
this is fulfilled for all x. Consider the difference for an arbitrary x with slightly rewritten
conditional probabilities:
p(σl|ρh, x)p(θl|σl, ρh, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, dk))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θl|σh, ρh, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, dk))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, df )))
+ p(σl|ρh, x)p(θh|σl, ρh, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, dk))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θh|σh, ρh, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, dk))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, df ))).
The principal’s expectation about the difference in payoffs for the agent is larger than the
agents own prediction, which in turn is given by
p(σl|ρh, x)p(θl|σl, dh, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, dk))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θl|σh, dh, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, dk))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, df )))
+ p(σl|ρh, x)p(θh|σl, dh, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, dk))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θh|σh, dh, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, dk))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, df ))).
This is clearly larger or equal to zero, because agents maximize their expected utility. The
integral can only attain zero, if the actions following dk and df are equal for all agents.
Since there is a continuum of agents with full support over the interval [1
2
, 1], this can
never be the case. We conclude that default df is played with probability zero whenever
the principal receives a high signal. Hence, every default played in response to a high
signal inhibits the same information. All other defaults reveal that the principal received
a low signal.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: For µ → ∞, the preferences of the principal and the
agents are fully aligned. Hence, full information is the only possible equilibrium if there
is information transferred. Since preferences are continuous in µ, there exists a µ¯ such
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that for all µ ≥ µ¯ full information transmission is the only informative equilibrium.
Furthermore, this equilibrium clearly Pareto-dominates the babbling equilibrium, which
always exists. If µ is equal to zero, however, the principal always chooses the default
inducing the highest z. As a consequence, defaults cannot transfer any information. With
the same argument as above there exists a µ such that for all µ ≤ µ defaults inhibit no
informational content in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: In the following we show that cpd is increasing in µ along
the path of Pareto-efficient equilibria. To simplify notation, we write Di for any default
from the set Di. Note first that
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dl))|ρh, x]df(x) is constant in c
pd as
explained in Lemma 2.3. In any mixed equilibrium, the principal is indifferent between
all defaults given she received a low signal∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dh))|ρl, x]df(x)−
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dl))|ρl, x]df(x) = 0.
The change of cpd with increasing µ can be derived by implicit differentiation of this
equilibrium condition.
dcpd
dµ
=
−
∂
(∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dh))|ρl, x]df(x)−
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dl))|ρl, x]df(x)
)
/∂µ
∂
(∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, sxA(σ,Dh))|ρl, x]df(x)−
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, sxA(σ,Dl))|ρl, x]df(x)
)
/∂cpd
=
−
∂
(∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dh))|ρl, x]df(x)−
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dl))|ρl, x]df(x)
)
/∂µ
∂
(∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, sxA(σ,Dh))|ρl, x]df(x)
)
/∂cpd
The numerator of this fraction is smaller than zero, if∫ 1
1
2
p(σl, θl|ρl, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, Dh))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, Dl))))
+ p(σh, θl|ρl, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, Dh))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, Dl)))
+ p(σl, θh|ρl, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, Dh))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, Dl)))
+ p(σh, θh|ρl, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, Dh))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, Dl)))df(x) ≤ 0
This follows, if the inequality holds for all x. Since defaults convey less information than
the signal of the principal and since agents maximize their utility, this holds, because
p(σl|ρl, x)p(θl|σl, Dl, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, Dh))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σl, Dl))))
+ p(σh|ρl, x)p(θl|σh, Dl, x)(UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, Dh))− UA(θl, s
x
A(σh, Dl)))
+ p(σl|ρl, x)p(θh|σl, Dl, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, Dh))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σl, Dl)))
+ p(σh, ρl, x)p(θh|σh, Dl, x)(UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, Dh))− UA(θh, s
x
A(σh, Dl))) ≤ 0.
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Consequently, the numerator is negative, yielding
dcpd
dµ
> 0⇔
∂
∫ 1
1
2
Eσ,θ[UP (θ, s
x
A(σ,Dh))|ρl, x]df(x)
∂cpd
> 0.
Lemma 2 states that the equilibrium with the highest information transmission rate is
Pareto-efficient. Suppose that the latter derivative is negative. As a consequence, the
payoff from a low default is larger than the one from a high default for all transmission
rates larger than cpd. In particular, this also holds for c = 1, implying that there exists an
equilibrium with full information transmission. This is a contradiction to the assumption
that we are in a mixed Pareto-efficient equilibrium. There can, thus, only exist mixed
Pareto-efficient equilibria with positive derivative and dc
pd
dµ
≥ 0. Since agents are Bayesian
updater, this leads to weakly stronger responses by the agents, i.e, sxA(σi, Dh) is increasing
and sxA(σi, Dl) is decreasing in µ.
Proof of Proposition 2.3: We assumed that the partial derivative with respect to z of
UA(z, θl) is smaller than the corresponding derivative of UA(z, θh) for all z. Hence, higher
zs are optimal if the agent puts more probability weight on θh. Since agents are Bayesian
updater, they weigh their private signal stronger, if it conveys more information. Hence,
for any given equilibrium, agents are more susceptible to the default, if they have less
private information.
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A.1.2. Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1.: Agent’s information screen. Example in which two black and three red cards
are revealed.
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Figure A.2.: Frequency with which principals set default according to their signal. Average
values for 5-period intervals in FUL, PAR, and MIS.
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Figure A.3.: Frequency with which agents follow default option. Average values for 5-
period intervals in FUL, PAR, and MIS.
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Dependent variable: Frequency with which principal
chooses black default after black signal (MIS treatment)
(1) (2) (3)
HHS .341** .314*
(.121) (.143)
CRT -.859 -.381
(3.221) (3.290)
Math grade 2.926 2.621
(3.354) (3.751)
Const. 12.573*** 6.870 6.927
(1.273) (11.294) (13.021)
N 48 48 48
R2 .098 .502 .134
Table A.1.: Determinants of principals’ behavior in MIS. OLS estimations. The re-
ported standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential clustering on
the matching-group level.
A.1.3. Instructions of the experiment (PAR Treatment)
Welcome to today’s decision experiment!
Please read the following information carefully. Everything that you need to know to
participate in this experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties in
understanding these instructions please raise your hand. We will answer your questions
at your cubicle.
For your arrival on time you receive an initial endowment of 4 euros. During the experi-
ment, you can earn further money by earning points. The amount of points that you earn
during the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants.
All points that you earn during the experiment will be added up and converted into euros
at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is:
100 Points = 1 euro
The experiment consists of several periods. In each period you have to make decisions,
which you feed into the computer. There will be 50 periods in total. At the end of the
experiment, the amount of money that you earned during the experiment and your initial
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endowment will be paid out in cash. Please hand in all documents you received from us
when you collect your payment at the end of the experiment.
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the
entire experiment. In addition, we would like to point out that you may only use the
computer functions which are required for the experiment. Violations of these rules will
lead to an exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we shall be glad
to assist you.
Short Overview of the Experimental Procedures
The experiment consists of several periods. In each period you have to make decisions
which you feed into the computer. There will be 50 periods in total.
In the experiment participants will be divided into three groups. The participants of
the three groups will be named player 1A, player 1B and player 2 during the entire
experiment. There will be 6 participants of type 1A, 6 participants of type 1B
and 12 participants of type 2. Your role will be drawn randomly at the beginning
of the experiment, and presented on your screen. Your role remains the same during the
entire experiment.
In each period of the experiment groups consisting of one player 1A and one player 2 or
one player 1B and one player 2 will be formed. For each period new groups of two
players will be formed randomly. The probability that your group in a certain period
consist of one player 1A and one player 2 is thus 50%. The probability that your group
in a certain period consist of one player 1B and one player 2 is also 50%. Player 2 learns
only at the very end of a given period whether he was in a group with a player
of type 1A or 1B in that period. The experiment is conducted fully anonymously.
This means that you and the other participants never get to know with whom you were
matched during the experiment. Only the other group member in a given period will get
to know your choices in that period. All of the other participants will learn nothing about
your decisions.
In each period of the experiment player 2 has to make a decision about which color appears
more often in a set of cards. In each period there will be a set of 9 cards. Each of
the 9 cards can be either red or black. Player 1A or player 1B receives information
about the number of red and black cards in the current set and makes a preselection
for player 2. Player 2 also receives information about the number of red and black cards
and makes the final decision for the group. He can either confirm the preselection of
the other group member, or make a different decision.
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 87
In each period a new set of cards will be generated randomly for each group. The
probability that a certain card of the set is red or black is 50%. That is, for each card
it is equal likely to be red or black. Hence, in each period it will be independently
and randomly drawn how many red or black cards appear and the order of the cards. At
the beginning of a period the probability that there are more red or more black cards is
thus the same. The number of red and black cards does not depend on the cards of the
previous period or on the cards of another group.
The final decision of player 2 determines the earnings of both members of the group:
• Player 1A earns 50 points if the final decision is ”more red cards”. He earns 0
points if the final decision is ”more black cards”.
• Player 1B earns 50 points if player 2 chooses the color that appears more frequently
in the actual set of cards. He earns 0 points if player 2 chooses the wrong color.
• Player 2 earns 50 points if his decision is the color that appears more frequently
in the actual set of cards. He earns 0 points if the final decision is the wrong color.
The Experimental Procedures in Detail
Each period consists of two stages. On the first stage a new set of cards will be generated
for each group. Afterwards the players get incomplete information about which color
appears more often in their current set of cards. On the second stage, player 1A or player
1B make a preselection on the color of the cards. Player 2 gets to know the preselection
and makes the final decision for the group. He can confirm the preselection or make a
different decision. The decision of player 2 is the final decision for the entire group. That
is, only the decision of player 2 determines the earnings of both group members.
Player 1 (that is, player 1A or 1B) receives his information about the amount of
red and black cards in the current set of cards via a signal on his screen. There are two
possible signals which can be displayed on the screen: either the signal for player
1 is ”more red cards” or the signal is ”more black cards”. In each group only player 1 gets
this signal.
The probability of a correct signal for player 1 is 80%. That is, player 1 gets to know
the color that actually appears more often in the current card set of his group in on
average 80 out of 100 cases. On average he gets a wrong signal about the color that
actually appears more often in the set of cards in 20 out of 100 cases. Only at the end
of a given period, player 1 can determine whether he got a correct or incorrect signal.
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Whether a signal is correct or incorrect in a certain period will be randomly
and independently determined in each period. That is, the probability that player1
gets the correct signal is always exactly 80% and independent of the correctness of her
signals in previous periods. The probability of a correct signal is also independent of the
information player 2 or other players of type 1A or 1B receive in a certain period. None of
the other participants ever gets to know which signal player 1 received in a certain period.
Player 2 receives his information about the number of red and black cards by the
uncovering of a part of the set of 9 cards. In each period either two or five cards
will be uncovered for player 2. The probability that two cards will be uncovered in a
certain period is 50%. The probability that five cards will be uncovered in a certain
period is also 50%. That is, in on average 50 out of 100 cases two cards will be
uncovered, and in 50 out of 100 cases five cards will be uncovered.
Whether player 2 gets to know two or five cards in a certain period will be drawn randomly
and independently across periods. The number of cards a certain player 2 gets to know
is also independent of the number of cards that other players of type 2 get to know.
Finally, the draw whether player 2 gets displayed two or five cards is independent of the
correctness of the signal of the other group member. All other participants never get to
know how many cards were uncovered for player 2 in a certain period.
Once player 1 and player 2 have seen their information, the second stage of the period
begins. On the second stage player 1 (that is, player 1A or 1B) makes a pre-
selection for player 2. Player 1 can choose between two options for the preselection.
She can either choose ”more black cards”, or ”more red cards”. To make her decision, the
following screen is displayed to her. She chooses the preselection by clicking the respective
button.
Afterwards, player 2 is informed about the preselection which the other group
member made for him. The following screen is shown to player 2, on which the preselection
of player 1 will be displayed (instead of the black boardered field in the middle of the
screen, a red or black field will be displayed):
Subsequently, player 2 makes the final decision for the entire group. He can
confirm the preselection of the other group member or change the selection. If player 2
confirms the preselection, this is the final decision for the group. If player 2 decides
to change the selection he sees a new screen. On this screen, he can choose either
”more black cards” or ”more red cards”. At the time of his decision, player 2 doesn’t know
whether he is in a group with a player of type 1A or 1B. The decision of player 2 is
the final decision for both group members. The final decision of player 2 determines
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the earnings for the entire group.
How are incomes calculated?
The earnings of player 1A, player 1B and player 2 in a certain period are calculated as
follows.
Player 1A:
• When the final decision is ”more red cards”, player 1A earns an income of 50
points.
• When the final decision is ”more black cards”, player 1A earns an income of 0
points.
Player 1B:
• When the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears more
frequently in the set of cards, player 1B earns an income of 50 points.
• When the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears less fre-
quently in the set of cards, player 1B earns an income of 0 points.
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Player 2:
• When the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears more
frequently in the set of cards, player 2 earns an income of 50 points.
• When the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears less fre-
quently in the set of cards, player 2 earns an income of 0 points.
At the end of a period, the complete set of cards from this period will be displayed to
both group members. You are also informed about the earnings of both group members in
this period. Subsequently a new period begins, for which new groups of two participants
of type 1A or 1B and 2 will be formed randomly.
In case you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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A.2. Appendix to Chapter II
A.2.1. Theory appendix
In this appendix, we provide a model that formalizes the intuition for how contractual
incompleteness can cause involuntary unemployment and labor market segmentation.
Model Set-up: We denote by N + U the mass of workers and by N
2
the mass of firms.
Workers and firms interact for T periods in discrete time. All firms can offer up to two
vacancies in a given period. Maximum employment is thus N , and excess supply of
workers implies that the minimum level of unemployment is U .1 In any period, firms
offer contracts to either one or two workers. If effort is verifiable, the contract determines
both the (upfront) wage and the effort level. If efforts are only observable but not third-
party verifiable, workers have discretion over their level of effort. We assume that workers
are homogeneous in their productivity and can choose between n different effort levels
e ∈ {e1, ..., en}, where ei < ei+1 and c(ei) = ci denotes the increasing cost of effort.
There are two types of workers: a fraction λ of the population is fair (f) and a fraction
of 1 − λ is selfish (s). The utility of an employed selfish worker in any period is the
difference of the received wage and the effort cost:
us = w − c(e).
Fair workers, in contrast, face an additional psychological cost or benefit, g(w − c(eˆ)), if
they fulfill the contract. Utility for fair workers is thus denoted as:
uf =

w − c(e) + g(w − c(eˆ)) if the worker fulfills the contract (e = eˆ)w − c(e) if the worker breaches the contract (e < eˆ)
We assume that g(·) is strictly increasing in the rent offered by the firm, and g(x˜) = 0
for some x˜ ≥ 0. Thus, more generous contract terms make shirking increasingly less
attractive for a fair worker, and g(·) changes from negative (a cost of contract fulfillment)
to positive (an additional benefit of contract fulfillment), when offered rents exceed a
benchmark level of fairness, x˜. This captures in a simple and tractable way the central
theme of all reciprocity-based fairness models that fair types reward kind actions and
punish unkind actions (e.g., Rabin 1993, Falk and Fischbacher 2006), where in our setting
kindness of the firm is captured by the size of offered rents. Denote by g−1(·) the inverse
function of g(·), which exists and is well defined due to the monotonicity of g(·).
Firms are characterized by the following production technology, with output increasing
in the level of effort:
0 ≤ f(e1) = z1 ≤ · · · ≤ f(en) = zn, 0 ≤ f(2e1) = zn+1 ≤ · · · ≤ f(2en) = z2n,
1While a level of U > 0 is implemented in the experiment, all results also hold for U = 0.
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z1 to zn denote the output of a firm that employs one worker who exerts e1 to en, and zn+1
to z2n are the corresponding output levels of two-worker firms.
2 Furthermore, we require
the production technology to exhibit a weak form of decreasing returns to scale (Part 1 of
Assumption A.1) and to be efficient (Part 2 of Assumption A.1). The latter means that
in the final period even in the case of incomplete contracts the wage needed to induce an
extra unit of effort by a fair agent is smaller than the induced gain in output.
Assumption A.1. Let zi < zj be output levels with corresponding effort input ei < ej.
Then,
1.
zj − zi
ej − ei
>
zn+j − zn+i
2(ej − ei)
2. zn+j − 2(g
−1(cj) + cj) > zn+i − 2(g
−1(ci) + ci) > zi − (g
−1(ci) + ci) > 0
We further assume that output translates directly into firm revenue, all firms have access
to the same production technology, and maximize total profits (i.e., revenue - overall wage
costs). At the end of each period, firms decide whether to renew the contract with their
worker(s). As a simplification we assume that a firm which renews the contract of its
worker(s) also keeps its size constant. We denote by btk ∈ [0, 1] with k ∈ {1w, 2w} the
probability that a one-worker firm (1w) or two-worker firm (2w) separates from a worker
if he exerts the desired effort level in period t. Purely for expositional reasons, we assume
that firms always separate from workers who deviate from the contractually stipulated
effort level (atk=1).
3 Workers and firms discount the future at a rate r ∈ [0, 1].
Equilibrium with verifiable effort: As a first step, we solve for the market equilib-
rium when effort is contractible. Consider the last period of the game. Selfish workers
accept a contract offer if the wage at least covers the stipulated effort costs. Fair workers
will accept a contract if
w − c(e) + g(w − c(eˆ)) ≥ 0.
Given our assumptions about x˜, firms need to pay (possibly low, but) positive monetary
rents to induce fair workers to accept an offer. Since the production function is efficient,
firms always offer a contract rather then staying out of the market. The optimal terms
of the contract depend on the subjective probability of facing a fair worker, denoted by
2Note that we rule out the possibility that firms hire two workers and elicit different effort levels from
each worker. This corresponds to assuming that a single firm does not offer both bad and good jobs.
However, allowing for this possibility would not change the existence of the segmentation equilibrium
that is our focus, although existence would be for a more restricted range of parameters.
3Endogenizing atk would not change the characteristics of feasible equilibria. In particular, no-shirking
conditions for separation rates 0 < atk < 1 can be derived analogously to conditions (A.1) and (A.3)
below.
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λˆ. If, for instance, λˆ = 1, a firm expects to face a fair worker with certainty and thus
pays wages equal to the sum of effort and the psychological costs. The efficiency of
the production technology implies that employment of two workers with maximal effort
exertion is optimal in this case. Thus, there exists a cutoff λ˜ such that for all beliefs
λˆ ≥ λ˜, firms use a homogeneous contracting strategy of hiring two workers, that involves
paying wages to cover both types of costs, and workers exert the maximum effort level.
Maintaining λˆ > λ¯, in the second-to-last period backward induction implies that fair
workers accept the same offer as before, since they do not expect any future utility rents.
In contrast, selfish workers may anticipate a positive rent in the next period. Nevertheless,
they do not accept any offer involving negative current rents, because this would reveal
their type. If they did, the firm would have an incentive to renegotiate in the next period,
and offer rents equivalent to the value of unemployment which is zero in the last period.
However, selfish workers always accept the contract needed to employ fair types, which
ensures positive current and future rents. For any stipulated level of effort, the rent needed
to hire selfish workers is therefore weakly larger than in the last period, while the rent
for fair types is the same. This makes it even less attractive than in the last period for
firms to offer a contract that only attracts selfish workers, and thus firms offer the same
contract terms as in the last period.
Assuming that there are enough fair types in the population such that λ ≥ λ˜, this
argument holds for all previous periods. This implies for all periods that (i) firms offer
a wage-effort combination that induces maximal effort provision, (ii) firms always hire
two workers and the level of unemployment is thus minimal, and (iii) all workers accept
posted contracts.
Equilibria with non-verifiable effort: If effort is non-verifiable, the type of equilib-
rium depends on the shape of firms’ production technology and the psychological cost
function for fair workers. Since our main interest is to illustrate how contractual in-
completeness can give rise to equilibria involving endogenous unemployment and market
segmentation, we concentrate on the existence of these segmentation equilibria. As a first
step we show that the endgame of the model features positive continuation values. Sec-
ond, we characterize the no-shirking conditions for both worker types in pre-final periods.
Third, assuming positive continuation values from period t, we pin down the conditions
leading to a segmentation equilibrium in period t− 1.
Endgame and continuation value: Selfish workers always choose to shirk in the final
period. In contrast, fair workers fulfill their contract if their effort cost is smaller than their
psychological return from fulfilling the contract. Anticipating this behavior of workers,
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firms either stay out of the market or offer wages such that fair workers are indifferent
between working and shirking. The latter is profitable if there exists at least one effort
level ei such that either a one- or a two-worker firm expects positive payoffs from inducing
ei, given its belief λˆ that it faces a fair worker.
Assumption A.2.
∃ ei : λzi − (g
−1(ci) + ci) > 0 or λ
2zn+i + 2(1− λ)λzi − 2(g
−1(ci) + ci) > 0.
Assumption A.2 ensures that there are enough fair types such that firms are willing to
offer contracts with positive wages in the one-shot version of the game.4 This generates
positive continuation values for workers in the pre-final period, if there has not been any
screening in previous periods. Note that all firms use homogeneous contracting strategies
that involve positive rents in the final period.5 Hence, unemployment is involuntary from
a worker’s perspective. We denote the value of a job for a worker of type j who is employed
by a firm of type k in period t by V tk,j. The value of unemployment in period for a worker
of type j is denoted by V tu,j . We set all continuation values to zero in period T + 1 and
denote by Lt1w, L
t
2w the number of jobs in one-worker and two-worker firms in period t.
No-shirking conditions for workers in pre-final periods: We start the analysis of
pre-final periods by characterizing worker behavior. Workers trade off the short-run gains
of low effort costs due to shirking against potential long-run costs due to higher risk of
dismissal and unemployment. Let wt−1k and eˆ
t−1
k denote the wage and desired effort level,
offered by a firm of type k in period t− 1. For a fair worker, the no-shirking condition in
period t− 1 is then:
wt−1k − c
t−1
k + g(w
t−1
k − c
t−1
k ) + (1− r)
[
(1− bt−1k )V
t
kf + b
t−1
k V
t
uf
]
≥ wt−1k + (1− r)V
t
uf
(A.1)
⇒ wt−1k ≥ g
−1
[
ct−1k + (1− r)(b
t−1
k − 1)(V
t
kf − V
t
uf )
]
+ ct−1k . (A.2)
A fair worker’s utility in case of contract fulfillment (left hand side of equation (A.1))
consists of four components. The worker earns the current period’s wage wt−1k , bears the
4Strictly speaking, fair types are not necessary for a final-period rent if workers can generate positive
output without incurring effort costs (i.e., if c1 = 0 and z1, zn+1 > 0, as was the case in our exper-
imental setting). In this case, firms could profitably offer minimal, but positive worker rents in the
final period, which in turn opens up the possibility for “reputation equilibria”, even when all workers
are selfish. Empirically, final-period rents are substantially above this level, and many workers exert
non-minimal effort in the final period; thus, an equilibrium based on fair types is better supported by
the data (see our discussion in section 3.4.1).
5Since all firms are of the same type in the last period, we require that either firm type may rehire a
worker from the pre-final period, using the final-period contract terms.
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cost of effort ct−1k , experiences psychological utility g(·), and receives the continuation
value conditional on contract fulfillment. In case of shirking (right hand side of (A.1)),
the worker saves the effort cost and experiences no psychological utility. Furthermore, the
current firm does not renew the worker’s contract in the next period. Hence, the worker
only receives the value of unemployment V tuf in the next period, which compromises the
likelihood of finding a job of either type, and the likelihood of remaining unemployed in
that period.
Selfish workers are not subject to the psychological cost, and since wages are paid before
efforts are revealed, their effort choice is independent of the current period’s wage. Selfish
workers thus exert effort in period t− 1 if:
wt−1k − c
t−1
k + (1− r)
[
(1− bt−1k )V
t
ks + b
t−1
k V
t
us
]
≥ wt−1k + (1− r)V
t
us (A.3)
⇔ V tks − V
t
us ≥
ct−1k
(1− r)(1− bt−1k )
.
Denote by Bt(ei, V
t
us) the set of all vectors of separation rates (b
t
1w, b
t
2w) such that selfish
types are willing to exert effort ei in both types of firms, for a given value of unemployment
V tus. Note that B
t may be empty for some effort levels, if future rents cannot compensate
selfish types for the respective effort costs in the given period, as it is for instance the case
in the final period of the game. Moreover, define the set B¯t = Bt(en,maxLt V
t
us), which
constitutes the set of separation rates for which the highest effort level is implementable
even in the case of minimal unemployment threat.
In what follows, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for separation rates to
be in B¯t. For a worker of type j in period t the value of unemployment is given by:
V tuj =
(bt−11w − 1)L
t−1
1w + L
t
1w
U + (1 + bt−11w )L
t−1
1w + b
t−1
2w L
t−1
2w
V t1w,j +
(bt−12w − 1)L
t−1
2w + L
t
2w
U + (1 + bt−11w )L
t−1
1w + b
t−1
2w L
t−1
2w
V t2w,j
+
[
1−
(bt−11w − 1)L
t−1
1w + L
t
1w
U + (1 + bt−11w )L
t−1
1w + b
t−1
2w L
t−1
2w
−
(bt−12w − 1)L
t−1
2w + L
t
2w
U + (1 + bt−11w )L
t−1
1w + b
t−1
2w L
t−1
2w
]
V t+1uj (1− r).
The equation illustrates the three components of the value of unemployment in period
t: finding a new job in either a one-worker firm, or a two-worker firm, or remaining
unemployed in that period. V tuj is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Depending
on the contract renewal strategies of either firm type in period t − 1, it is more or less
likely to get hired in a corresponding job in period t. The total derivative with respect to
the number of one-worker jobs Lt−11w , shows that V
t
uj is monotone in L
t−1
1w . Hence, V
t
uj is
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smaller than the maximum of its boundary values:
lim
Lt−1
1w →
N
2
V tuj =
(bt−11w − 1)
N
2
+ Lt1w
U + (1 + bt−11w )
N
2
V t1w,j +
Lt2w
U + (1 + bt−11w )
N
2
V t2w,j +
U + Lt1w
U + (1 + bt−11w )
N
2
V t+1uj (1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H1,j(b
t−1
1w ,b
t−1
2w )
lim
Lt−1
1w →0
V tuj =
Lt1w
U + bt−12w N
V t1w,j +
(bt−12w − 1)N + L
t
2w
U + bt−12w N
V t2w,j +
U + Lt1w
U + bt−12w N
V t+1uj (1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H2,j(b
t−1
1w ,b
t−1
2w )
.
H1 and H2 represent the value of unemployment for maximal and minimal level of unem-
ployment, respectively. Since the maximal value of unemployment is, thus, well defined
for each combination of separation rates, so is the set B¯t. A necessary and sufficient
condition for a vector of separation rates to be in B¯t is thus:
V tks −max
{
H1,s(b
t−1
1w , b
t−1
2w ), H2,s(b
t−1
1w , b
t−1
2w )
}
≥
cn
(1− r)(1− bt−1k )
, k ∈ {1w, 2w}.
Sufficient conditions for a segmentation equilibrium in pre-final periods: In
the following we derive conditions for segmentation equilibria to arise, given separation
rates that induce selfish workers to work. As discussed in the text, the data indicate that
selfish types are indeed willing to work in pre-final periods of the experiment, consistent
with such an equilibrium.
Condition 1. There exist (b1w, b2w) ∈ B¯
t such that for all ci ≤ cj:
(a) Γt−11 (b1w, b2w, cj, ci) < zn+i − zj < Γ
t−1
2 (b1w, b2w, cj, ci)
(b) (1− bk)N ≤ L
t
k
Γt−11 and Γ
t−1
2 will be defined in the course of the proof and depend on the fairness
consideration of workers. They represent the difference in wage payments in one- and two-
worker firms for the tightest labor market (Γt−11 ) and the least tight labor market (Γ
t−1
2 ).
The essence of part (a) of Condition 1 is that the production function is (i) “sufficiently
concave”such that the output differential between one-worker and two-worker firms cannot
become too large and (ii) steep enough such that a one-worker strategy inducing high
effort does not dominate a two-worker strategy with lower effort levels for all possible
labor market conditions. Part (b) of Condition 1 is purely technical: it guarantees that
the number of jobs in period t is larger or equal to the number of workers who have their
contract renewed.
Lemma A.1. Suppose Condition 1 is fulfilled, the continuation values satisfy (1−r)V t+1uf <
V t2w,f , V
t
1w,f , and λˆ = λ. Then there exist an equilibrium with a segmented labor market in
period t− 1 that exhibits the following properties:
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1. Effort levels et−11w ≥ e
t−1
2w are realized in one- and two-worker firms, respectively,
with wages wt−11w ≥ w
t−1
2w such that fair workers are indifferent between working and
shirking.
2. Fair and selfish workers exert effort for the given wages and shirk if they get paid
less.
3. There is a number Lt−11w > 0 of one-worker firms, a number L
t−1
2w > 0 of two-worker
firms, and a number of Lt−11w + U unemployed agents.
4. Workers who do not exert the stipulated effort level or who are known to be self-
ish are fired with certainty, those who exert the contractually stipulated effort have
separation rates of (bt−11w , b
t−1
2w ) ∈ B
t−1.
5. From a fair worker’s perspective, high-effort jobs in one-worker firms yield higher
rents than jobs in two-worker firms, which in turn yield higher rents than unem-
ployment.
To prove the lemma we first characterize firms’ optimal wage-effort schedules for given
behavior of workers and given separation rates. In a second step, we show that there
is an intermediate number of one-worker firms and corresponding separation rates, such
that the derived wage-effort schedules for one-worker and two-worker firms are equally
profitable for firms. This gives rise to a segmentation equilibrium, if the offered wage-
effort schedules are incentive compatible for workers, which we show in the last step.
In any period, firms decide first on the wage and stipulated effort level. For any level of
effort a firm pays wages to set fair workers indifferent between working and shirking. If a
firm offered a contract with a lower wage, all workers would shirk, thereby decreasing firms
profits. An offer of a higher wage inducing the same effort clearly also diminishes firm
profits. We denote by et−11w , e
t−1
2w the profit-maximizing levels of effort given the value of
unemployment and implied wage payments.6 Effort in one-worker firms needs to be higher
than in two-worker firms. Otherwise firms could profitably deviate, due to the decreasing
returns to scale production function. To see this, suppose the opposite et−11w < e
t−1
2w . From
the optimal behavior of the firms we know:
f(et−11w )− w
t−1
1w ≥ f(e
t−1
2w )− w
t−1
2w and f(2e
t−1
2w )− 2w
t−1
2w ≥ f(2e
t−1
1w )− 2w
t−1
1w
⇒ 2(f(et−12w )− f(e
t−1
1w )) ≤ f(2e
t−1
2w )− f(2e
t−1
1w ).
This is a contradiction to Assumption A.1.
6If firms are indifferent between two or more levels of induced effort, we assume that there is a tie
breaking rule that is homogeneous across firms.
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From the fair workers’ no-shirking condition (A.2), and the observation that future
rents of employed workers exceed those of unemployed agents for at least one firm type,
we know that there are wage-effort schedules such that the wage is below g−1(ci) + ci.
Since the production technology is efficient (Assumption A.1), firms will offer the most
profitable contract rather than leaving the market. The decision of firms then boils down
to deciding whether to employ only one worker or two workers. A one-worker strategy is
more profitable if:
zt−11w − w
t−1
1w > z
t−1
2w − 2w
t−1
2w
⇔ 0 < zt−11w − (g
−1(ct−11w + (1− r)(b
t−1
1w − 1)(V
t
1w,f − V
t
uf ) + c
t−1
1w )
− zt−12w + 2(g
−1(ct−12w + (1− r)(b
t−1
2w − 1)(V
t
2w,f − V
t
uf )) + c
t−1
2w ) ≡ ∆
Whether this is the case depends on the difference in outputs between one-worker firms
(zt−11w ) and two-worker firms (z
t−1
2w ), and the tightness of the labor market, which determines
V tuf . ∆ is continuous in V
t
uf , therefore a shift in the sign of this inequality leads to at least
one level for the value of unemployment such that firms are indifferent between both
strategies.7 This reversal in the sign of ∆ is given if:8
Γt−11 (b1w, b2w, c
t−1
1w , c
t−1
2w ) ≡ 2g
−1
(
ct−12w + (1− r)(b
t−1
2w − 1)(V
t
2w,f −H1,f )
)
+ 2ct−12w
− g−1
(
ct−11w + (1− r)(b
t−1
1w − 1)(V
t
1w,f −H1,f )
)
− ct−11w
< zt−12w − z
t−1
1w
< 2g−1
(
ct−12w + (1− r)(b
t−1
2w − 1)(V
t
2w,f −H2,f )
)
+ 2ct−12w
− g−1
(
ct−11w + (1− r)(b
t−1
1w − 1)(V
t
1w,f −H2,f )
)
− ct−11w ≡ Γ
t−1
2 (b1w, b2w, c
t−1
1w , c
t−1
2w )
Condition 1 ensures that a combination of separation rates from the set B¯t−1 exists such
that this is fulfilled. Hence, there is a number Lt−11w such that firms are indifferent between
both strategies. This gives rise to a segmentation equilibrium in which Lt−11w firms employ
only one worker at a high level of effort. These firms do not fill their second vacancy
and thus the equilibrium features endogenous unemployment. Note that the separation
rates in any segmentation equilibrium must be larger than zero. If they are zero, firms
renew all their contracts and there are no vacancies in the next period, independently of
the fraction of one-worker firms. The value of unemployment would then be independent
of the current fraction of firms that ration jobs (H1,j = H2,j). Hence, the profitability of
firm strategies would not depend on the labor market conditions
(
Γt−11 = Γ
t−1
2
)
, and one
firm size would dominate the alternative throughout.
7If the optimal induced effort choice changes in the course of varying the number of one-worker firms
from zero to N
2
the segmentation equilibria may feature three different levels of effort.
8There is also a segmentation equilibrium if limLt−1
1w
→
N
2
∆ > 0 > limLt−1
1w
→0
∆. The following analysis
is also valid for this case.
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After firms have observed the effort choice of the worker they decide whether to renew
the contract. In the Lemma we consider the case in which firms have no additional
information about the type of agent they employ compared to those that are unemployed
(λˆ = λ). Hence, there is always an “equally good” worker available, implying that firms
are indifferent between dismissing the worker and renewing the contract. All separation
rates are thus incentive compatible.
Turning to the workers, fair types by construction choose to exert the stipulated effort
level. Furthermore, selfish workers comply to the contract, since the separation rates are
in B¯t−1. Hence, there exists an equilibrium fulfilling properties 1 to 4 from Lemma A.1.
Part 5 of Lemma A.1 implies that the segmentation of the labor market into one- and
two-worker firms has strong consequences for workers. First, a fraction of workers is
unemployed, and this unemployment is involuntary. This follows since an unemployed
agent only receives the discounted value of unemployment from the next period which is
less than what an agent in either job receives (cf. equation (A.1)). Second, from a fair
worker’s perspective, there are two types of jobs: “primary-sector” jobs that pay high rents
for high efforts, and “secondary-sector” jobs with lower rent payments and lower efforts.
This difference arises since workers have some discretion about their effort level. The
higher effort levels in one-worker firms imply higher wages, which in turn yields higher
rents by the no shirking condition of fair types:
V t−11w,f ≥ V
t−1
2w,f ⇔ w
t−1
1w + (1− r)V
t
uf ≥ w
t−1
2w + (1− r)V
t
uf .
This concludes the proof of Lemma A.1.
Proposition A.1. If Condition 1 is fulfilled for all t < T , there exists an equilibrium
with a segmented labor market and involuntary unemployment in all periods t < T .
Since Condition 1 is satisfied for all t, there is an equilibrium with a segmented labor
market in all periods, if (i) (1 − r)V t+1uf < V
t
2w,f , V
t
1w,f and (ii) λˆ = λ hold for all t. The
first follows immediately from the no-shirking condition (A.2), since wages are positive.
Moreover, workers behave homogeneously in every period. As a consequence, screening
is not possible and λˆ = λ in all periods. This implies the existence of a segmentation
equilibrium featuring involuntary unemployment in all periods.
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Dependent variable:
work effort ei 1 if ei < eˆi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage (wi) 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.114*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Desired effort (eˆi) 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.257*** 0.235*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.098***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.075) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Wage coworker (wj) -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Desired effort coworker (eˆj) -0.003 -0.012 -0.011 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.015
(0.064) (0.064) (0.059) (0.068) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
Relational contract 0.400 0.239 -0.186 -0.136** -0.068 0.011
(0.279) (0.287) (0.322) (0.067) (0.066) (0.074)
Market period 0.042 0.030 -0.015*** -0.014**
(0.028) (0.032) (0.005) (0.006)
Final period -1.605*** -1.415** 0.363*** 0.360**
(0.586) (0.716) (0.133) (0.152)
Constant 0.771*** 0.744*** 0.538 1.184*** 0.159** 0.166** 0.271*** 0.103
(0.243) (0.230) (0.365) (0.445) (0.073) (0.071) (0.088) (0.105)
N 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452
Worker fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
Table A.2.: Influence of co-worker wage on effort provision. ∗∗∗ indicates significance on the 1-percent level, ∗∗ significance on the 5-percent
level, ∗ significance on the 10-percent level. All models are estimated with random effects at the firm and session level.
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A.2.3. Instructions of the experiment (IC Treatment)
In what follows, we present a translation of the instructions for buyers (i.e., employers) in
the IC treatment. The instructions for workers in this treatment had a similar structure.
The instructions of participants in the C treatment differed only in the description of the
second stage (i.e., the work phase).
Instructions for Buyers
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions
carefully. Everything that you need to know to participate in this experiment is explained
below. Should you have any difficulties in understanding these instructions please raise
your hand. We will answer your questions at your cubicle.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 8 euros. During
the experiment you can increase your income by earning points. The amount of points
that you earn during the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions of other
participants.
All points that you earn during the experiment will be converted into euros at the end of
the experiment. The exchange rate is:
1 Point = 4 cents
At the end of the experiment, the amount of money that you earned during
the experiment will be paid out in cash.
The experiment consists of several periods. In each period you have to make decisions
which you enter in a computer. There will be 18 periods in total.
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the
entire experiment. In addition we would like to point out that you may only use the
computer functions which are required for the experiment. Violations of these rules will
lead to exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we shall be glad
to assist you.
Prior to the experiment, the 24 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers.
There are 7 buyers and 17 sellers in the experiment.
You will be a buyer for the entire duration of the experiment. All participants
have received an identification number which they will keep for the entire experiment.
You can find your identification number on the documentation sheet in front of you.
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Short Overview of the Experimental Procedures
In each period of the experiment every buyer can trade a product with zero, one, or two
sellers. The seller earns profits when he sells the product at a price which exceeds his
production costs. The buyer earns profits when the price she pays for the product is less
than her valuation of the product. The production costs of the traded product as well as
the buyer’s valuation of the product depend on the quality of the product. In addition,
the value of the product for the buyer depends on the number of products bought. Two
products of a certain quality are worth more, but not twice as much as one product of
the same quality.
The experiment lasts for 18 periods. In each period, procedures are as follows.
1. Each period commences with a trading phase that lasts for 200 seconds. During this
phase buyers can submit trade offers which can be accepted by sellers. When submitting
an offer a buyer has to specify three variables:
• Which price she offers to pay
• which product quality she desires
• and finally, which sellers she wants to submit the offer to. Buyers can submit two
types of offers: private offers and public offers. Private offers are submitted to
one specific seller and can only be accepted by that seller. Public offers are
submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any seller.
As a buyer you can submit as many offers as you like in each period. Once submitted, offers
can be accepted at any time. Each seller can at most conclude one trade agreement
in each period. Each buyer can at most conclude two trade agreements per
period. As there are 7 buyers and 17 sellers in total, some sellers will not trade in each
period.
2. After the trading phase, every seller who concluded a trade agreement has to determine
which product quality he provides to his buyer. The seller does not have to provide
the product quality desired by the buyer.
Once every seller has chosen his product quality, earnings of all participants for the given
period are determined. Subsequently, the next period starts. Earnings of all 18 periods
will be summed up at the end of the experiment, converted into euros and paid out in
cash together with your initial endowment.
The Experimental Procedures in Detail
There are 7 buyers and 17 sellers in the experiment. You are a buyer for the entire
duration of the experiment. During the experiment you enter your decisions in a computer.
In the following, we describe in detail how you make your decisions in each period.
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1. The Trading Phase
Each period begins with a trading phase. During the trading phase the buyers can con-
clude trade agreements with the sellers. In order to do so, each buyer can submit as
many trade offers as she wishes. In each trading phase you will see the following
screen.
In the top left corner of the screen you will see the current period of the experiment. In
the top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this trading phase,
displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each period lasts 200 seconds. When
this time is up the trading phase is over, and no further offers can be submitted or accepted
in this period.
Once you see the screen displayed, the trading phase starts. As a buyer, you now have
the opportunity to submit trade offers to the sellers. In order to do so you have to enter
three variables on the right hand side of the screen:
(A) First, you have to specify whether you want to submit a public or private offer:
Public offers
Public offers are communicated to all participants in the market. All sellers see all public
offers on their screens. A public offer can therefore be accepted by any seller. As a
buyer, you will also see all public offers submitted by the other buyers. If you want to
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submit a public offer, please click on the field “public” using the mouse.
Private offers
Private offers are submitted to one seller only. Only this seller will be informed about
the offer and only this seller can accept the trade offer. No other seller or buyer will be
informed about the offer. If you want to submit a private offer, please click on the field
“private” using the mouse. In the next field, you have to specify to which seller you
want to submit the offer. Each of the 17 sellers has an identification number (Seller1,
Seller2, ..., Seller17). Each seller keeps his identification number for the entire duration
of the experiment. To submit an offer to a specific seller, please enter the number of that
seller (e.g. “4” for Seller4).
(B) Once you have specified who you want to submit an offer to, you have to determine
which price you offer. You enter the price into the field “your price”. The price you
offer must not be below 0 or above 100:
0 ≤ Price ≤ 100
(C) Finally, you have to specify which product quality you desire. You enter this in the
field “desired quality”. Your desired quality cannot be lower than 1 or higher than 10.
1≤ Desired quality ≤ 10
After you have fully specified your trade offer, you have to click the“OK”button to submit
it. As long as you have not clicked “OK” you can still change your offer. After you click
“OK” the offer will be displayed to all sellers to whom it has been submitted.
On the left side of your screen you see the heading “public offers”. All public offers in
the current trading phase will be displayed here—your public offers as well as the public
offers of all other buyers. You can see which buyer submitted the offer, which price she
offered and which quality she desired. All buyers also have an identification number that
they keep throughout the experiment (Buyer1, Buyer2, ..., Buyer7).
In the middle column of the screen, under the header “your private offers” you will see all
private offers that you have submitted in the current trading phase. Here you can see to
which sellers you made an offer, which price you offered and which quality you desired.
As long as none of your offers has been accepted by a seller, you as a buyer
can submit as many private and public offers as you wish in a given period.
Each offer that you submit can be accepted at any time during the trading phase.
As soon as one of your offers has been accepted, you are informed which seller accepted
the offer and which of your offers has been accepted. In the bottom left corner of your
screen the identification number of the seller who accepted the offer will be displayed,
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together with your offered price and your desired quality. At the same time all your other
offers will be automatically canceled.
You can then decide whether you want to conclude another trade agreement. Each buyer
can conclude zero, one, or two trade agreements in each period. If you want to
conclude another trade agreement you can submit further offers to the sellers. As long as
none of your offers has been accepted by a seller you can offer as many private and public
offers for the second trade as you wish.
If you do not want to conclude another trade agreement you can press the button “finish
trading phase”. This reduces the length of the trading phase in case no other buyer wants
to submit further offers. By pressing the button, the offers you have already submitted
will be automatically canceled and you can not submit further offers. Trade agreements
which were already accepted by a seller of course persist. In addition, you will continue
to see the screen of the trading phase until it is over.
Each seller can conclude at most one trade agreement in a given period. You
will be constantly informed which sellers have not yet concluded a trade agreement. In
the table with the title “The following sellers have already concluded a contract” you can
see 17 fields. Once a seller has accepted an offer, a “+” will appear in the field below
his identification number. You cannot submit private offers to a seller who has already
accepted an offer.
The trading phase is over as soon as one of the following occurs: 200 seconds have
elapsed, or all buyers have concluded two trade agreements, or the remaining buyers have
signalled that they do not want to conclude trade agreements anymore by pressing the
button “finish trading phase”.
No buyer is obliged to submit trade offers, and no seller is obliged to accept a trade offer.
2. Determination of actual product quality
After the trading phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade agreement determine which
product quality they will supply to their buyer. First, the sellers see again the price and
the desired quality on a new screen. If you have concluded two trade agreements in a given
period your sellers can also see the price and the desired quality of your other seller. The
sellers then decide independently which actual product quality to choose for their product.
The product quality which you desired in your trade offer is not binding for
your seller(s). Your seller can choose exactly the quality you desired, but he can also
choose a higher or lower product quality. The product quality that your seller chooses
has to be an integer between 1 and 10:
1 ≤ Actual product quality ≤ 10
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 106
While the sellers determine the actual product quality, we will ask you on a separate
screen to specify which quality(ies) you expect him (them) to supply. In addition we ask
you to state how sure you are about this expectation.
How are incomes calculated?
Your income:
If you have not concluded a trade agreement during a trading phase you earn an
income of 0 points in this period.
If you have concluded one trade agreement, your income depends on the price you paid
and the product quality your seller supplied to you. Your income equals 10 times the
actual product quality minus the price you paid. Your income thus amounts to:
Your income = 10*Actual product quality - Price
If you have concluded two trade agreements, your income depends on which prices you
paid to the sellers and which product qualities were supplied to you. The value of the
products in total can be higher for you if you conclude two trade agreements, but the
value of each individual product is lower in this case.
In other words, two products of a certain quality are worth more to you than one product
of the same quality; but they are not worth twice as much as one product of the same
quality. If you buy one product you earn 10 times the chosen product quality. If you buy
two products you earn 7 times the quality of the first product and 7 times the quality
of the other product. Of course, when you buy two products you also have to pay two
prices. Your income if you conclude two trade agreements is thus calculated as follows:
Your income = 7*Actual product quality Product 1
+ 7*Actual product quality Product 2 - Price 1 - Price 2
An example: If you conclude one trade agreement and the actual product quality is 8,
your income is 80 minus the price you paid. If you conclude two trade agreements and
both actual product qualities are 8 your income is 112 (=7*8+7*8) minus both prices. If,
for instance, one actual product quality is 8 and the other quality is 1, your income is 63
(= 7*8 + 7*1) minus both prices.
As you can see from the above formula your income generally increases in the product
quality actually supplied by the seller(s). At the same time your income is higher, the
lower the price(s) you have to pay for the product(s).
Income of your seller:
If a seller has not concluded a trade agreement during a trading phase he earns an income
of 0 points in this period.
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If a seller has accepted a trade offer his income will equal the price he receives minus
the production costs he incurs for supplying the product The income of your seller is
determined as follows:
Income of your seller = Price - Production Costs
The production costs of a seller are higher, the higher the quality of the product he
chooses. The production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table below:
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Production costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
The income of your seller increases in the price he receives. Furthermore, his income is
higher, the lower the product quality he supplies.
The incomes of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can
therefore calculate the income of his seller(s) and each seller can calculate the
income of her buyer. In addition, buyers and sellers are informed of the identification
number of their trading partner in a given period.
Please note that buyers and sellers can also incur losses in each period. These losses have
to be covered from your initial endowment or from earnings in other periods.
You will be informed about your income and the income of your seller on a separate
“income screen”. On the screen the following information will be displayed:
• Which seller(s) you traded with
• Which price(s) you paid
• Your desired quality(ies)
• The actual product quality(ies) supplied by your seller(s)
• The income of your seller(s) in this period
• Your income in this period.
Please enter all of the information from this screen into the documentation sheet on your
desk. After the income screen has been displayed, the period is finished. Thereafter the
trading phase of the following period starts. Once you have finished reading the income
screen please click on the “OK” button.
The sellers also see an income screen which displays the above information. They see the
ID of their buyer, the price, the desired and actual product quality as well as their own
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 108
income, your income and—if you have concluded two trade agreements—the income of
your other seller.
The experiment will not start until all participants are completely familiar with all pro-
cedures. In order to make sure that this is the case we ask you to solve the exercises
below.
In addition we will conduct a trial period of the trading phase to familiarize you with
using the computer. This trial phase will not be added to the results of the experiment,
and will not be remunerated. After the trial phase, the experiment which lasts for 18
periods will start.
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A.3. Appendix to Chapter III
A.3.1. Proofs of propositions and lemmas main part
Proof to Proposition 4.1:
Efficient policy choice: Since voters can directly observe candidates’ abilities as well as
their policies, voters have that the belief system σ = a and are able to fully anticipate the
difference in payoffs. The vote share of Candidate 1 is given by:
v1(x1, x2, σ) = 1− Ω(x2(aˆ2(x2)− c)− x1(aˆ1(x1)− c)) = 1− Ω(x2(a2 − c)− x1(a1 − c)).
Candidate 1 chooses x1, taking into account his opponent’s strategy X2, to maximize
U1(x1, a1) =
∫ 1
0
φ(a2)f(v1(x1, x2, σ), ρ) (θ + x1(a1 − c)) da2
As f is strictly increasing in v1, which in turn is strictly increasing in the difference in welfare
contributions, candidate 1 is only interested in maximizing his welfare contribution. Clearly, the
dominant strategy is given by
X1(a1) =
{
xi = 0
xi = 1
for
ai < c
ai ≥ c.
Positive welfare effect of increasing power concentration: To simplify notation,
denote the welfare contribution of player i by pii(xi, σ) = xi(aˆi(xi) − c). We suppress the
dependence on the belief system and the action if possible without creating confusion. Moreover,
let g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) be the expected power share above one half
f(v1(x1, x2, σ), ρ)−
1
2
= g(pi1 − pi2, ρ).
For any candidate there are two cases. He can either face an opponent with a reform proposal
or one that proposed the status quo. The ex ante welfare is the weighted average of these two
alternatives. Given the optimal behavior identified above, welfare in the full information case is
given by
W (ρ) =∫ 1
0
∫ a1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2)
{
pi(X1(a1), σ)
[
1
2
+ g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]
+ pi(X2(a2), σ)
[
1
2
− g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]}
da2da1
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
a1
φ(a1)φ(a2)
{
pi(X1(a1), σ)
[
1
2
+ g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]
+ pi(X2(a2), σ)
[
1
2
− g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]}
da2da1
= 2
∫ 1
0
∫ a1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2)
{
pi(X1(a1), σ)
[
1
2
+ g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]
+ pi(X2(a2), σ)
[
1
2
− g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]}
da2da1.
The derivative of the welfare function with respect to power concentration ρ is given by
dW
dρ
= 2
∫ 1
0
∫ a1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2) [pi(X1(a1), σ)− pi(X2(a2), σ)]
∂g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
∂ρ
da2da1 > 0.
As a1 > a2 under the integral, the payoff difference pi1 − pi2 and g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) are throughout
positive, so that we have ∂g(pi1−pi2,ρ)
∂ρ
> 0 due to the properties of the function f(v, ρ).
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Proof of Lemma 4.1: We only need to deal with the case of a politician with ability lower
than c, since candidates with ability above c always choose to reform. Candidate 1 chooses to
reform if and only if:
prob(x2 = 1)f(v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 1, σ), ρ)(θ + a1 − c)
+ (1− prob(x2 = 1))f(v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 2, σ), ρ)(θ + a1 − c)
− prob(x2 = 1)f(v1(x1 = 0, x2 = 1, σ), ρ)θ − (1− prob(x2 = 1))θ
1
2
> 0.
It can easily be seen that this reform incentive function is strictly monotonously increasing in
the individual ability a. The same argument holds for Candidate 2. Thus, the optimal strategy
of each candidate will always be of the cutoff type.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Depending on the parameter values there may exist equilibria
with cutoff being equal to one. As argued in the text these cannot be divine. In the following
we show that there exists a unique equilibrium exhibiting cutoffs different from 1 and that this
equilibrium features symmetric cutoffs.
Symmetry of cutoffs: Using the insight from above, we can write the incentive function of
player 1 as:
R1(a, α1, α2, ρ) =(1− Φ(α2))f(ρ, v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 1, σ))(θ + a− c)
+ Φ(α2)f(ρ, v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 0, σ))(θ + a− c)
− (1− Φ(α2))f(ρ, v1(x1 = 0, x2 = 1, σ))θ − Φ(α2)
θ
2
.
Using the definition of g(pi1 − pi2, ρ), this simplifies to
R(a, α1, α2) = (1− Φ(α2))
[(
g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) +
1
2
)
(θ + a− c)
]
+Φ(α2)
[(
g(pi1, ρ) +
1
2
)
(θ + a− c)
]
− (1− Φ(α2))
(
1
2
− g(pi2, ρ)
)
θ − Φ(α2)θ
1
2
.
In equilibrium, the reform incentive is zero for the cutoff-type α1.
R1(α1, α1, α2) = 0
⇔
θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2)) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]]
c− α1
=
1
2
+ Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2).
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Subtracting the corresponding equation for R2, we get
θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2)) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]]
c− α1
−
θ [Φ(α1)g(pi2, ρ) + (1− Φ(α1)) [−g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi1, ρ)]]
c− α2
=
Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)− Φ(α1)g(pi2, ρ) + (1− Φ(α1))g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
⇔
[
θΦ(α2)
c− α1
−
θ(1− Φ(α1))
c− α2
− Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ)
−
[
θΦ(α1)
c− α2
−
θ(1− Φ(α2))
c− α1
− Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ)
+
[
(1− Φ(α2))
(
θ
c− α1
− 1
)
+ (1− Φ(α1))
(
θ
c− α2
− 1
)]
g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0.
If α1 = α2, this condition is trivially fulfilled. Assuming wlog α1 > α2, the equality above can
only be satisfied, if [
θΦ(α2)
c− α1
−
θ(1− Φ(α1))
c− α2
− Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ) <[
θΦ(α1)
c− α2
−
θ(1− Φ(α2))
c− α1
− Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ).
However, we have pi1 > pi2 by assumption, which implies g(pi1, ρ) > g(pi2, ρ). Furthermore, we
can show that the factor before g(pi1, ρ) is larger than the one before g(pi2, ρ):
θ
c− α1
Φ(α2)−
θ
c− α2
(1− Φ(α1))− Φ(α2) >
θ
c− α2
Φ(α1)−
θ
c− α1
(1− Φ(α2))− Φ(α1)
⇔
θ
c− α1
+Φ(α1) >
θ
c− α2
+Φ(α2).
The last inequality is clearly fulfilled, generating a contradiction. Thus, the reform incentive
functions R1 and R2 can never attain zero simultaneously for different cutoffs and there are only
symmetric equilibria.
Existence: Let pi denote the difference in welfare contributions between a reform and a status
quo proposal. Making use of the symmetric cutoffs, the incentive function simplifies to:
R(α, ρ) =
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
]
(α− c) + θg(pi, ρ) = 0.
Note that R(1, ρ) is always positive if α = 1. If R(0, ρ) < 0, the reform incentive is equal to zero
at least once, due to the continuity and there exists an interior equilibrium. If R(0, ρ) ≥ 0, it is
an equilibrium that all candidates choose to reform. Hence, there is at least one equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Next, we establish uniqueness. The derivative of the incentive
function with respect to α is:
∂R
∂α
= (θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
(
1
2
+ (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
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The reform incentive function yields that A is always larger than zero in equilibrium for the
cutoff type. B is also larger than zero, due to Assumption 4.1. The reform incentive is thus
increasing at any cutoff. Consequently, there can only be one cutoff value.
Since the incentive function is equal to zero in any informative equilibrium, we use implicit
differentiation to prove that there is a unique θ˜(ρ). The cutoff α is given by the maximum of zero
and the value implying a reform incentive equal to zero. If there is an informative equilibrium
the derivative is given by
dα
dθ
= −
g(pi, ρ)
(θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α
+
(
1
2 + (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
) < 0.
The denominator is positive (see above), as is numerator. Thus, the derivative is strictly negative
in any interior equilibrium. Moreover, the reform incentive implies that α→ c if θ → 0. Hence,
there is a unique θ˜ > 0, such that the unique equilibrium is informative if θ < θ˜.
Proof of Proposition 4.4: Again we use implicit differentiation to evaluate the derivative.
dα
dρ
= −
∂R
∂ρ
∂R
∂α
= −
(θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gρ(pi, ρ)
(θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α
+
(
1
2 + (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
) < 0.
While the numerator is unambiguously positive, the positive sign of the denominator follows
from Assumption 4.2. Hence, the overall effect is negative.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Using the symmetry in equilibrium, the welfare can be simplified
considerably.
W (ρ)
2
=
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(a− c)da︸ ︷︷ ︸
z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
.
Note that there is a direct effect on welfare, since the function g(pi, ρ) depends on ρ and an
indirect effect since ρ changes the strategies of the politicians. Hence, we evaluate the total
derivative of W (ρ):
dW
dρ
=
∂W
∂ρ
+
∂W
∂α
dα
dρ
.
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In the following we denote by D > 0 the denominator of the derivative of α with respect to ρ.
dW
dρ
=Φ(α)z(α)gρ(pi, ρ)+
+
{
(c− α)φ(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
+ z(α)
(
φ(α)g(pi, ρ) + Φ(α)gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α
)}
dα
dρ
=
{
Φ(α)z(α) [θ + (α− c)Φ(α)] gpi
dpi
dα
+Φ(α)z(α)
[
1
2
+ (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
]
−
[
(c− α)φ(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
+ z(α)
(
φ(α)g(pi, ρ) + Φ(α)gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α
)]
[θ +Φ(α)(α− c)]}
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
{
Φ(α)z(α)
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ) + (α− c)φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
]
− [φ(α)θg(pi, ρ) + z(α)φ(α)g(pi, ρ)]
c− α
2g(pi, ρ)
}
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
{
Φ(α)z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
− φ(α)(c− α)
[
θ
2
+ z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)
)]}
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
{
Φ(α)
W (ρ)
2
− φ(α)(c− α)
[
θ
2
+
W (ρ)
2
]}
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
2D
{Φ(α)W (ρ)− φ(α)(c− α) (θ +W (ρ))}
In any equilibrium, the term in brackets has to equal zero, since its factor is always positive.
Rearranging, we get the following necessary and sufficient condition for extreme values of the
welfare function:
h(ρ) ≡
Φ(α)
φ(α)(c− α)
−
(
1 +
θ
W (ρ)
)
= 0.
Next, we prove that function h has at most one root in ρ, i. e., the welfare function attains at
most one maximum. Assumption 4.2 is a sufficient condition for the first term to be decreasing
in ρ and, thus, increasing in α. In any extreme value of the welfare function, the second term
is constant in ρ. Thus, h is decreasing in each root and so is the term in brackets. As h(ρ) is
continuous in ρ, this implies that the welfare function has at most one interior maximum and
no interior minimum, i. e., it is strictly quasi-concave.
Proof of Proposition 4.5: In the next step, we show how the derived maximum shifts with
changes in θ. For θ → 0 we get from the equilibrium condition α = c. The derivative of the
welfare function at θ = 0 is given by:
dW (ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
θ=0
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
Φ(α)W (ρ).
This is positive. Hence, for θ → 0 the optimal institution embodies full concentration of power.
Due to continuity, this is also true for an interval around 0. Finally, we show that the optimal
ρ decreases monotonically in θ.
dρ∗
dθ
= −
dh(ρ)
dθ
dh(ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
ρ=ρ∗
.
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As argued before the term in the denominator is negative. With respect to the numerator, note
that the equilibrium cutoff α is decreasing in θ, dα
dθ
= − g(pi,ρ)
D
< 0. Consequently, the same is
true for welfare, dW
dθ
= ∂W
∂α
dα
dθ
< 0. Hence, h is monotonically decreasing in θ. In total, we
conclude that dρ
∗
dθ
< 0.
A.3.2. Proofs of propositions and lemmas extensions
Proof of Proposition 4.6: The cutoff θ¯(ρ) is defined by θ¯ = c2g(pi,ρ) . At this point a
candidate with ability equal to zero is indifferent between proposing a reform or the status quo.
θ¯ is decreasing in ρ. For ρ→ 0, we get that g(pi, ρ)→ 0 implying θ¯ →∞. Hence, for any given
θ there is a ρ such that only informative equilibria can exist. Due to the monotonicity of ¯θ(ρ),
there is exactly one cutoff ρ¯(θ), such that for all ρ < ρ¯(θ) the unique divine equilibrium must be
informative.
Proof of Proposition 4.8: For the case of limited commitment, the proofs of Proposition
1-5 need to be considered one by one. We shorten the argumentation, whenever it is equivalent
or very similar to the case with full commitment. The proof of Proposition 4.1 does not rely on
full commitment and thus conveys to the new setting.
Proof of Lemma 4.1 with limited commitment: We only need to deal with the case
of a politician with ability lower than c, since candidates with ability above c always choose to
reform. Limited commitment changes the payoff from entering office from θ+a−c to θ+λ(a−c).
The rest of the proof is equivalent to the case with full commitment.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 with limited commitment: We just need to prove symmetry
of cutoffs. The proof with regard to the classification of equilibria is identical to the case with
full commitment. In equilibrium, the reform incentive with limited commitment simplifies to:
R1(α1, α1, α2) =
θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ2) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]] +
λ(α1 − c)
[
1
2
+ Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2)
]
= 0
⇔
θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2)) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]]
λ(c− α1)
=
1
2
+ Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2).
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Subtracting the corresponding equation for the second player and proceeding as in the proof
with full commitment, we obtain
⇔
[
θΦ(α2)
λ(c− α1)
−
θ(1− Φ(α1))
λ(c− α2)
− Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ)+[
(1− Φ(α2))
(
θ
λ(c− α1)
− 1
)
+ (1− Φ(α1))
(
θ
λ(c− α2)
− 1
)]
g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
=
[
θΦ(α1)
λ(c− α2)
−
θ(1− Φ(α2))
λ(c− α1)
− Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ).
If α1 = α2, this condition is trivially fulfilled. Assuming wlog α1 > α2, the equality above
implies that[
θΦ(α2)
λ(c− α1)
−
θ(1− Φ(α1))
λ(c− α2)
− Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ) <
[
θΦ(α1)
λ(c− α2)
−
θ(1− Φ(α2))
λ(c− α1)
− Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ).
However, we have pi1 > pi2. Moreover, we can show that
θ
λ(c− α1)
Φ(α2)−
θ
λ(c− α2)
(1− Φ(α1))− Φ(α2) >
θ
λ(c− α2)
Φ(α1)−
θ
λ(c− α1)
(1− Φ(α2))− Φ(α1)
⇔
θ
λ(c− α1)
+ Φ(α1) >
θ
λ(c− α2)
+ Φ(α2).
Thus, the reform incentive functions R1 and R2 can never simultaneously attain zero for α1 > α2,
implying that there can only be symmetric equilibria.
Existence: The reform incentive function simplifies to
R(α, ρ) =
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
]
λ(α− c) + θg(pi, ρ) = 0.
Note that it is always positive if α = 1. If R(0, ρ) < 0, the reform incentive is equal to zero at
least once, due to the continuity and there exists an interior equilibrium. If R(0, ρ) ≥ 0, it is an
equilibrium that all candidates choose to reform. Hence, there is at least one equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.3 with limited commitment: Next, we establish uniqueness.
The derivative with respect to α is:
∂R
∂α
= (θ + (α− c)λΦ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+λ
(
1
2
+ (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
The remainder of the proof is equivalent to the case with perfect commitment.
Proof of Proposition 4.4 with limited commitment: We use implicit differentiation
to prove the proposition:
dα
dρ
= −
∂R
∂ρ
∂R
∂α
= −
(θ + λ(α− c)Φ(α))gρ(pi, ρ)
(θ + (α− c)λΦ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)
∂pi
∂α
+ λ
(
1
2 + (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
) < 0.
While the numerator is unambiguously positive, the positive sign of the denominator follows
from Assumption 4.1.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5 with limited commitment: The welfare can be simplified
to:
W (ρ)
2
=
(
λ
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(a− c)da+ (1− λ)
∫ 1
c
φ(a)(a− c)da
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
.
The total derivative of the welfare function can be simplified along the same lines as with full
commitment and yields the same equilibrium condition
h(ρ) =
Φ(α)
φ(α)(c− α)
−
(
1 +
θ
W (ρ)
)
= 0.
Thus, the rest of the proof is equivalent.
For the second step, we have to show how the unique maximum changes with θ. For θ → 0
we get from the reform incentive α = c and
dW (ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
θ=0
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
Φ(α)λW (ρ).
This is positive. Hence, for θ → 0 the optimal institution is full power concentration. Due to
continuity we get that this is also true for an interval around 0. Since h(ρ, α) does not change
with limited commitment we again refer the reader to the proofs for full commitment to see that
the optimal ρ is monotonically decreasing in θ.
Proof of Proposition 4.9: In all proofs of Appendix A.3.1 we use only one important
feature of the vote share vi(x1, x2, σ). This is, the vote share is weakly increasing in the expected
abilities of the candidates and thus in the difference of welfare contributions. In the following
we show that this still holds for the case of heterogeneous policy preferences. All other proofs
do not change. In the new setting, voter i votes for candidate 1 if:
x1(µ1iaˆ1 − c) ≥ x2(µ2i aˆ2 − c)
If both propose a reform, the vote share for candidate one is:
v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 1, σ) =
∫ l
k
∫ µ1aˆ1
aˆ2
k
ξ(µ2)ξ(µ1).
The derivative with respect to aˆ1 is positive, since we assume the mean of the preferences to be
larger than zero. If candidate 1 faces a status quo proposing opponent, his expected vote shares
is
v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 0, σ) =
∫ l
c
aˆ1
ξ(µ1).
The derivative with respect to the expected ability of Candidate 1 is again positive. In the third
case, where Candidate 1 proposes the status quo, the vote share does not depend on the expected
ability, since the payoff does neither. Hence, the expected overall vote share of candidate i is
weakly increasing in his expected competence and, thus, his welfare contribution.
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Proof of Lemma 4.3: In an informative equilibrium, the expected utility of voter k with
reform preference µk is given by
V (µk, ρ) = 2
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
.
It is strictly increasing in µk, and negative for any µk ≤ c. Its derivative with respect to power
concentration follows as
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
= 2Φ(α)
dg
dρ
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
+2
[(
φ(α)g +Φ(α)
dg
dρ
)∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
−φ(α)(c− µα)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)]
dα
dρ
= 2
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
(Φ(α) + φ(α− c))
dg
dρ
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
+2
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
φ(α)(c− µα)
dα
dρ
=
gρ
D
{
[Φ(α)− φ(α)(c− α)]
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
−φ(α)(c− µα)
θ
2
}
For any ρ ≤ ρ∗(θ), the term Φ(α)− φ(c−α) is positive by Proposition 4.5 and Assumption 4.2.
Thus, the expected utility of every voter with µk < c is strictly decreasing in ρ on this interval.
By a similar argument as used in Lemma 4.2, it can be shown that V (µk, ρ) has at most one
minimizer. For the limit case ρ → ∞, however, we find that dV
dρ
≤ 0. In this limit, we have
g(pi, ρ) = 1, which implies θ ≥ [1 + Φ(α)] (c − α) and a negative sign of the bracket in the last
line above. Thus, V (µk, ρ) is monotonically decreasing in ρ.
Proof of Proposition 4.10: The proof consists of two steps. First we show that there ex-
ists at least one maximum for some ρ < ρ∗, second we ensure that there can never be a maximum
for any ρ ≥ ρ∗. Note that the expected utility V (µk, ρ) is increasing in the reform preference
µk. Due to the strict concavity of w, this directly implies that w
′(V (µk, ρ)) > w
′(V (µ′k, ρ)) for
any µk < µ
′
k. Moreover, the marginal effect of ρ on the expected utilities is
d2V (µk, ρ)
dρ dµk
=
2gρ(pi, ρ)
D
[(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
(Φ(α) + φ(α)(α− c))
∫ 1
α
aφ(a)da+
θ
2
αφ(α)
]
.
Take any welfare function of an inequality averse society:
WIA(ρ) =
∫ µ¯
µ
w(V (µk, ρ))ξ(µk)dµk
Its derivative with respect to ρ is
dWIA(ρ)
dρ
=
∫ µ¯
µ
w′(V (µk, ρ))
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
ξ(µk)dµk.
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For the case of ρ′ < ρ∗, the cross derivative d
2V (µk,ρ)
dρ dµk
is larger than zero. All terms of it are always
positive except for (Φ(α) + φ(α− c)). This however is positive for all ρ′ ≤ ρ∗ (see Proposition
4.5 and Assumption 4.2). The positive cross derivative yields
dWIA(ρ)
dρ
=
∫ µ¯
µ
w′(V (µk, ρ))
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
ξ(µk)dµk <
dW (ρ)
dρ
=
∫ µ¯
µ
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
ξ(µk)dµk.
The derivatives of the expected utility are smaller for voters with smaller µ. Exactly these
utilities are weighted more strongly in the case of inequality aversion, since w′(V (µk, ρ)) >
w′(V (µ′k, ρ)). Hence, the derivative of the welfare function at ρ
∗ is negative and there exists at
least one local maximum for a ρ′ < ρ∗.
Now consider the case of ρ′ > ρ∗, where dW
dρ
< 0. If the cross derivative is still positive for
any ρ′ > ρ∗, we have that dWIA
dρ
∣∣∣
ρ′
< dW
dρ
∣∣∣
ρ′
< 0 and there can not be a maximum at ρ′. Suppose
that the cross derivative is negative at ρ′. From Lemma 4.3 we know that the marginal effect
of ρ is negative for voters with µ < c. As a consequence of the negative cross derivative, the
marginal effect is negative for all agents. Thus, the derivative of the welfare function is certainly
negative. Overall there cannot be any maximum in the range [ρ∗,∞).
A.3.3. Additional figures and tables
Description and sources of variables
Growth in real GDP per capita Average growth rate. Self calculated based on
GDP in 2000 US$. World Bank.
GDP per capita Denominated in thousand year 2000 US$. World Bank.
Office motivation International Social Survey Panel,
module “Citizenship 1”, 2004.
Power dispersion Lijphart’s index for executive-parties dimension.
Lijphart (1999).
Checks and balances Number of veto players. Keefer and Stasavage (2003).
Plurality electoral system Dummy variable. Beck et al. (2001).
Electoral system Type of electoral system, 9 minor categories.
IDEA (2004).
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Country list
Australia Austria Canada Denmark
Finland France Germany Ireland
Israel Japan Netherlands Norway
Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland
United Kingdom United States
Summary of variables
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Poss. values
Power dispersion 0.31 0.98 −1.21 1.77 [-2,2]
Office motivation 3.37 0.37 2.61 4.20 [1,5]
GDP p.c. 26.98 7.69 11.55 39.83
GDP p.c. growth
(2004-2011)
0.68 0.74 −0.61 2.40
GDP p.c. growth
(1991-2004)
2.08 1.07 0.56 5.59
Correlation between variables
Power Office GDP p.c. growth
dispersion motivation GDP p.c. (2004-2011)
Office motivation −0.20 1
(0.43)
GDP p.c. 0.20 −0.58 1
(0.43) (0.01)
GDP p.c. growth 0.44 0.072 −0.15 1
(2004-2011) (0.07) (0.78) (0.56)
GDP p.c. growth −0.27 −0.10 −0.021 −0.48
(1991-2004) (0.28) (0.69) (0.93) (0.05)
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, p-values in parentheses
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